Exemption under section 54E of the Income-tax Act cannot be denied to the assessee on account of the fiction created in section 50. It is true that section 50 is enacted with the object of denying multiple benefits to the owners of depreciable assets. However, that restriction is limited to the computation of capital gains and not to the exemption provisions.
CIT can review the grant of registration at any time because the words used in the provision are, and subsequently the Commissioner is satisfied, which means that registration can be reviewed at any given point of time. There is no question, that once the registration is granted, the issue of registration becomes functus officio.
The assessee had submitted that direct salary cost should be considered and indirect overhead cost should not be considered as concerned employees performed insignificant role for the credit monitoring assistance done for the overseas associate enterprises. However, it is true that no fresh ECB loans have been granted during the year under consideration, but services indeed have been rendered by the assessee to its overseas entities.
Entire nature of work comes squarely within the realm of ‘carrying out any work in pursuance of a contract’ as stipulated in section 194C. ‘Carrying out any work’ has a very wide import, which includes within its ambit not only simply works contract but also all kind of work, which a person carries out in pursuance of a contract.
In the present case, the provisions of sec.74(1) as amended w.e.f. 1.4.2003 have been relied upon by the revenue authorities to disallow the assessee’s claim for set off of long-term capital loss relating to AY 2001-02 against short-term capital gain of the year under consideration and as already noted by us, the plain grammatical construction of the language of sec.74(1) as amended w.e.f. 1.4.2003 makes it clear that the same are applicable and deal with carry forward and set off of loss under the head “capital gain” incurred in AY 2003-04 and subsequent years. The right accrued to the assessee by virtue of sec.74(1) as it stood prior to the amendment made w.e.f.1.4.2003 thus has not been taken away either expressly by the provisions of sec. 74(1) as amended w.e.f. 1.4.2003 or even by implication.
Accrual of income is a well-known concept of taxation jurisprudence. It is a fact that assessee is following the Mercantile system of accounting and as per the established principles of that system, whatever accrues to an assessee in a particular AY has to be offered for taxation for that particular year. In our opinion the concept of real income or no real income can never be a concept which can work if it is at variance with the statutory provisions.
Tribunal held that the payment made by assessee to a foreign company for the services rendered by it for uploading and display of the banner advertisement on its portal was in the nature of business profit and not royalty and such payment was not chargeable to tax in India as the recipient has no PE in India and, therefore, assessee was not liable to deduct tax at source from the payment for such services and the same cannot be disallowed by invoking the provisions of section 40(a)(i) for non-deduction of tax.
It is undisputed that the Revenue is aggrieved against the allowability of expenditure incurred in respect of earning dividend and interest income liable to tax at special rate u/s 115A, against the income chargeable to tax at normal rate. It is not a case and cannot be that such dividend and interest income are not at all chargeable to tax. The contention which has been made is that the expenses incurred by the assessee in respect of income liable to tax at special rate u/s 115A should not be allowed as deduction against the income chargeable to tax at normal rate.
Income from deferred guarantee commission did not accrue or arise in the year in which guarantee agreements were entered’. It was held that such income should be spread over the period to which the guarantee commission related and should be assessed proportionately.
The learned Counsel for the assessee submitted that section 234D cannot apply to the extant case because refund was granted on 24.04.2003 which is well before the date of insertion of section 234D itself. Referring to the language of sub-section (1) : ‘… where any refund is granted …….’, it was stated that since the only word ‘is’ used which is not accompanied by ‘or has been’, it would mean that if the refund is granted after 01.06.2003, the provision shall fail.
