During the course of assessment proceedings the Income Tax Officer has raised certain queries with regard to deductions, which were replied by the assessee and the in the assessment order in paragraph no.4.1 the Assessing Officer has dealt with the question of grant of deduction and has allowed deductions. In our opinion, the reasons given for reopening the assessment and the notice issued under section 148 of the Act is nothing, but a change of opinion. It is not the case of escape assessment as nothing was concealed by the assessee nor he has failed to furnish the material relevant to the assessment year before the Assessing Officer. For the aforesaid reasons, notice issued under section 148 of the Act deserves to be quashed.
From the documents on record, it can be seen that part of the penalty was confirmed by the CIT(Appeals). However, with respect to the rest, the same was deleted. The Tribunal concurred with such view of CIT (Appeals). Several additions were struck down in the assessment proceeding itself and were sent for reconsideration. With respect to disallowance of deduction under section 80IA of the Act, the authorities held that the claim cannot be stated to be a wrong claim. Relying on the decision in the case of CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts (P.) Ltd. [2010] 322 ITR 158, such penalty was deleted.
Tribunal observed that no penalty can be imposed merely because account books of assessee were rejected and that profit was estimated on the basis of fair gross profit ratio. With respect to retention of the portion of the sales tax, the Tribunal stated that no evidence was brought by the Revenue to suggest that assessee had retained a portion of sales tax with it. Assessee filed its explanation which could not be termed as not bona fide. In absence of any corroborative evidence to prove the charge that the portion of sales tax bill was retained by the assessee, penalty could not be imposed.
In the present case, we notice that that petitioners belonged to the same family or group. They were subjected to common search operation. Their assessments were therefore, under proposal for transfer. A show cause notice was issued to all of them in which the Commissioner called upon them to explain why the cases should not be centralised at Ahmedabad for effective and coordinated investigation. After considering their objections and permitting the oral submissions by the authorised representative, the Commissioner passed the order transferring the cases on the ground that cases were required to be centralised. Since Bhavnagar did not have Central Range Office, they could be transferred at Ahmedabad. Their request that cases be consolidated at Bhavnagar or Mumbai was considered but not accepted. They were instead offered alternative places for transfer of cases within the jurisdiction of Surat, Baroda or Rajkot Office. They did not accept the offer. It was thereupon that the Commissioner proceeded to finalise his proposed transfer of cases from Bhavnagar to Ahmedabad.
It is true that as per the agreement dated 13.9.1991, the assessee company was obliged to make payment for godown space which the assessee committed to hire from M/s. Coastal Roadways Ltd irrespective of whether such godowns utilised by the assessee or not. However, it is a matter of considerable importance that M/s. Coastal Roadways Ltd. never owned or possessed such godowns though so falsely claimed in the agreement dated 13.9.1991. More importantly during the entire period between 1.9.1991 to 31.3.1992, M/s. Coastal Roadways ltd. had not even hired the godown from any other source.
Tribunal proceeded to decide certain issues on merits without giving full opportunity to the aggrieved party to make submissions thereon, the order did certainly suffer from an error apparent on the record. Tribunal, therefore, committed no error in exercising power of rectification. We may, however, clarify that by recalling the said order, the Tribunal cannot seem to have recalled its earlier conclusions.
it is well settled that even if an issue is brought to the notice of the Assessing Officer by the audit party, it would not preclude the Assessing Officer from acting on such communication as long as the final opinion to take appropriate action is that of the Assessing Officer and not that of the audit party. Referring to the decision in case of CIT v. P.V.S Beedies (P.) Ltd. [1999] 237 ITR 13, it is equally well settled however that if the Assessing Officer has acted only under compulsion of the audit party and not independently, the action of re-opening would be vitiated.
Absence of an appeal does not necessarily render the legislation unreasonable as only because no appeal is provided under the Act against the order passed under section 14 of the Securitisation Act will not render section 14 ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution of India.
We agree with the view taken by the Tribunal; and the appeal is devoid of any merits. Both the substantial questions raised by the appellant do not involve any substantial question of law and therefore, the appeal is dismissed.
From the above portion, we noticed that the Tribunal has bifurcated the expenditure in two parts – first related to investment of Rs. 5907.18 lakhs in foreign subsidiaries, it was held that the dividend income from such subsidiaries is taxable in India and that therefore, Section 14A would have no applicability. The remaining amount pertain to investment of Rs. 38 Crores [rounded off] made in Indian subsidiaries. In this respect, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had to its disposal, own interest free funds many times over the investment in question. As per the balance sheet as on 31st March 2005, the assessee had interest free fund of Rs. 929.57 Crores.
