ITO V. Shakti Insulated Wires (P.) Ltd. We are of the opinion that the Assessing Officer has wrongly considered the facts available on record and without understanding the details of purchases and its availability in closing stock, made the disallowance on flimsy grounds. Therefore, we uphold the order of the Ld CIT (A).
ACIT v. Deepak S. Bheda The Assessing Officer denied the benefit claimed by the assessee under section 54 EC towards the investment made in REC bonds for a sum of Rs. 50 lakh out of total long-term capital gain of Rs. 3.40 crores. The Assessing Officer was of the view that once the exemption has been claimed under section 54F and the entire capital gain has not been utilised for the purchase of residential house, then the net consideration which is not appropriated by the assessee towards the purchase of new asset and also not deposited in the banks or institution as specified and notified in the official Gazette by the Central Government as per the provisions of sub section (4) of section 54F, the assessee cannot avail the exemption under section 54 EC.
Section 80-IA(7) which is applicable to the provisions of section 80-IB requires the accounts of the eligible undertaking to be audited and a certificate to be filed. The essence of this requirement is that at any given time the financial position of the undertaking should be ascertainable.
Giving marketing services outside India, even if we consider it as technical services, nothing was made available to the assessee in the nature of any technical knowledge, experience, skill know-how or processes.
In any case, expert advice obtained by the assessee from Vakharia & Associates lacks credibility and just because the assessee’s claim is supported by a chartered accountant’s opinion, this fact per se cannot absolve the assessee from penalty under section 271(1)(c). In the case of CIT Vs Escort Finance Limited (328 ITR 44), Hon’ble Delhi High Court has rejected assessee’s reliance on expert advice to avoid the penalty
These appeals involving certain common grounds regarding interpretation of section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and claimed for deduction under section 80-IA (4) of the Act. The same are being discussed by us with reference to the facts of the case for assessment year 2004-2005 in the case of Allcargo Global Logistics Ltd.
It is not the case of the assessee, at this stage, that the AO has not given sufficient opportunity; the case of the assessee is that the additional evidence produced before the CIT(A) ought to have been admitted under Rule 46A. If additional evidence is not admitted, the ld. CIT(A) ought to have furnished reasons for non-admission so that the assessee could explain properly as to whether the reasons for non-admission of additional evidence are in accordance with law or not. In the instant case, the ld. CIT(A) completely ignored to take notice of the additional evidence.
As regarding the other addition of Rs.34,82,972/- on account of Sundry creditors the ld. CIT(A) has deleted the same by relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Sugauli Sugar Works (P) Ltd. 236 ITR 518 (SC) without going into the facts of the case. In this case the assessee has not filed even the details of the sundry creditors and when the Bench asked for the list of sundry creditors outstanding since several years, the ld. Counsel for assessee has submitted that the books of account relating to A.Yr. 1981-82 are already seized by the revenue and lying with the revenue authorities till now.
The requirement of recording of reasons and communication thereof has been read as an integral part of the concept of fair procedure and safeguard to ensure observance of the rule of law. We may point out that a ‘decision’ does not merely mean the ‘conclusion’. It embraces within its fold the reasons forming basis for the conclusion.[Mukhtiar Singh Vs. State of Punjab,(1995)1SCC 760(SC)].
The monies held in the account must be regarded as being at the joint disposal of Mr and Mrs Pflum which means when the mandate is such that either party can draw on them, that either party is free to withdraw and spend them as he or she wishes. In practice most withdrawals were made by Mrs Pflum without reference to Mr Pflum. Thus when she withdrew sums in the UK using the debit card, the cash so withdrawn would be her own money and she was drawing on an asset which was just as much her own asset as it was Mr Pflum’s. That is the essence of a joint bank account held by the holders as joint tenants. We therefore reject Mrs Teggart’s submission that because the monies were derived from Mr Pflum’s earnings he was to be regarded as not having alienated them, in the absence of clear evidence of an intention to sever the joint tenancy and confer beneficial ownership on Mrs Pflum. The application of this principle also leads to the same conclusion in relation to purchases made through use of the debit card in the UK.
