Condonation of Delay in GST Appeals: Relief via Writ or Closed Door?

When an appeal is preferred before an appellate authority under any statute, it must strictly conform to the procedural framework prescribed under that legislation. Generally, it is seen that statutes prescribe a specific limitation period for filing appeals, and not only this, they also provide an outer limit or maximum period for condonation of delay in the case of belated appeals.

For example, Section 107 of the CGST Act provides that any person aggrieved by an order passed under the Act may file an appeal before the Appellate Authority within three months from the date of communication of such order. It further stipulates that, if sufficient cause is shown, the Appellate Authority may condone a delay of up to one month beyond the prescribed limitation period.

“Section 107- Appeal to Appellate Authority

(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act by an adjudicating authority may appeal to such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person.

(4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month.”

Now, the question that arises is: what remedy remains for an aggrieved person who is barred from filing an appeal due to the expiration of the four-month limitation period prescribed under the statute, i.e., in this case, the CGST Act?

First, it is important to note a well-known principle: the law helps those who are alert about their rights, not those who ignore them. This idea is captured in the Latin saying “Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt.” The reason is that legal matters need clarity and cannot be kept open or uncertain forever.

However, it is also important to understand that sometimes a person may face genuine problems in filing an appeal on time. Situations like medical emergencies, absence of important staff, limited access to the GST portal, or other real personal or work difficulties may cause the delay.

If the appellate authority has no power to accept the appeal after the four-month limitation period has expired, the question then is: who will provide relief to the aggrieved person in the interest of natural justice?

We know that Article 226 of the Constitution of India empowers every High Court to issue writs not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights but also “for any other purpose.” The provision reads as follows:

“Article 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.

In the context of GST appeals, an important question arises: Can the High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, condone the delay in filing an appeal when the statute itself limits such condonation to a maximum of four months?  To address this, it becomes necessary to examine the constitutional contours of the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

However, before proceeding further, it becomes essential to examine whether the Limitation Act, 1963 and its provisions—particularly Section 5—can be invoked to condone delay in filing an appeal when the parent statute itself prescribes a strict limitation period and expressly limits condonation to a maximum of four months under GST.

Section 5 permits condonation of delay, whereas Section 29(2) determines the extent to which this power applies when the limitation period is prescribed under a special or local law. Under Section 29(2), the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act—including Section 5—apply to such special statutes only to the extent they are not expressly excluded. These provisions are reproduced herein as under-

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Section 29- Savings.—

 (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

In view of the above, it is well settled that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies only where its operation is not expressly or impliedly excluded by the special statute. Accordingly, when a special law prescribes not only a specific period of limitation but also an outer limit for condonation of delay, the application of Section 5 stands excluded by necessary implication. This means that Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be used only when the special law does not stop it. If a special law clearly fixes the time limit for filing an appeal and also sets a maximum limit for condoning delay, then Section 5 automatically does not apply.

Further in pursuance to the Section 29, if a special or local law sets a time limit for filing a suit, appeal, or application that is different from the general limitation period in the Limitation Act, then the other rules of the Act apply only to the extent that the special law does not specifically exclude them. The Limitation Act applies to special laws only as long as the special law allows it. If the special law clearly overrides or limits the Act, the Act cannot be used to extend the time.

Now, it is pertinent to note that Section 107 of the CGST Act provides that any person aggrieved by an order passed under the Act may file an appeal before the Appellate Authority within three months from the date of communication of such order. It further stipulates that, if sufficient cause is shown, the Appellate Authority may condone a delay of up to one month beyond the prescribed limitation period. Therefore, Section 5 does not apply automatically.

Therefore, in the context of GST appeals, when an aggrieved person chooses the statutory appellate route, the appellate authority is duty-bound to act strictly within the four corners of the statute. It cannot entertain an appeal filed beyond the maximum period of limitation prescribed under the Act.

In ONGC v. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd. in Civil Appeal No. 1315 of 2010 judgment dated 01.03.2017, the Supreme Court dismissed ONGC’s appeal on the ground of limitation. The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was filed beyond the maximum permissible period prescribed under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Under Section 125, an appeal must be filed within 60 days, with a further 60-day period available for condonation of delay. ONGC filed the appeal with an additional delay of 71 days beyond this outer limit. The Court held that once the statutory cap of 120 days expires, neither the Supreme Court nor any other authority has the power to condone the delay. The Court further clarified that Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to extend a legislatively mandated limitation period. Since the appeal was time-barred, the Court dismissed it without entering into the merits of the case.

“16………….The Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to the limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to be followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a different way, the prescription of limitation in a case of present nature, when the statute commands that this Court may condone the further delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the ambit and sweep of the provisions and policy of legislation. It is equivalent to Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse to Article 142 of the Constitution.”

The Electricity Act is a special law, so the time-limit written in it must be strictly followed. When the law clearly says that the Supreme Court can allow a delay only up to 60 extra days, that rule is mandatory. It works just like Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which requires courts to reject cases filed late. Therefore, if an appeal is filed after the maximum 120 days, the delay cannot be excused, and the Supreme Court cannot use Article 142 (its “complete justice” powers) to extend the time. The delay is legally not condonable.

Based on this judgments, the CGST Act is a special law, so the authorities have no power to excuse any delay beyond four months, whether by using Section 5 of the Limitation Act or in any other way.

In a significant ruling on the limits of writ jurisdiction vis-à-vis statutory remedies, the Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada v. M/s Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd. set aside the High Court’s order that had entertained a writ petition against a VAT assessment despite the assessee’s failure to file an appeal within the strict statutory timeframe. The Court observed that the assessment order dated 21.06.2017 had attained finality because the statutory appeal was filed only on 24.09.2018—far beyond the 60-day limitation under Section 31 of the AP VAT Act—without placing any substantiated or credible explanation for the delay. The assessee had relied solely on an affidavit from its Site Director and did not file supporting affidavits from the concerned employee allegedly responsible for withholding the assessment order, rendering the plea of “sufficient cause” unproven. The Supreme Court emphasised that neither Article 226 nor Article 142 can be invoked to override express statutory limitations, and that High Courts cannot grant relief merely because the statutory remedy has become time-barred due to the assessee’s own inaction. Reaffirming that rejection of a delay-condonation application does not result in merger of the original assessment order, the Court held that the writ petition ought to have been rejected at the threshold. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and reinstated the assessment order, reiterating the principle that writ jurisdiction cannot be used to bypass statutory timelines or resurrect remedies lost by efflux of time.

In this significant decision interpreting the limitation framework under the Companies Act, 2013, the Supreme Court in Bengal Chemists & Druggists Association v. Kalyan Chowdhury (2018) upheld the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal’s dismissal of an appeal filed 9 days beyond the maximum permissible extended period under Section 421(3). The Court emphasized that Section 421(3) prescribes a strict limitation structure: 45 days for filing an appeal, and a further period not exceeding 45 days only if sufficient cause is shown. After the second 45-day window expires, the Appellate Tribunal becomes functus officio with respect to condonation. The appellant’s argument that Section 433 brings in Section 5 of the Limitation Act was rejected, the Court clarifying that the Limitation Act applies only “as far as may be,” and cannot override a special statutory scheme that already contains its own limited condonation provision. The Court relied on analogous rulings, including Chhattisgarh SEB v. CERC, holding that where the statute itself fixes an outer limit, further condonation is impermissible. The Court also distinguished earlier precedents cited by the appellant, noting that none dealt with a situation where the statute itself created a two-tier limitation with an absolute bar thereafter. Concluding that Section 421(3)’s second period is peremptory—functionally equivalent to the “but not thereafter” clause in the Arbitration Act—the Supreme Court affirmed the NCLAT’s view and dismissed the appeal, reinforcing that statutory limitation cannot be expanded by equitable interpretation.

Writ Jurisdiction of High Courts

In the context of GST appeals, an important question arises: Can the High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, condone the delay in filing an appeal when the statute itself limits such condonation to a maximum of four months?  Now we will examine the constitutional contours of the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

It is important to understand that the Constitution of India gives special powers to the High Courts and the Supreme Court to protect people’s rights. If a person’s fundamental or legal rights are violated by the government or its officers, they can approach the High Court under Article 226 or the Supreme Court under Article 32. These writ powers help the courts give quick justice, especially when no other effective remedy is available, when the legal procedure has not been followed, or when a court or authority has given an unreasonable or unfair decision.

The GST law contains its own complete process for filing an appeal against orders passed by adjudicating authorities. Normally, the High Court does not use its writ powers when such an alternate remedy is available under the law. However, even when an appeal option exists, there are certain exceptions where the writ court can still step in.

i) When a person approaches the court to protect their fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

ii) When the government or authority has not followed the basic principles of natural justice, such as giving a fair hearing.

iii) When the order or action taken by the authority is completely without legal power or beyond its jurisdiction.

Sufficient Cause

Courts and appellate authorities have consistently recognized certain circumstances as constituting “sufficient cause” for condoning delays, provided they are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Commonly acknowledged grounds include medical emergencies, such as serious illness or hospitalization of the taxpayer or key personnel like a managing director; technical glitches, where genuine difficulties with the GST portal hindered timely online filing; and lack of communication, for instance, when an order is only uploaded on the portal without proper intimation to the taxpayer. Bona fide errors, arising from genuine mistakes or misadvice from an accountant or legal counsel—so long as they are not attributable to negligence—also qualify. Additionally, natural calamities, including floods, earthquakes, or government-imposed lockdowns, have been recognized as valid reasons for delay. Each of these grounds emphasizes the need for credible evidence to substantiate the claim of “sufficient cause.”

Writ Jurisdiction of High Courts for condoning the delay

Now, the first question that needs to be considered is whether the High Court can apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act in writ proceedings.

Relief under Writ Jurisdiction with Limitation Act

Calcutta High Court

The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court, in the matter S.K. Chakraborty & Sons v. Union of India in MAT 81 and 82 of 2022, judgment dated 01.12.2023, dealt with whether the delay-condonation provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly Section 5, apply to appeals filed under Section 107 of the GST Act, 2017. The appellant’s GST appeal had been rejected because it was filed beyond the three-month period and the further one-month condonable period under Section 107(4). The appellate authority and the Single Judge both held that delay beyond the total 60 days could not be condoned.

In appeal, the Division Bench examined whether the GST Act expressly or implicitly excludes the operation of the Limitation Act. The Court held that Section 107 does not contain any non-obstante clause nor any language that excludes Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The judges also noted that Section 108, which provides a much longer period for revision, indicates that the statute does not intend an absolute cut-off for all remedies and does not exclude general limitation principles.

Relying on Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the Court held that when a special law prescribes a different limitation period, Sections 4–24 of the Limitation Act apply unless expressly excluded. Since the GST Act does not expressly or impliedly exclude Section 5, the Court held that the appellate authority can condone delay even beyond the 60-day outer period if sufficient cause is shown.

The Court disagreed with the earlier Single Judge’s view that the 60-day period under GST law is absolute. It clarified that the GST limitation provision is not final or inflexible and that a taxpayer should not lose the right to appeal merely due to technical rigidity, especially when the statute does not bar further condonation.

Finally, the Court set aside the orders of both the appellate authority and the Single Judge. It remanded the matter back to the appellate authority to examine the appellant’s explanation for delay on merits, and if sufficient cause is shown, to condone the delay and hear the appeal.

Relying on the same rationale, the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Arvind Gupta v. Assistant Commissioner of Revenue, State Taxes, WPA 2904/2023 (dated 04.01.2024), also condoned the delay beyond the outer limit of four months by invoking its constitutional powers under Article 226. The Court held that, in view of the Division Bench decision in S.K. Chakraborty & Sons, the GST Act does not expressly or impliedly bar the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It further observed that where sufficient cause is demonstrated—such as the petitioner’s serious medical condition—the High Court can intervene to prevent miscarriage of justice and direct the appellate authority to hear the appeal on merits.

It is pertinent to note that the Division Bench judgment in S.K. Chakraborty & Sons has been challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 28069/2024. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, by its order dated 5.08.2024, has stayed the effect and operation of the said judgment. Consequently, the issue is now sub judice before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

In Ashok Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (MAT 82 of 2025, decided 04.11.2025), the Calcutta High Court Division Bench addressed a GST appeal filed beyond the statutory period under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The Single Judge had dismissed the writ petition, relying on Supreme Court precedents under the Central Excise Act—Singh Enterprises (2008) 3 SCC 70 and Hongo India (2009) 5 SCC 791—and held that delay beyond four months could not be condoned. The petitioner also relied on an unreported Division Bench judgment in S.K. Chakraborty & Sons (M.A.T. 81 of 2022), which was stayed by the Supreme Court, but the Single Judge deemed it irrelevant.

Before the Division Bench, the appellant contended that the Supreme Court decisions pertained to the Central Excise Act and were not applicable to GST. He relied on S.K. Chakraborty & Sons and Ram Kumar Sinhal v. State of West Bengal, where Section 107(4) was held to be directory, allowing condonation of delay with sufficient explanation. The Court observed that a Supreme Court stay does not negate the precedential value of a Division Bench judgment (Pijush Kanti Chowdhury v. State of West Bengal).

The Division Bench concluded that the Appellate Authority has the power to condone delay beyond the statutory limit if adequate justification is provided. Consequently, the Single Judge’s and Appellate Authority’s orders were set aside, and the matter was remanded for reconsideration of delay condonation.

The next question that arises is whether High Courts, in exercise of their inherent constitutional powers under Article 226, can condone delay even when the statute imposes an express bar on condonation beyond the prescribed period.

Relief under Writ Jurisdiction –regarding condonation of delay

It is important to note that several High Courts have held that, despite a strict statutory bar under the CGST Act, a constitutional court cannot be rendered powerless in the face of serious procedural injustice. In cases involving failure of natural justice, lack of proper service, or genuine procedural impediments, courts have exercised their inherent constitutional powers to condone delay.

Punjab & Haryana High Court

In the case of M/s Vasudeva Engineering vs. Union of India (CWP No. 27468 of 2023 and connected cases), judgment dated 24.10.2024, the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court considered the key question common to all these petitions: whether the Appellate Authority, while hearing appeals under Section 107 of the Act, was legally correct in rejecting appeals filed after the time limit prescribed under the Haryana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. In this case, the petitioner had failed to file an appeal within the prescribed time frame, even the maximum period for condonation by appellate authority had lapsed.

The Hon’ble P&H High Court, exercising its powers under Article 226, granted relief to the petitioners. The Hon’ble Court held that

“4. Accordingly, we hold that the powers to hear the appeal in terms of Section 107 of the Act would not be subject to filing of an appeal within the time prescribed wherein, it would not in any manner deprive a person from claiming the right of hearing of an appeal by filing of a writ petition before this Court for condonation of delay.

Accordingly, Hon’ble P&H High Court held that the power to hear an appeal under Section 107 of the Act is not lost simply because the appeal was not filed within the prescribed time. A person still has the right to have their appeal heard by filing a writ petition before this Court to seek condonation of the delay.

Further, relying on this judgment, the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court also condoned delays beyond four months in Pawan Fabrics v. Commissioner, Central Goods and Services Tax and Ors. (CWP No. 8187 of 2024), judgment dated 19.12.2024. The Court held that, considering the petitioner’s documents and medical condition, the delay in filing the appeal was condoned. The Court directed the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the appeal on its merits without questioning the limitation period.

It is pertinent to note that the Revenue has challenged the judgment rendered in Vasudeva Engineering before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 14673 of 2025, and the matter is presently sub judice before the Hon’ble Court.

Madras High Court

Further, in Sathya Furnitures v. Assistant Commissioner (ST) (W.P. No. 10598 of 2023, decided on 05.04.2023), the Hon’ble Madras High Court similarly exercised its writ jurisdiction in a situation where the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Tamil Nadu GST Act, 2017 had become unavailable due to expiry of the maximum permissible limitation period. In this matter, the petitioner approached the writ court after both the 90-day appeal period and the further condonable period of 30 days had lapsed. As the appellate authority lacked jurisdiction to entertain any such belated appeal, the Hon’ble Court considered whether the circumstances justified intervention under Article 226.

The Court observed that the petitioner, a small trader, had explained the delay by attributing it to mistakes committed by the accountant and non-receipt of subsequent notices. Although the Hon’ble Court did not treat these explanations as conclusive on merits, it accepted that the petitioner had demonstrated bona fide grounds warranting limited relief. The Court also noted that the constitutional validity of Section 16(4), under which the input tax credit had been reversed, was already under judicial consideration in other pending writ petitions.

Taking these factors into account, the Hon’ble Madras High Court permitted the petitioner to file an appeal before the appellate authority and directed that the same be entertained without reference to limitation, subject to fulfillment of the statutory pre-deposit requirements.

Further, in T. Porkodi v. Deputy Commissioner (CT) (W.P. No. 20516 of 2025, Madras High Court, order dated 13.06.2025), the Hon’ble Court dealt with a situation where the petitioner’s appeal under Section 107 of the GST Act had been rejected on the ground that it was filed with a delay of 288 days—well beyond both the statutory limitation period and the maximum condonable period. As the appellate authority lacked jurisdiction to entertain such a belated appeal, the petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.

The petitioner explained that the delay had occurred due to the consultant’s failure to inform her about the issuance of the show-cause notice and assessment order, which had been uploaded only on the GST portal. She also placed on record that she had been hospitalized during the relevant period. The Hon’ble Court accepted these explanations as bona fide and held that sufficient cause had been shown for condonation of the delay.

In view of these circumstances, the Madras High Court set aside the rejection order, condoned the 288-day delay, and directed that the appeal be taken on file, subject to the petitioner depositing an additional 5% of the disputed tax, over and above the statutory pre-deposit of 10% already made. The appellate authority was further directed to hear and dispose of the appeal on its merits.

In Kaajal Agarwal v. State Tax Officer & Deputy Commissioner (CT) (W.P. Nos. 20985 & 20991 of 2025, judgment dated 16.06.2025), the Hon’ble Madras High Court considered a challenge to the rejection of an appeal filed under Section 107 of the TNGST Act on the ground of limitation. The petitioner had filed an appeal with a delay of 67 days, explaining that the delay occurred because she was bona fide pursuing a rectification application, which had been rejected only on 06.02.2025. Immediately thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 07.03.2025.

The Hon’ble Court noted that the petitioner had promptly responded to the show-cause notice and had pursued the rectification mechanism before the assessment order was confirmed. The Court observed that the explanation offered—namely, that the petitioner was prosecuting the rectification proceedings—constituted a genuine and acceptable reason for the delay. Consequently, the Court invoked its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and condoned the delay of 67 days.

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Similarly, in Shaik Abdul Azeez v. State of Andhra Pradesh (W.P. No. 33509 of 2023), the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court reaffirmed the breadth of the writ jurisdiction in circumstances where the statutory appellate authority is rendered powerless to condone delay beyond the maximum four-month period prescribed under Section 107 of the APGST Act. In that case, the petitioner’s registration had been cancelled on 13.03.2023 pursuant to a show-cause notice issued on 14.01.2023. The appeal filed thereafter was rejected at the threshold on the ground that the delay, being 128 days beyond the condonable period, made the appeal non-maintainable and left the appellate authority without jurisdiction.

The petitioner explained that the delay resulted from serious medical complications, including surgery and prolonged bed rest, which prevented him from attending to business affairs or pursuing statutory remedies. It was further submitted that the cancellation order had not been physically communicated. These circumstances were consistently set out in the writ affidavit as well as in Form GST APL-01. The petitioner also relied upon a coordinate Bench decision in W.P. No. 17349 of 2023, wherein similar medical grounds had been accepted as sufficient cause.

The Hon’ble Court held that while the appellate authority was correct in declining to entertain the appeal due to lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner had established sufficient cause for the delay. Emphasising that the right of appeal is a valuable statutory right that ought not to be defeated solely on procedural grounds when compelling circumstances exist, the Court invoked its powers under Article 226 and condoned the delay. The delay was condoned subject to payment of costs of ₹20,000, and the appellate authority was directed to consider and decide the appeal on its merits, uninfluenced by the issue of limitation.

Allahabad High Court

In Engineered and Innovative Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (Writ Tax No. 222 of 2023, judgment dated 08.02.2024), the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) considered a challenge to the rejection of an appeal under Section 107 of the U.P. GST Act on the ground of limitation. The petitioner’s GST registration had been cancelled after the petitioner failed to respond to the show-cause notice, purportedly due to the Managing Director’s serious medical condition. The subsequent appeal was dismissed as being filed with a delay of 95 days, beyond the statutory and condonable periods.

Before the Hon’ble Court, the petitioner produced medical records demonstrating that the Managing Director was suffering from tuberculosis during the relevant period, which prevented him from conducting business or responding to the authorities. It was also submitted that the petitioner had discharged the entire tax liability along with late fees and interest.

Observing that cancellation of GST registration carries severe consequences for the assessee, the Hon’ble Court held that the petitioner had shown bona fide and sufficient cause for the delay and that the rigid application of limitation should not defeat substantial justice in such circumstances. The Court accordingly directed the respondents to restore the petitioner’s GST registration within ten days of receipt of the order, while permitting the authorities to communicate any remaining dues, which the petitioner would be required to clear within seven days of such communication.

No relief even under Writ Jurisdiction

It is to be noted that various Courts have repeatedly made it clear that a writ petition under Article 226 cannot be used as a substitute for a regular appeal. If High Courts start relaxing limitation freely, it would defeat the purpose of the time limits fixed under Section 107. Therefore, unless the order being challenged is completely without authority or violates basic principles of natural justice, even a small delay or delays caused by practical difficulties are usually treated as sufficient grounds to reject the writ petition.

Delhi High Court

In Addichem Speciallity LLP v. Special Commissioner-I, Department of Trade and Taxes & Anr. (W.P.(C) No. 14279 of 2024, judgment dated 07.02.2025), the Hon’ble Delhi High Court dealt with a batch of petitions arising out of orders passed by the Appellate Authority. In all these cases, the Appellate Authority had rejected the petitioners’ appeals on the ground of limitation, holding that the appeals were filed beyond the period prescribed under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. In this matter, the Court held that petition seeking an extension of the limitation period for filing an appeal under section 107 of the CGST Act cannot be sustained in the law. The Court observed in para 69 as under-

“69. In summary, the power to condone delay caused in pursuing a statutory remedy would always be dependent upon the statutory provision that governs. The right to seek condonation of delay and invoke the discretionary power inhering in an appellate authority would depend upon whether the statute creates a special and independent regime with respect to limitation or leaves an avenue open for the appellant to invoke the general provisions of the Limitation Act to seek condonation of delay. The facility to seek condonation can be resorted provided the legislation does not construct an independent regime with respect to an appeal being preferred. Once it is found that the legislation incorporates a provision which creates a special period of limitation and proscribes the same being entertained after a terminal date, the general provisions of the Limitation Act would cease to apply.”

If the law creates its own special time limits and clearly states that no appeal can be accepted after a certain final date, then the general Limitation Act cannot be used to extend the time. But if the law does not create a separate or special limitation system, then the appellant can use the general rules of the Limitation Act to ask for condonation. So, when a statute has a strict final cut-off date, no authority can condone delay beyond that point.

Rajasthan High Court

The Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court, in Akshansh Consultancy Services Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner (Civil Writ Petition No. 2957 of 2024, judgment dated 01.04.2025), declined to entertain a writ petition filed after the expiry of both the statutory limitation period and the condonable period prescribed for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act. The Court observed that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the assessment order suffered from a jurisdictional error or that it had been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, the Hon’ble Court refused to invoke its writ jurisdiction to surmount the statutory bar of limitation.

The Rajasthan High Court placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada & Ors. v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited, (2020) 19 SCC 681, which had also been considered and followed by the Court in M/s Thekedar Girraj Prasad Garg v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1615/2024, decided on 04.04.2024). In that case as well, the Court had held that when an assessee allows both the period of limitation for filing an appeal and the maximum period permissible for condonation of delay to lapse, a writ petition would not be maintainable.

Allahabad High Court

The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court, in M/s Garg Enterprises v. State of U.P. & Ors. (Writ Tax No. 291 of 2022, judgment dated 19.01.2024), declined to entertain a writ petition filed after the expiry of both the statutory period and the condonable period prescribed for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act. In paragraph 7 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Court observed: –

“7. The Central Goods and Services Act is a special statute and a self-contained code by itself. Section 107 of the Act has an inbuilt mechanism and has impliedly excluded the application of the Limitation Act. It is trite law that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply only if it is extended to the special statute. Section 107 of the Act specifically provides for the limitation and in the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, one cannot apply. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the aforesaid provision.”

Thus, the Court held that the CGST Act is a special law containing a complete and independent mechanism for appeals. Since Section 107 expressly prescribes the limitation period and does not provide for condonation of delay beyond the statutory limit, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded.

The same view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in M/s Abhishek Trading Corporation v. Commissioner (Appeals) & Anr. (Writ Tax No. 1394 of 2023, judgment dated 19.01.2024), wherein the Court similarly declined to interfere and dismissed the writ petition.

Further, in M/s Yadav Scrap Traders v. Additional Commissioner & Ors. (Writ Tax Nos. 975 & 977 of 2023, judgment dated 15.02.2024), the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court declined to entertain a writ petition filed after the expiry of both the statutory period and the condonable period prescribed for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act. The Hon’ble Court held that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in S.K. Chakraborty & Sons did not adequately consider the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Singh Enterprises and Hongo India. Consequently, the Court held that the Calcutta High Court’s view had no precedential value and could not be accepted. The Hon’ble Court reaffirmed the principles earlier laid down in Garg Enterprises.

In paragraph 7, the Hon’ble Court observed:

 “7. Upon a perusal of Section 107 of the Act, it is clear that the appellate authority can only allow extension of a period of one month as provided in sub section (4) of Section 107 of the Act. In the present case, the appeal was filed approximately 73 days subsequent to the expiry of one month that was condonable under Section 107(4) of the Act. To make it more clear, the period within which the appeal could have been filed was three months plus a period of one month. However, in the present case the appeal was filed beyond the period of four months, and therefore, the appellate authority could not have condoned the delay even if sufficient cause was made out.”

Kerala High Court

In Penuel Nexus Pvt. Ltd. v. The Additional Commissioner, Headquarters (Appeals) & Ors. (W.P.(C) No. 15574 of 2023, judgment dated 13.06.2023), the Hon’ble Kerala High Court held that the GST Act is a special statute functioning as a self-contained code, and therefore the provisions of the Limitation Act stand excluded unless expressly incorporated. The Hon’ble Court observed as follows:

“10. The Central Goods and Services Tax Act is a special statute and a self-contained code by itself. Section 107 has an inbuilt mechanism and has impliedly excluded the application of the Limitation Act. It is trite, that the Limitation Act will apply only if it is extended to the special statute. It is also rudimentary that the provisions of a fiscal statute have to be strictly construed and interpreted.”

High Court of Chhattisgarh

In Nandan Steels and Power Limited v. State of Chhattisgarh (WA No. 104 of 2021, decided on 10.08.2022), the Hon’ble High Court of Chhattisgarh held that the CGST Act is a special law which prescribes its own specific periods of limitation under Sections 107(1) and 107(4). Accordingly, the limitation framework contained in the CGST Act alone governs the filing of appeals under Section 107. The Hon’ble Court further observed that the Limitation Act contains no provision applicable to appeals under the CGST Act and, since the CGST Act is a complete and self-contained code, the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stands excluded.

Relying on the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav, Hongo India, Singh Enterprises, Patel Brothers, P. Radha Bai, and Glaxo SmithKline, the Court reiterated that where a statute expressly prescribes (i) a period of limitation and (ii) a maximum period for condonation of delay, neither courts nor authorities have jurisdiction to extend the time beyond the statutory outer limit. Consequently, no delay beyond the maximum condonable period under Section 107(4) can be condoned.

Conclusion: High Courts have, in certain cases, exercised their inherent power under Article 226 of the Constitution to condone delays, particularly where strict adherence to procedural timelines would result in manifest injustice, or where the appellate authorities are non-functional or inaccessible. Such intervention, however, is exceptional and discretionary; it is not to be treated as an automatic or routine remedy. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is inherently limited, but it remains a viable option in appropriate circumstances where statutory remedies are unavailable or ineffective. The ultimate authority on the matter rests with the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which has kept the relevant issues pending. Until the Supreme Court renders a final decision, the writ route continues to serve as a potential, though narrow, mechanism for condoning delays that would otherwise be barred under the GST statute, offering taxpayers a limited opportunity to seek relief in extraordinary situations.

FAVOURABLE JUDGMENTS (Delay Condoned / Relief Granted)

UNFAVOURABLE JUDGMENTS (Delay NOT Condoned / Writ Dismissed)

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