It is evident from the above account of the conduct of the two officials that they chose not to take proper steps at appropriate stage for filing the appeal even though they knew that it was their duty to do so. We have also noted that Mr. Prasad is totally remorseless in his affidavit. If the company loses this case it is because of his inaction. We nave already borne on record that we are not satisfied with the explanation offered in the COD application and the accompanying affidavits. Heavy delay of the appeal cannot be said to have been satisfactorily explained, particularly the delay from the first week of April 2012. The COD application is dismissed.
It is not in dispute that the show-cause notice invoked the extended period of limitation on the ground of suppression of facts with intent to avail undue CENVAT credit. The assessee did not choose to contest the demand on the ground of limitation, thereby virtually accepting the allegation of suppression. Their only grievance is against the penalty. The grounds for invoking the extended period of limitation are Indisputably identical to the grounds for invoking the section 11 AC. If that be so, where the demand has not been contested on the ground of limitation, it is not open to the assessee to oppose the section 11 AC penalty. In other words, where mens rea stands accepted in relation to the demand of duty, it has to be accepted by the assessee vis-a-vis the proposal for imposition of penalty under section 11AC. In the result, the penalty is unquestionable in this case.
The gist of the above averments is that the concerned person dealing with the matter in the appellant’s office received the orders and kept the same with him and forgot to hand it over to the appellant. The identity of “the concerned person dealing with the matter is not forthcoming. The appellant is a corporate entity and hence the concerned person dealing with the matter must be an employee of the company.
CESTAT Bangalore dismisses Ambience Constructions’ appeal on service tax refund, ruling it time-barred. Details of the case and key arguments provided.
CESTAT, BANGALORE BENCH Wadpack (P.) Ltd. Versus Commissioner of Central Excise FINAL ORDER NO. 700 OF 2012 CENTRAL EXCISE APPEAL NO. 637 OF 2010 NOVEMBER 5, 2012 ORDER 1. In this appeal filed by the assessee, the short question is whether, for the period from April 2005 to June 2007, the appellant was entitled to […]
We have not found prima facie case for the appellant insofar as the demand of service tax on life membership fees is concerned. Though it has been claimed that such fees are refundable as per the by-laws of the appellant, the claim is yet to be substantiated. We have not been shown a copy of the by-laws.
On a perusal of the Hon’ble High Court’s judgement, I have found that the period of dispute involved in that case was prior to April 2006. The Hon’ble High Court, on a set of facts similar to the facts of the instant case, framed the following question of law
The bank’s customers holding credit cards purchase goods from shops and the bank pays to the shop keeper on their behalf. Till the customers pay up the money to the bank, they are debtors and they stand in the shoes of borrowers. If that be the case, the amount transacted is a loan and interest must accrue to the bank in the event of delay in repayment thereof.
The terms and conditions of the relevant Agreements show that the appellant was, in fact, using their infrastructure, staff and expertise to market products of the Banks. In both the Agreements, the appellant was referred to as Direct Sales Association/Agent.
The order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is not a remand order and he has clearly held that the refund was available in respect of all services except ‘Air Travel Agent service’. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the submission that the Commissioner’s (Appeals) order is a remand order. In view of the above, the grounds raised by the department challenging the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) are not valid and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of MIL India Ltd. (supra) does not applicable to the facts of the present case.
