It is ostensibly interesting to note that the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment in W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025 and also cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:DHC:3142 that was pronounced just recently on 16.04.2026 has issued a slew of guidelines on the quashing of consensual POCSO cases. We see in this leading case that a 22 year old man and a 17 year old girl entered into a consensual relationship and the girl got pregnant, so they married and had a child. It merits noting that the criminal process was set in motion not by complaint of the girl, but by the hospital where she delivered her baby under the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of the POCSO Act.
It was consistently maintained by the young woman that the relationship between them was consensual, that she had no grievance and that the prosecution of her now husband would eventually destroy her family. The Delhi High Court thus deemed it absolutely fit to quash the criminal proceedings. Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Anup Jairam Bhambhani sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.
– Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
The present case is a compelling instance that brings into focus the prescient words of Justice Holmes, since it exposes the disconnect between a rigid legal construct and the human lives it seeks to govern.”
While stating the purpose of the petition, the Bench then specifies in para 2 observing that, “By way of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 (‘BNSS’), the petitioner (accused), who is the husband of respondent No.2 (prosecutrix), seeks quashing of case FIR No.279/2025 dated 13.06.2025 registered under section 64(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNS’) and section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO Act’) at P.S.: Malviya Nagar, South Delhi.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 that, “The petition is premised on the ‘consent’ of the complainant, who is arrayed as respondent No.2 in the petition. It is not disputed that at the time of commission of the alleged offences, respondent No.2 was ‘minor’ i.e., below the age of 18 years, for which reason an offence under section 6 of the POCSO Act has also been alleged against the petitioner.”
To be sure, the Bench pointed out in para 35 that, “That being said, this court would also caution against wanton misuse of ‘compromise’ quashing of criminal proceedings by unscrupulous offenders against gullible or vulnerable victims. The courts must be vigilant against offenders who use deceit, stratagem or dishonest device, to obtain quashing of criminal proceedings in their favour. In particular, it is necessary to install strong guardrails and parameters for consent quashing of criminal proceedings concerning offences under the POCSO Act.”
Most significantly, most forthrightly and most remarkably, the Bench then encapsulates in para 36 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “This court is of the view, that though quashing of criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act is not anathema to the law, such quashing demands careful and sensitive consideration of the fact situation. When examining a plea for quashing of an offence under the POCSO Act based on the consent of a de-juré victim, the court must carefully evaluate the reasons as to why the victim disclaims any loss or injury to her and must record its satisfaction inter-alia on the following aspects :
36.1. Based on the circumstances of a given case, the court must be satisfied that in granting a ‘no-objection’ to the quashing of criminal proceedings, the de-juré victim is genuinely acting on her own free will and volition and has not been misled, pressurised or deceived into offering such no-objection;
36.2. Whether the de-juré victim has taken a consistent stand in favour of closing the case from the inception of the criminal proceedings, and has disclaimed that she has suffered any loss or injury at the hands of the offender;
36.3. Whether the circumstances of the case justify an inference that the acts or omissions that the parties have indulged in, were volitional on the part of the de-juré victim;
36.4. Whether the marriage or other arrangement, based on which the offender and the de-juré victim are seeking closure of criminal proceedings, evokes confidence on the part of the court; or does it appear to be a ruse or stratagem of the offender to evade conviction and punishment;
36.5. Whether the parties have been living together as a family for a length of time; and whether children are born to the parties, whose future would also be impacted by a decision not to quash the criminal proceedings;
36.6. Whether the offender is alleged to have committed any violence or brutality on the de-juré victim; or has committed any other act or omission that points to the absence of genuine volition on the part of the de-juré victim; and if so, is there any medical and other forensic evidence to show such conduct on the offender’s part;
36.7. What was the respective age of the offender and the de-juré victim at the relevant time; whether both were minor; and what are the ramifications of the relative age difference and minority;
36.8. This court would hasten to add, that the aforementioned considerations are only suggestive and far from exhaustive; and before quashing any criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act, the court must interact with the parties and arrive at a subjective satisfaction that the quashing of the case is warranted on larger considerations of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of law, as discussed above; and
36.9. Ultimately, the decision to quash criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act must be founded on the best interests of the de-juré victim and the children, if any, born from the union of the parties.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench then hastens to add in para 39 noting that, “Applying the aforesaid consideration to the facts of the present case, the following aspects weigh with the court:
39.1. At the time of the alleged commission of the offence, respondent No.2 was about 17 years and 02 months of age and the petitioner was about 22 years old ;
39.2. Respondent No.2 never made any complaint to the police authorities herself and the subject FIR was registered at the instance of the doctors attending to her at the hospital where respondent No.2 had gone to deliver the child she had had with the petitioner;
39.3. From the outset, respondent No.2 has never pressed any charges against the petitioner; she married him on 04.09.2024, whereupon they had a child on 12.06.2025; and on the very next date after the birth of the child, i.e., on 13.06.2025, the subject FIR came to be registered;
39.4. There is not the remotest allegation that the petitioner was guilty of any violence, much less any brutality against respondent No.2;
39.5. In the course of hearing before this court, and during the interaction with respondent No.2, she has expressed unequivocal support for quashing of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner; she has said that the relationship was the result of her full consent and concurrence; that parties now need to take care of their 08-month old baby; and that their young family would be destroyed if the petitioner is prosecuted in the subject FIR.”
As a corollary, the Bench then directs and holds in para 40 that, “Upon a conspectus of the foregoing facts and circumstances, and in particular keeping in mind the enormous consequences that would befall not only respondent No.2 but also her infant, both of whom would be left completely bereft of any support and sustenance if the petitioner were to be imprisoned, this court is persuaded to allow the present petition.”
Resultantly, the Bench then directs and holds in para 41 that, “In view of the foregoing discussion, in the opinion of this court, the right course of action to secure the ends of justice and especially to prevent re-victimisation of the de-juré victim, would be to quash the criminal proceedings.”
Further, the Bench points out in para 42 that, “Mr. Anand V Khatri, learned ASC (Criminal) confirms that the State has no objection to the subject FIR being quashed.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 43 that, “In the circumstances, this court is of the view that in light of the consistent, unequivocal and volitional stand taken by respondent No.2, continuing with the subject FIR and all subsequent proceedings would not be conducive to the welfare and interests of respondent No.2 and her infant.”
Needless to say, the Bench then directs and holds in para 44 that, “Accordingly, case FIR No.279/2025 dated 13.06.2025 registered under section 64(1) of the BNS and section 6 of the POCSO Act at P.S.:Malviya Nagar, South Delhi is quashed. All proceedings arising therefrom also stand closed.”
What’s more, the Bench then directs and holds in para 45 that, “Petition stands disposed-of.”
Finally, the Bench then aptly concludes by directing and holding in para 46 that, “Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed-of.”
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