What is to be seen in the instant case, is whether the claim for deduction of depreciation u/s 32 of the Act, made by the assessee was bona-fide and whether all the material facts relevant thereto have been furnished and once it is so established, the assessee cannot be held liable for concealment penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act.
Having regard to the facts noted above as well as explanation adduced by the assessee in respect of the payments and the suspicious approach of the DGIT(E) towards the evidence adduced by the assessee without noticing the crucial facts such as payment by cheques etc., it seems that the DGIT(E) was not justified in law in readily inferring that assessee manipulated and fabricated its books of account and vouchers and also debited personal, bogus and exaggerated expenses.
As explained by assessee, the income could not be offered as assessee sought approval under section 10(23G) as early as of 24-8-2005 which was followed with reminder letter addressed to the CCIT on 17-1-2006. Since the application was made in form No. 56E, it is natural that the Board will either accept or reject the application in a reasonable period of time. As on 1-11-2006 assessee has not been communicated by the result of the application, even though it was following it up.
In the light of the above discussions, the admitted facts of the case under consideration are that during the year under consideration share holding of the company has changed by more than 51% and management and control of the company has been passed on to Pippal family.
During the course of the proceedings before the Tribunal the revenue contended that the borrowings on which the interest has been claimed as a deduction are in fact capital of the assessee and brought only under the nomenclature of loan for tax consideration. It was the case of the appellant-revenue before the Tribunal that debt capital is required to be re-characterized as equity capital.
The definition of ‘input service’ provided under rule 2(l) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 covers a gamut of activities relating to the business undertaken by the manufacturer or the service provider. In the case under consideration the appellant has used the vehicles owned by them either for transportation of their employees or for transportation of goods which is an integral part of the business of appellant-firm.
In the present case, therefore, the fact that the assessee had completed the construction well before 31st March, 2008 is not in doubt. It is, of course, true that formally BU permission was not granted by the Municipal Authority by such date. It is equally true that explanation to clause (a) to section 80-IB(10) links the completion of the construction to the BU permission being granted by the local authority.
In order to determine whether the payment is not sustainable, the Assessing Officer has to first return a finding that the payment made is excessive under section 40A (2). If it is found to be so, then the Assessing Officer has to determine what constitutes the fair market value of the services rendered and disallow the difference between what is claimed and what is such value determined (as fair market value).
Section-132B(4) cannot be construed or interpreted in a manner as to defeat the rights of the assessee/writ petitioner to the property itself. The fact that it limits the liability to the point of time when assessment is completed would mean that authorities have to be alive of this fact and release the amount within reasonable time.
Thus in case of service tax also the Commissioner (A) is not empowered to remand the matter, he has to decide the matter by himself. Therefore the order of ld. Commissioner (Appeals) remanding the case to the lower authority, is not sustainable.
