The factual matrix or the case is that the assessee had contracted with landlord to take a premise on lease for opening its branch though no formal agreement with the landlord was entered into. Based on the understanding, the landlord had started the construction of the premises as per the requirement of the assessee. Before the construction was completed the assessee came to know of the proposed construction of overbridge over the said property. The assessee was of the view that overbridge will cause hindrance to conduct the business and services.
In case of Ratanlall Murarka and others (supra), as already noted, Kerala High Court did hold that under section 179 of the Act not only the tax dues but also interest can be recovered from the director of a public company. This was on the basis that according to the Court, the company was liable for interest under section 220(2) of the Act.
Issue pertains to deduction claim by the assessee under section 80IB(10) of the Act on development of a housing project. Revenue, however, holds a belief that the respondent-assessee had not developed the housing project on the ground that the land was not owned by the assessee. The Tribunal, however, held that as per the development agreement, the assessee had to incur and bear all expenses for development of the land. The assessee had the right to allot possession of the constructed units to the members of the housing project after developing the housing project. The Tribunal relied on the decision of this Court in the case of CIT v. Radhe Developers [2012] 341 ITR 403 in which this Court had upheld the decision of the Tribunal. In the result, Tax Appeal is dismissed.
The Department appears to have sent a proposal to the Finance Department which had approved it on 4th September 2012 and after the same was received back alongwith necessary papers and orders permitting the Office of the Government Pleader to file Tax Appeal, it appears that the Tax Appeal which was to be filed on or before 10th November 2009, came to be filed after a huge delay of 1226 days on 27th November 2012. What is stated for explaining such delay is that due to Government administrative mechanism, within the statutory time period, tax appeal could not be filed. In absence of any specific details and explanation, this explanation in general terms does not satisfy us.
As it appears from the portion highlighted by us, the question involved in that matter regarding the validity of the State Laws included in the Ninth Schedule cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. Regarding constituent power under Article 368, we have already relied upon the observations of the nine-bench-judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of I.R. Coelho [dead] by L.Rs. v. State of T.N. (supra) holding that by addition of the words ‘constituent power’ in Article 368, the amending body, namely, Parliament does not become the original Constituent Assembly. We, thus, find that the above decision relied upon by Mr. Champaneri does not help his client in any way.
In case of Ashok Taksali (supra), the Rajasthan High Court came across a similar question. The Bench was of the opinion that once a salary income of the block year has been taxed and such tax has been deducted at source, there is no question of holding that the income of the assessee was undisclosed income of the block period. It was observed as under:-
Firstly, the petitioners had lodged their refund claims at the relevant time itself way back in the year 1991 when the question of classification was decided in their favour by the Commissioner. Secondly, the Department did not release the refund for a considerable period of time since such order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was challenged before the Tribunal. Thirdly, the Commissioner (Appeals) disposed of the petitioners’ case on 11-10-2002 with respect to the refund and not with respect to the original claim of classification.
Considering all the facts and circumstances and taking into account all the contentions raised by the affidavits and reply affidavits, considering the decisions of other High Courts, Supreme Court and the Division Bench of this High Court on the issues raised by the Regional Director and the submissions during the course of hearing, I am satisfied that the observations made by the Regional Director, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, do not survive. I have come to the conclusion that the present scheme of arrangement is in the interest of its shareholders and creditors as well as in the public interest and the same deserves to be sanctioned.
From the material documents allowed to be produced, the assessee could satisfy the Commissioner (Appeals) that the place of effective management of its enterprises was situated at Netherlands and thus, the requirement of condition in Article 8A of DTA agreement was met with. The Tribunal has rightly confirmed the decision of the Appellate Commissioner holding the assessee to be eligible for benefits of DTAA.
As is more than apparent, assessment was completed on scrutiny. In post assessment period, audit party raised the objection and Assessing Officer had strongly objected to such objections by communicating internally as mentioned hereinabove. In such background, reasons for reopening if are noted, they are almost identically worded as that of audit report. No material worth the name emerges to indicate any independent application of mind. Facts are quite glaring on the contrary & they clearly establish absence of subjective satisfaction of Assessing Officer. Thus, the ground raised by the petitioner that such notice of reopening is invalid for the Assessing Officer having not formed his independent belief requires to be sustained.
