Once it is not in dispute that the facts of the case are materially similar to the facts of ISG Traders Ltd. vs. CIT, WB-II, Kolkata (I.T,A No.264 of 2003-2011- TIOL-621-HC-KOL-IT). And that the said decision applies in this case, the computation of disallowance has to be done on the same basis as was accepted by Their Lordships in ISG Traders Ltd.’s case (supra).
So far as pre June 2008 position is concerned, tax withholding obligations under section 194 C in respect of an individual only in cases where the payments were made to a sub contractor for carrying out a part off work, or the work itself, undertaken by the assessee and that too when such individual’s turnover from business or profession exceeded threshold specified in section 44AB.
Admittedly, assessee has produced a register, which contained payments to various labourers. Admittedly, this register does not contain the addresses of the labourers nor it contains revenue stamp, nor is it signed by the Labour Department, no PF has also been deducted. Does all these wrongs in its entirety or individuality make the expenses incurred by the assessee deniable? Can this defect be held to be changing the mode of payment of the assessee from one mode to another? Here we would answer ‘no’.
It is important to bear in mind uncontroverted claim of the assessee that there were sufficient reserves and surplus, which were eligible for distribution as ‘dividend’, and the NIPL had sufficient cash balances as well. The nature of amounts distributed as dividend has not been altered as a result of, what the revenue authorities describe as, colourable device to evade taxes.
Interest expenses directly attributable to tax exempt income as also directly attributable to taxable income, are required to be excluded from computation of common interest expenses to be allocated under rule 8D(2)(ii).
From the facts of the present case, it is clear that there is no link with expenditure for earning of dividend income incurred by the assessee and once the facts are clear, no disallowance can be made by invoking rule 8D of the Rules. Neither the AO nor CIT(A) has recorded any finding that having regard to the account of the assessee, they are not satisfied with the correctness of the claim of expenditure made by assessee or the claim made by assessee that no expenditure has been incurred in relation to income which do not form part of the total income under the Act for the relevant assessment year. In the absence of any such finding, facts of the present case shows that the investment in shares was made out of own capital employed and not from borrowed funds, no disallowance on account of interest expenditure can be made by invoking rule 8D of the Rules.
There is nothing in the said section to treat, inter alia, the assessee as defaulter where there is a shortfall in deduction. With regard to the shortfall, it cannot be assumed that there is a default as the deduction is not as required by or under the Act, but the facts is that this expression, ‘on which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been deducted or, after deduction has not been paid on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139’.
Where a foreign company gives a technical know-how and obtains equity shares in the new company, the amount attributable to technical know-how was not revenue expenditure under section 37 of the Act. However, it was treated to be of capital nature.
Where the assessee has maintained the Attendance Register of labourers shown the ledger account of labour charges and office expenses, which were all duly produced before the AO and also placed before us which contained the details of wages paid to and accepted by the labourers, no defect in the same has been pointed by the revenue. The action to make the ad hoc disallowance @5% qua the same and 10% in the case of office expenses on the reasoning that to curb the possibility of revenue leakage and seems excessive respectively is arbitrary which cannot be supported in law.
The Revenue’s case is that the provision of sec. 50C having come on the statute book with effect from 1-4-2003, and the capital asset which is the subject-matter of transfer, being land, the same would apply, and thus stands rightly invoked by the AO. The assessee’s case, and on the basis of which it found favour with the first appellate authority, is that the transfer in the first five (5) cases stood effected much prior the relevant year, i.e., on 15-01-1998
