SC Seeks Extensive Data From Allahabad HC On Pending Criminal Cases Among Other Things
It is most heartening to note that while taking a very bold initiative, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Kailash Chandra Kapri vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors in Criminal Appeal (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 6564 of 2026) and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026 INSC that was pronounced just recently on 29.04.2026 has sought extensive data from the Allahabad High Court on criminal pendency, undertrial detention, bail applications and vacancies in the Uttar Pradesh district judiciary. It was made indubitably clear by the top court that merely granting relief to the appellant would not serve the larger purpose behind the judgment. In this context, the court sought relevant information from the Allahabad High Court and indicated that after collecting the necessary data and statistics, it may consider evolving some modalities to improve the situation in Uttar Pradesh. It was also made crystal clear that the right to speedy trial under Article 21 cannot remain an “abstract or illusory safeguard”.
What causes maximum heartburn is to see that Allahabad High Court which is the biggest High Court in not only just India alone, in not only just Asia alone, in not only just few continents alone but in whole world and all the continents with maximum number of pending cases among all the States with more than 12 lakhs in Allahabad High Court and still has just one High Court Bench created at Lucknow so close to Allahabad High Court way back in July 1948 and West UP which owes for majority of the pending cases of UP has not even a single High Court Bench or to say the very least not even a Circuit Bench even though Justice Jaswant Singh Commission headed by former Supreme Court Judge appointed by Centre itself recommended permanent seat of High Court Bench in West UP about 50 years ago yet not even a Circuit Bench created till date and West UP attached with not even Lucknow but right uptill Allahabad which is already overburdened and majority of pending cases from West UP as conceded by Justice Jaswant Singh Commission. But that is a separate issue and shall dwell some other time separately on it as it will consume a lot of space.
We see that in this leading case, the top court allowed an appeal that had been filed by police constable Kailash Chandra Kapri (accused) challenging an Allahabad High Court order refusing to quash criminal proceedings that were pending against him since 1991. The Apex Court noted that the case involved allegations of simple hurt and criminal intimidation but the prosecution had continued for 35 years without any justification. It was held by the top court that, “35 years for a trial for simple hurt and criminal intimidation is too long a time. Quick justice is sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution.”
Before stating anything else, it would be relevant to note that in this most progressive judgment authored by a Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice JB Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr Justice Ujjal Bhuyan sets the ball in motion by first and foremost stating that, ““Crime and the actions of the criminal justice system are mutually responsive, influencing each other in ways that are only minimally predictable; general changes in the political and socio-economic climate will affect both crime and the criminal justice system in a similar manner”. [Alfred Blumstein in Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, Khadish (ed.)].”
At the very outset, this laudable judgment puts forth in para 2 that, “This appeal arises from the order passed by the High court of Allahabad dated 23.02.2006 in application under Section 482 No. 20610 of 2024 by which the application preferred by the appellant-herein praying for quashing of the criminal proceedings of Case No. 545 of 1991 arising out of Case Crime No. 115 of 1989 registered with the GRP Rambagh Police Station for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code,(for short, “IPC”) respectively and Section 120 of the Railways Act came to be dismissed.”
As we see, the Bench then discloses in para 3 that, “It appears from the materials on record that one Gajendra Singh, constable No. 614, posted at the relevant point of time, at GRP Rambagh, Distt. Gonda, Allahabad lodged a First Information Report with the GRP Rambagh police station referred to above against the appellant-herein and four other police constables for the offences enumerated above.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 5 that, “Upon completion of the investigation chargesheet came to be filed for the offences enumerated above against the appellant and other co-accused. The filing of the chargesheet culminated in Criminal Case No. 545 of 1991 pending as on date in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Railway) Allahabad.”
Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 6 that, “We take notice of the fact that two of the co-accused passed away during the pendency of the proceedings and the other two co-accused were put to trial and came to be acquitted by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Railway) Allahabad vide judgment and order dated 01.02.2023. We are informed that the two co-accused were acquitted as prosecution was unable to lead any evidence in support of the charge.”
Do further note, the Bench then notes in para 8 that, “We enquired with the learned counsel appearing for the State as to why the trial did not proceed against the appellant along with the co-accused. We were informed that the appellant came to be transferred to the State of Uttarakhand after the bifurcation took place of the State of Uttar Pradesh and since the appellant left Uttar Pradesh, no summons could be served upon him.”
Simply put, the Bench then observes in para 9 that, “It appears on plain reading of the FIR and the other materials on record that on the date of the alleged incident five police constables posted with the GRP Rambagh fought with each other on a very trivial issue. This incident occurred in the police mess relating to food.”
It merits noting that the Bench notes in para 10 that, “We also take notice of the fact that in 1991 when the FIR came to be registered the appellant was 22 years old and as on date, he is 59 years of age. It appears that for the reasons assigned by the appellant in the pleadings no summons was issued to him by the trial court till the year 2021.”
Briefly stated, the Bench states in para 11 that, “In such circumstances referred to above the appellant went before the High court and prayed that it has been 35 years that the criminal proceedings are pending against him and on this ground alone the proceedings deserve to be quashed. The High court declined to quash the proceedings by way of the impugned order.”
As a corollary, the Bench then points out in para 12 that, “In such circumstances referred to above the appellant is here before this court with the present appeal.”
Quite remarkably, the Bench propounds in para 15 holding that, “The Right to have a speedy trial is one of the requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution irrespective of the fact whether the accused is in jail or on bail and furthermore irrespective of the nature of the crime. This speedy trial is one of the requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution and from the facts and circumstances of a given case if the High Court finds that the proceeding if allowed to continue will amount to violation of Article 21 of the Constitution then the High court should not hesitate to exercise its inherent powers under Section 528 of the BNSS 2023 or in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
While citing the relevant case law from USA, the Bench observes in para 16 that, “The Supreme Court of the United States in Robert Dean Dickey v. State of Florida, (1970) 26 Law Ed 2d 26 : 398 US 30, has explained the right to a speedy trial in the following words:
“The right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical or abstract right but one rooted in hard reality in the need to have charges promptly exposed. If the case for the prosecution calls on the accused to meet charges rather than rest on the infirmities of the prosecution’s case, as is the defendant’s right, the time to meet them is when the case is fresh. Stale claims have never been favoured by the law, and far less so in criminal cases. Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial.” (Emphasis supplied).”
While citing yet another relevant case law from USA, the Bench mentions in para 17 that, “Another aspect of the right to speedy trial was then highlighted in Barker v. Wingo, (1972) 33 Law Ed 2d 101 : 407 US 514 in these words:
“The right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused. In addition to the general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent and fair procedures, there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and, at times in opposition to the interests of the accused.” (Emphasis supplied).”
Adding more to it, the Bench then mentions yet another relevant case law from USA in para 18 observing that, “Yet again, the basic principles underlying the right were embodied in the following terms in Richard M. Smith v. Fred M. Hooey, (1969) 21 Law Ed 2d 607 : 393 US 374:—
“Suffice it to remember that this constitutional guarantee has universally been thought essential to protect at least three basic demands of criminal justice in the Anglo-American legal system:
‘(1) to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial,
(2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation, and,
(3) to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.’”
(Emphasis supplied).”
It is worth paying attention that the Bench points out in para 39 that, “We wonder how many such guidelines as referred to above may have been issued by this Court over a period of at least two decades. Guidelines just remain on paper; guidelines do not work fully. The reason for the same is also very simple. No court bothers to follow the guidelines. They do not follow because there is no accountability. No one is made answerable for the same.”
Most forthrightly, the Bench mandates and holds in para 40 that, “The case at hand is one of causing simple hurt and criminal intimidation. It is, as such, neither a grave or heinous offence nor an offence against the community as such, though all criminal offences are crime against the society. Having regard to the nature of offence, there is enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution- 35 years for a trial for simple hurt and criminal intimidation is too long a time. Quick justice is sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 35 years and that too a public servant without any cause at all- and none was indicted before the High court or before us- gone by with the spirit of procedure established by law. In that view of the matter, it is just unfair and in accordance with equity to direct that the trial or prosecution of the appellant to proceed no further. We do so accordingly.”
Most remarkably, the Bench expounds in para 41 holding that, “Having said so as afore-noted we could have closed this matter. However, closing this matter with the grant of necessary relief to the appellant is not going to serve the overall purpose with which we have dictated this judgment. Article 21 has been a part of our Constitution since it was adopted in 1949 and came into effect on January 26, 1950. As of 2026, it has been a cornerstone of Indian democracy for 76 years while it states that “ No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law”, its meaning has expanded significantly over the decades through various decisions of this Court to include the right to privacy, education, clean environment, etc., and above all, the right to speedy trial. This right to speedy trial should not remain as an abstract or illusory safeguard.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 42 that, “We firmly believe that we should carry this matter further to make this right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution more meaningful and real. The question is how to go about it? In other words, how to make this right more meaningful and real and not just let it remain illusory.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench hastens to add in para 43 noting that, “We believe we should call for some relevant information from the High court of Allahabad. Once we are able to collect the necessary data and the statistics, we may consider to work out some modalities by which we can make some difference in so far as the State of U.P. is concerned.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 44 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “We direct the Registrar General of the Allahabad High court to furnish us with the following information on oath by way of an affidavit.
i. How many criminal cases are pending as on date in the courts of Judicial Magistrate First Class and Chief Judicial Magistrates? How old are these cases pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class and the Chief Judicial Magistrates respectively in the State? In how many cases the accused persons are in jail as under trial prisoners and since how long? What is the status of these criminal cases and what are the impediments coming in the way of different courts in proceeding further with these cases?
ii. How many sessions cases are pending as on date in the sessions courts? How old are these cases pending before the sessions courts in the State? In how many cases the accused persons are in jail as under trial prisoners and since how long? What is the status of these criminal cases and what are the impediments coming in the way of different courts in proceeding further with these cases?
iii. How many judicial officers are functioning as on date in the rank of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chief Judicial Magistrate and Sessions judge respectively?
iv. How many sanctioned posts are there in so far as civil judges and JMFCs are concerned? How many sanctioned posts are there in the cadre of Chief Judicial Magistrate? How many sanctioned posts are there for the post Sessions judge?
v. How many posts are lying vacant in so far as the judicial officers of different cadres referred to above are concerned?
vi. Are there any proposals forwarded by the High Court pending with the State Government for filling up of various posts at the level of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chief Judicial Magistrate and Sessions judges?
Information Regarding Pendency and Tracking of Bail Applications
1. Whether information about the period of custody undergone by an undertrial prisoner is recorded by the High Court Registry in respect of bail applications filed before the High Court? If not, whether collection of such a data point can be mandated for subsequent filings?
2. What is the number of bail applications pending before the High Court as on 30.04.2026? Kindly categories the data in a tabular format according to the year of filing.
3. Whether the pending bail applications can be categorized according to the period of custody undergone by the applicant/undertrial prisoner?
4. If the answer to Question No.3 is in the affirmative, kindly provide the data in the following manner:
a. Number of cases where the period of custody undergone by the applicant is more than 10 years.
b. Number of cases where the period of custody undergone is between 8-10 years.
c. Number of cases where the period of custody undergone is between 6-8 years.
d. Number of cases where the period of custody undergone is between 4-9 years.
e. Number of cases where the period of custody undergone is between 2-4 years.
f. Number of cases where the period of custody undergone is between 1-2 years.
g. Number of cases where the period of custody undergone is between 0-1 years.
5. Whether any measures are currently in place, or were introduced in the past, to expedite the disposal of bail applications wherein the period of detention undergone by the applicant exceeds 5 years, or to prioritise the disposal of the oldest pending bail applications or bail applications where the applicant is in custody pending trial for unduly long periods?
6. If the answer to Question No. 5 is in the negative, whether any measures can be introduced for tracking and expediting the disposal of bail applications wherein the period of custody of the undertrial prisoner exceeds 5 years and the oldest pending bail applications?
7. Whether data is available regarding the number of undertrial prisoners in the State of Uttar Pradesh who are in custody for a period exceeding 5 years and whose bail applications have not yet been filed or decided by the Court of Sessions, or who have not yet preferred a bail application before the High Court in the event of rejection of bail by the Court of Sessions?”
Further, the Bench directs in para 45 holding that, “The aforesaid information called for should reach the Registry of this Court on or before 13.07.2026.”
Furthermore, the Bench then also directs and holds in para 46 that, “Post this matter for further hearing along with the status report that may be received from the High Court of Allahabad.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 47 that, “The matter be treated as part heard.”
Author Bio
