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With regard to section 3 of the Act, the informant stated that OP1 (in its board meeting held on 16.04.2012) decided that Joint Plant Committee (JPC) would be collecting and furnishing price data to OP 1 so as to enable it to have a long term pricing methodology. This, along with existence of price parallelism resulted in a collusion under section 3 (3)(a) of the Act.
The informant herein was trying to experiment with an innovative way to have premier of its movie in India through DTH so as to have reach to maximum number of consumers/viewers at a premier show through DTH medium. The decision of the OP not to exhibit this movie or any other movie released before it was released to theatres, through DTH or any other technology prima facie has an effect of limiting the market of exhibition of films for the benefit of viewers at large in the territories under its control. The decision prima facie also seems to be restricting informant from taking advantage of technological development in the relevant industry at a timing of its choice. Such a decision of OP prima facie seems to be anti competitive as it deters a producer from providing to consumers an opportunity of watching premiere show in an economic manner in the comforts of his home. It also has the potential of adversely affecting the competition and depriving benefit to producers and consumers of newer technologies.
In this case Nothing has been pointed out that the bank was not within its right to firstly levy those charges or that it was acting beyond the rules. In levying those charges, the bank has fully justified as it relied on the Reserve Bank Rules and the banking practice. After all the bank had to maintain the accounts and it was by way of an agreement between the complainant and the bank that the bank was levying Rs. 250 per bill per quarter. Therefore, on this account there was no fault on the part of the bank.
By no stretch of imagination, Lakme can be considered as dominant either in the geographical market of Delhi or of Gurgaon. There are innumerable branded and non-branded saloons exclusively for women in Delhi alone looking at the population of Delhi being 1.26 crore and the same is the situation with regard to the number of exclusive saloons for women within district Gurgaon which covers a large area within it.In view of the presence of such a large number of beauty saloons exclusively for women in these areas having 7 saloons or so would not give a dominant status to Lakme under any circumstance. Thus, the question of abuse of dominance by Lakme would not arise.
On a plain reading of the aforesaid circulars/letters, it is evident that the opposite party associations through these circulars/letters tried to limit/control the supply of the film in contravention of the provision of section 3 (1) read with section 3(3)(b) of the Act. By virtue of the provisions contained in section 3(3) of the Act, any agreement entered into between enterprises or associations of enterprises or persons or associations of persons or between any person and enterprise or practice carried on, or decision taken by, any association of enterprises or association of persons, including cartels, engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or provision of services, which (a) directly or indirectly determines purchase or sale prices;
In so far as the specific instances of the abuse of agreement in question are concerned, it is obvious that there has been a settlement between the original complainant and the respondents. Because the complainant does not have any more complaint/grievance of any boycott or the compulsory undertakings which he is to give under the authority of either FMC or FDC so that question will clearly be foreign to the present enquiry.
The role and functioning of BCCI have already been examined in detail earlier in this order. An analysis of the position clearly brings out that there is an overlap between the way BCCI is discharging its regulatory and commercial roles respectively, and the modus operandi/decision making process does not clearly separate the two roles.
There was nothing to show that unfair pricing was done by Microsoft in selling identical licence at different prices. No evidence was brought. The respondent was not tying its OEM with new computers. The purchase of personal computer has the choice to have the programme of Microsoft Office or Words getting installed in its computer if he so chooses. This cannot be, therefore, an example of tying up. There was no compulsion on the appellant to purchase Microsoft software to purchase the computers only as the OEM licensee was free to sell their product, i.e., personal computer even without the warranty that would clearly end the argument about the tying up.
Considering the Section and its language plainly, it is apparent that the agreement to allow concessions and benefits including allowances, discounts, rebates or credit have to have a nexus with the dealings of the respondent. The said dealings would not cover a uniform policy by the respondent to sell its product. We agree with Shri Makheeja when he says that if there is a discrimination between authorized dealers inter se, it would amount to a restrictive trade practice but in that case, it will be that the dealing of the respondent with a particular dealer was discriminatory in comparison to its dealing with another dealer. Such is not the case here.
Director General had concluded on the basis of his investigation that it was not proved that foreign airlines hold about 90% market share in the relevant market of international flying to and fro from India. The appellant was unable to give any specific statistics before the CCI or even before us. On the other hand, from the documents on record
