Case Law Details
Abhishek Trading Corporation Vs Commissioner (Appeals) And Another (Allahabad High Court)
In a landmark judgment, the Allahabad High Court has delivered a decisive ruling concerning the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, to appeals under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax (CGST) Act, 2017. The case, titled “Abhishek Trading Corporation Vs Commissioner (Appeals) And Another,” underscores the self-contained nature of the CGST Act and its precedence over general limitation laws.
The petitioner sought relief from an appellate order which dismissed their appeal as time-barred, arguing for the application of the Limitation Act to extend the prescribed period for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act. The court, referencing Supreme Court precedents, clarified that the appellate authorities under the CGST Act, being statutory creations, do not possess the jurisdiction to condone delays beyond the statutory limit. The CGST Act delineates a specific framework for filing appeals, including a fixed timeframe that does not accommodate the general extension provisions of the Limitation Act.
The ruling elaborated that Section 107 of the CGST Act implies a complete exclusion of the Limitation Act by not providing any clause for condoning delays beyond the prescribed period. This interpretation aligns with the Supreme Court’s stance in similar cases, emphasizing the intended exclusivity and self-sufficiency of the CGST framework in handling appeals related to tax assessments and penalties.
The Allahabad High Court’s decision to dismiss the petition reaffirms the autonomous regulatory mechanism of the CGST Act concerning the filing of appeals. By explicitly excluding the application of the Limitation Act to Section 107, the judgment reinforces the legislative intent to streamline tax-related disputes within a specified, non-extendable timeframe. This ruling not only ensures the expeditious resolution of tax disputes but also upholds the principle of legal certainty within the realm of tax law. It marks a significant moment in the interpretation of tax legislation, emphasizing the specialized nature of tax adjudication processes over general legal remedies.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
1. Heard Sri Suyash Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Parv Agarwal, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and learned Standing Counsel for the State.
2. This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein the petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated August 28, 2023 passed by the appellate authority being the Commissioner (Appeals), CGST and Central Appeal Commissionerate, Allahabad under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).
3. By the aforesaid order, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner on the ground that the same was time barred as it was filed beyond the period of four months. At paragraph 3.1 of the aforesaid order, the appellate authority has clearly pointed out that the petitioner has received the order dated October 13, 2021, whereas the appeal was filed on July 20, 2023, that is, after the period of more than 20 months and way beyond the time prescribed under Section 107 of the Act.
4. Upon perusal of the memo of appeal filed by the petitioner, it is clear that the order was communicated on October 13, 2021, as admitted by the petitioner itself. It is further to be noted that the order cancelling the registration was passed even earlier on January 22, 2021 and had been uploaded on the portal. As there is no dispute with regard to communication of the order and the fact that the appeal was filed beyond the time prescribed, this Court under the extraordinary jurisdiction cannot interfere with the appellate authority’s order as the application of Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to Section 107 of the Act.
5. The Supreme Court in Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Others reported in (2008) 3 SCC 70, while dealing with a similar issue as in the present case, has held as under:
“8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short “the Limitation Act”) can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days’ time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to subsection (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days’ period.”
6. In Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited and Another reported in (2009) 5 SCC 791, the Supreme Court has reiterated its stand and held as under:
“31. In this regard, it is useful to refer to a recent decision of this Court in Punjab Fibres Ltd. [(2008) 3 SCC 73] The Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise, Noida was the appellant in this case. While considering the very same question, namely, whether the High Court has power to condone the delay in presentation of the reference under Section 35-H(1) of the Act, the two-Judge Bench taking note of the said provision and the other related provisions following Singh Enterprises v. CCE [(2008) 3 SCC 70] concluded that: (Punjab Fibres Ltd. case [(2008) 3 SCC 73] , SCC p. 75, para 8)
“8….. the High Court was justified in holding that there was no power for condonation of delay in filing reference application.”
32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.”
7. The Central Goods and Services Act is a special statute and a self-contained code by itself. Section 107 of the Act has an inbuilt mechanism and has impliedly excluded the application of the Limitation Act. It is trite law that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply only if it is extended to the special statute. Section 107 of the Act specifically provides for the limitation and in the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, one cannot apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the aforesaid provision.
8. In light of the above, no interference is required in this petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
