After taking into consideration the Instruction No. 5 of 2008, it is found that by virtue of the said Instruction, the revenue was prohibited from pre
We find that during original assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer himself had accepted the position that the assessee had maintained quantitative details and that the general profit was on the higher side. We further find that in remand report also, the Assessing Officer could not justify the lump-sum addition other than making a short statement that addition was justified on books, vouchers, etc. as produced before him. In such circumstances, both the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal below deleted the lump-sum addition in the absence of any basis on the part of the Assessing Officer and even after holding that competitive details were maintained and the general profit was favourable.
In the case before us, it is not been established that the assessee has written off the outstanding liabilities in the books of account. The Appellate Tribunal is justified in taking the view that as assessee had continued to show the admitted amounts as liabilities in its balance sheet the same cannot be treated as assessment of liabilities. Merely because the liabilities are outstanding for last many years, it cannot be inferred that the said liabilities have seized to exist. The Appellate Tribunal has rightly observed that the Assessing Officer shall have to prove that the assessee has obtained the benefits in respect of such trading liabilities by way of remission or cessation thereof which is not the case before us.
Revenue having accepted the declaration of the valuation of the selfsame jewellery given by the assessee as on 31st March, 1989 as correct valuation for the purpose of Wealth Tax Act, there is no reason why the same valuation should not be treated to be a reliable base for the purpose of computing the capital gain under the Act by the process of reverse indexation.
Whether the decision of the three-judge-bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Ajantha Industries reported in [1976] 102 ITR 281 so far as it lays down the law that the requirement of recording reasons under section 127(1) of the Income tax Act is a mandatory direction under the law and non-communication thereof is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the file although not communicated to the assessee is still a good law in view of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074, and State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 as held by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Arti Ship Breaking vs. Director of Income Tax (Investigation) and others reported in (2000) 244 ITR 333.
Provisions of section 23(2) make it clear that benefits of relief in respect of self-occupied property is available only to owner who can reside in his own residence, that means, benefit of relief is available to self-occupied property only to an individual assessee and not to an imaginary assessable entity/fictional entity such as a partnership firm. Various High Court decisions denying relief under section 23(2) to partnership firms cannot be invoked to deny relief to a HUF since unlike a firm which is a fictional entity and cannot physically reside and so cannot claim benefit of provision, HUF cannot be held to be a fictional entity.
In the present case it is not the case of the Revenue that the new unit by itself is not capable of production of goods but the case of the Revenue is that it takes help of the old existing unit. We are of the view that, that itself should not be the reason to reject the claim under Section 80-I of the Act. Thus, whether an undertaking is a “new industrial undertaking” entitled to the exemption under Section 80-I of the Act depends on the facts of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down. Use by the assessee of the old undertaking for the purpose of production in its new undertaking is not a decisive test in construing Section 80-I of the Act.
The fact that the Assessing Officer in the assessment proceedings under section 143(3) of the Act did not give any opinion regarding the allowability or otherwise of deduction u/s 80IB (10) of the Act is not a ground of invoking Section 147 of the Act.
HC held that the benefit of Sec 80IB was not available where the assessee had not applied for Factory License before April 1st 2004. How¬ever, HC also clarified that in other cases where the assessee had applied for Factory License before April 1st 2004 but was granted the same later, deduction shall be allowable and such cases shall be treated as mere technical default.
Doshion Ltd. Vs. ITo (Ahmedabad HC)- Having thus heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the documents on record, it clearly emerges that the assessment previously framed after scrutiny is sought to be reopened beyond the period of 4 years from the end of relevant assessment year. In the reasons recorded, the Assessing Officer has not suggested that such income escaped assessment for the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts. In fact the sole ground on which such scrutiny assessment is sought to be reopened beyond 4 years is that by virtue of Explanation to Section 80IA added with retrospective effect from 1.4.2000, income derived from the works contract would not qualify for deduction under Section 80IA of the Act.
