It was observed by the CLB that if the Appellants failed to cooperate with NHEL for the determination of the value of the occupied premises, including land, plant and machinery and do not accept the fair value of the assets determined, the petition shall be deemed to have been dismissed. The impugned order thus makes it impossible for the Appellants to even question the valuation. Having succeeded in demonstrating oppression by the Respondents, the Appellants cannot be compelled to accept an arbitrary and unilateral determination of the fair value by the Respondents not based on any sound financial and accounting principles. The remedy provided by the CLB has thus been rendered illusory.
Supreme Court in the case of P. R. Prabhakar v. CIT [2006] 284 ITR 548 where the order of the Special Bench cited (supra) stands approved. It was clarified that the amendment made to clause (baa) of the Explanation below Section 80HHC which defines “profits of the business” in such a manner as to exclude receipts like interest, commission etc. which did not have an element of turnover, was introduced prospectively by the Finance (No.2) Act, 1991 w.e.f. the assessment year 1992-93 and the amendment did not operate retrospectively.
There is another aspect of the matter. The purport of unearned increase is to, in addition to the premium charged by the appellant DDA at the time of granting the lease, entitle the appellant DDA to share 50% of the increase in value of the leasehold rights from the date when the lease was given and till the date of transfer. The transfer of the leasehold rights in the present case, as aforesaid, is under the aegis of this Court. There is no doubt as to the consideration for the said transfer. It is not in dispute that the matter has throughout been pending in this Court on the issue of unearned increase. We are of the opinion that it would be highly unjust and unfair to ask the respondent M/s Aeroshine who though has purchased the leasehold rights at the rates of the year 1983-85, to pay unearned increase to the appellant DDA of the year 2004 or of today.
Counsel for the respondent is right in relying on sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 35EE to point out that in case the Central Government suo motu decides to issue notice to the assessee to enhance the penalty or fine or duty and after hearing the assessee decides to drop the proceedings, no grant of any opportunity to the Commissioner of Central Excise or any other officer executing the Act is envisaged.
The alternative prayer that RLB should be directed to be wound up, since its entire substratum has disappeared, will require a detailed examination of several relevant factors, all of which are not before the Court. Nothing precludes RLB from seeking winding up in accordance with law in appropriate proceedings by placing the full facts before the Court which can then be responded to by the OL, the RD and other interested parties including creditors. Given the pleadings in the present application, it is not possible to undertake that exercise at this stage.
This is a clear case where the primary facts were available before the AO, and therefore, the assessee cannot be held to have failed to disclose “fully and truly all material facts”. In our opinion, it was for the AO to draw the appropriate inference. The assessee is/was under no obligation to draw the inference of fact or law based on the primary facts available on record.
The original demand of Rs. 225.86 crores comprised of two components as per the petitioner. The two components were Rs. 114 crores towards the alleged principal tax liability and Rs. 110 crores towards the purported interest liability. We shall first consider the Rs. 110 crores interest liability. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the said figure of Rs. 110 crores can be broken up into three components.
Arrangement by which the respondent-assessee sent tickets to the stockists who in turn sold the same to their agents did not indicate that the sale took place at the point of dispatch of tickets to the stockists. We also notice that the unsold tickets are to be returned to the organizing agent of the respondent-assessee at least one day before the actual date of the draw and any tickets received thereafter would not be accepted and treated as sold by the stockists. This makes it clear that those tickets which are returned by the stockists cannot be treated as having been sold. The corollary to this is that mere dispatch of tickets to the stockists would not entail a sale. It is only those dispatches of tickets which are not returnable in the manner indicated above which would be recorded as sales. Thus, till the date of the draw or just prior to the date of the draw it cannot be ascertained as to whether the dispatched tickets were actually sold or not. We, therefore, agree with the view taken by the Tribunal and consequently, decide this question in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
The other ground on which the CLB interfered with the decision at the board meeting held on 31-10-2012 was that the notices of the board meeting were issued at a time when the Respondent was not in the country and was stuck in New Jersey, USA, which was admittedly hit by a hurricane. While the notice was properly delivered to the Respondent, its request for adjournment of the meeting could have been easily accommodated by the Appellants. Nevertheless, they went ahead and held the meeting. This has been sought to be remedied by the impugned order of the CLB by directing that a fresh board meeting be convened. In the facts and circumstances, the CLB was justified in issuing the said direction. What however cannot be sustained in law is the direction that in the fresh board meeting, effect must be given to clause 6.2 of the JVA. That portion of the impugned order is, therefore, set aside.
With regard to the amendment to section 2(14), which has been brought about by the Finance Act, 2007 w.e.f. 1.4.2008 and which alters the clause pertaining to ‘personal effects’ in the manner indicated below, we may say straightaway that the same would not apply as it has prospective operation with effect from 01.04.2008, whereas in the present case the assessment year is 2002-03.
