Counsel for the respondent is right in relying on sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 35EE to point out that in case the Central Government suo motu decides to issue notice to the assessee to enhance the penalty or fine or duty and after hearing the assessee decides to drop the proceedings, no grant of any opportunity to the Commissioner of Central Excise or any other officer executing the Act is envisaged.
The alternative prayer that RLB should be directed to be wound up, since its entire substratum has disappeared, will require a detailed examination of several relevant factors, all of which are not before the Court. Nothing precludes RLB from seeking winding up in accordance with law in appropriate proceedings by placing the full facts before the Court which can then be responded to by the OL, the RD and other interested parties including creditors. Given the pleadings in the present application, it is not possible to undertake that exercise at this stage.
This is a clear case where the primary facts were available before the AO, and therefore, the assessee cannot be held to have failed to disclose “fully and truly all material facts”. In our opinion, it was for the AO to draw the appropriate inference. The assessee is/was under no obligation to draw the inference of fact or law based on the primary facts available on record.
The original demand of Rs. 225.86 crores comprised of two components as per the petitioner. The two components were Rs. 114 crores towards the alleged principal tax liability and Rs. 110 crores towards the purported interest liability. We shall first consider the Rs. 110 crores interest liability. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the said figure of Rs. 110 crores can be broken up into three components.
Arrangement by which the respondent-assessee sent tickets to the stockists who in turn sold the same to their agents did not indicate that the sale took place at the point of dispatch of tickets to the stockists. We also notice that the unsold tickets are to be returned to the organizing agent of the respondent-assessee at least one day before the actual date of the draw and any tickets received thereafter would not be accepted and treated as sold by the stockists. This makes it clear that those tickets which are returned by the stockists cannot be treated as having been sold. The corollary to this is that mere dispatch of tickets to the stockists would not entail a sale. It is only those dispatches of tickets which are not returnable in the manner indicated above which would be recorded as sales. Thus, till the date of the draw or just prior to the date of the draw it cannot be ascertained as to whether the dispatched tickets were actually sold or not. We, therefore, agree with the view taken by the Tribunal and consequently, decide this question in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
The other ground on which the CLB interfered with the decision at the board meeting held on 31-10-2012 was that the notices of the board meeting were issued at a time when the Respondent was not in the country and was stuck in New Jersey, USA, which was admittedly hit by a hurricane. While the notice was properly delivered to the Respondent, its request for adjournment of the meeting could have been easily accommodated by the Appellants. Nevertheless, they went ahead and held the meeting. This has been sought to be remedied by the impugned order of the CLB by directing that a fresh board meeting be convened. In the facts and circumstances, the CLB was justified in issuing the said direction. What however cannot be sustained in law is the direction that in the fresh board meeting, effect must be given to clause 6.2 of the JVA. That portion of the impugned order is, therefore, set aside.
With regard to the amendment to section 2(14), which has been brought about by the Finance Act, 2007 w.e.f. 1.4.2008 and which alters the clause pertaining to ‘personal effects’ in the manner indicated below, we may say straightaway that the same would not apply as it has prospective operation with effect from 01.04.2008, whereas in the present case the assessment year is 2002-03.
The original assessment was made on 30-11-2006 under section 143(3). The Finance Act, 2008 inserted clause (h) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB retrospectively from 1-4-2001. The effect of this clause was to increase the book profit by the amount of deferred tax and the provision therefor. It is not in dispute that one of the reasons to believe as recorded by the respondent is that in view of the retrospective amendment, the deferred tax liability, for which a provision had been made in the accounts, was to be added back to the book profit.
In the present case, it was repeatedly emphasized that the assessee’s dividend income was confined to what it received from investment made in a sister concern, and that only one dividend warrant was received. These facts, in the opinion of this court, were material, and had been given weightage by the Tribunal in its impugned order. There is no dispute that the investment to the sister concern, was not questioned; even the Commissioner has not sought to undermine this aspect.
In the present case no material has been produced by the appellant/assessee to show that the admission made by him was incorrect in any way. On the other hand, it is the assessee who is insisting that it is for the department to corroborate the statement of admission made by him and until and unless the department corroborates the same, the statement cannot be relied upon. Admission once made can certainly be retracted, if the circumstances permit, and it can also be shown to have been made under some mistake or to be otherwise incorrect.
