Jharkhand HC Orders Enquiry Into Failure Of State Authorities To Conduct Judicial Inquiries In At Least 262 Custodial Death Cases
While not restraining itself from holding the bull by the horns, we see that the Jharkhand High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Md Mumtaz Ansari v. State of Jharkhand & Ors in Md Mumtaz Ansari Vs State of Jharkhand & Ors in W.P. (PIL) No. 1218 of 2022 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:JHHC:14765-DB that was reserved on 07.05.2026 and then finally pronounced on 14/05/2026 has ordered an enquiry into the failure of authorities in the State to conduct judicial inquiries in at least 262 custodial death cases. Custodial death is a very serious case as those entrusted with custody themselves cause death under their custody and this under no circumstances can ever be allowed to go unpunished and unaccounted for. It has observed clearly that substitution of judicial inquiries mandated under Section 176(1-A) CrPC with executive inquiries amounted to “administrative lawlessness” and reflected systemic disregard for statutory and constitutional safeguards. For the uninitiated, the Jharkhand High Court was hearing a public interest litigation seeking implementation of Section 176(1-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, now Section 196(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, mandating judicial inquiry in every case of custodial death, disappearance or custodial rape which under no circumstances can ever be allowed to go unpunished or unaccounted for!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble The Chief Justice Mr MS Sonak for a Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Rajesh Shankar sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present writ petition has been filed in public interest seeking, inter alia, the following reliefs –
a. Direction upon the Respondent concerned to issue Government Order/direction/notification/circular to conduct Judicial Enquiry in every cases of death or disappearance of a person, or rape of a woman while such person/woman is in the custody of the police or in Judicial Custody as per the mandate of 176 (1-A) of Cr.P.C
b. Pass any such other order/s as may be deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of this case.”
To put things in perspective, the Division Bench then envisages in para 2 that, “The above reliefs are sought in public interest litigation on behalf of the victims of custodial violence, the families of the deceased, and the marginalised and socio-economically weaker sections of society in the State of Jharkhand, who often lack the awareness and financial resources to legally pursue and enforce their fundamental rights against the State machinery.”
As it turned out, the Division Bench then enunciates in para 3 that, “The petitioner’s case is predicated upon a written reply furnished by the Department of Home, Prison and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand, in response to a starred question in the State Legislative Assembly. This official disclosure reveals that a total of 166 persons died in police or judicial custody between 2019 and 2021. Based on these figures, the petitioner contends that in most of these instances, the cause of death was custodial violence or torture.”
Do note, the Division Bench notes in para 7 that, “The supplementary counter-affidavit dated 13.03.2026, filed by Respondent No. 2, paints a deeply distressing and shocking picture of systemic non-compliance. The statistical data on custodial deaths from 2018 onwards, as extrapolated from Annexure-D to the affidavit, reveal a situation that strikes at the very root of the Rule of Law.”
Do also note, the Division Bench then notes in para 8 that, “The relevant particulars, as disclosed in the affidavit, are reproduced below:
Particulars Total No. of custodial death 427
No. of Custodial Death brought to the notice of Magistrate for enquiry. 427
No. of enquiry conducted by the Magistrate under Section 176 Cr.P.C or Section 196 of BNSS, 2023 427
No. of Magisterial inquiry held in addition to police inquiry 427
No. of inquiry done by Executive Magistrate 262
No. of inquiry done by Judicial Magistrate 225
No. of cases in which NHRC Guidelines taken into count 427
No. of cases in which provisions of BNSS complied 133.”
(for cases from 2023- 2025 only)
Plainly speaking, the Division Bench points out in para 9 that, “On a perusal of this data, this Court is shocked beyond words. While the respondents claim that magisterial inquiries were conducted in all 427 cases, their own figures reveal either a fundamental misunderstanding or a total disregard for the law. This Court fails to comprehend how the respondents can, under oath, state that they have complied with the mandates of Section 176 of the Cr.P.C. or Section 196 of the BNSS in letter and spirit.”
It cannot be lost sight of that the Division Bench points out in para 10 that, “By their own admission, 262 inquiries were conducted by Executive Magistrates, even though the law had unequivocally stripped the Executive of this prerogative two decades ago. Enquiries by Executive Magistrates could never have been regarded as substitutes for enquiries by judicial magistrates in matters of custodial deaths. Yet the affidavit claims that the letter and spirit of the law were followed when addressing the issue of large-scale custodial deaths in Jharkhand.”
Most strikingly, the Division Bench observes in para 11 that, “The figure, or at least the disclosed figure of 427 custodial deaths between 2018 and 2016, is alarming. But even more alarming is the utter disregard for legal procedures when addressing such issues of custodial deaths. The breaches, serious by themselves, if unchecked, will increase custodial unnatural deaths, embolden the perpetrators, and promote lawlessness. The right to life protected by our Constitution also extends to those in the custody of State Authorities, and those in Authority cannot, therefore, trample upon this right by disregarding, with impunity, the legal and Constitutional safeguards.”
Be it noted, the Division Bench notes in para 12 that, “The right to life is not a mere biological concept; it is an expansive guarantee that inherently encompasses the right to live with human dignity (Elizabeth Wicks, The Meaning of ‘Life’: Dignity and the Right to Life in International Human Rights Treaties, Vol 12, Human Rights Law Review; c2012. p. 199-203.). These fundamental tenets of existence continue to animate our legal and constitutional landscape, remaining immutable regardless of an individual’s status. Consequently, even when an individual is accused of an offence or stands as a convicted prisoner, her entitlement to a dignified and peaceful life remains inviolable.”
Most forthrightly, the Division Bench points out in para 13 that, “The occurrence of a fatality within the coercive control of the State, legally categorised as a “custodial death”, represents a profound failure of the constitutional machinery. In a civilised society governed by the Rule of Law, custodial violence is an affront to the very essence of justice. The social contract between the State and its citizens is fundamentally predicated on the dual pillars of dignity and security. Any breach of this trust while a person is in the State’s care strikes at the heart of our democratic values.”
While citing the relevant case laws, the Division Bench observes in para 34 that, “In this regard, it is pertinent to note that Constitutional Courts across the length and breadth of our country have consistently recognised the mandatory nature of Section 176(1-A) of the Cr.P.C. and its successor, Section 196(2) of the BNSS. The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in State v. Union of India (Cr.M.A. No. 10625 of 2009), the Hon’ble Madras High Court in P. Pugalenthi v. State of Tamil Nadu (W.P. No. 25743 of 2010), the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in India Centre for Human Rights and Law v. State of Maharashtra (Criminal PIL No. 8 of 2008), and the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mohamad Nazma Begum v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (W.P. No. 15484 of 2009) have collectively and unequivocally reiterated a foundational principle of criminal jurisprudence, namely that the word “shall” in Section 176(1-A) operates as an absolute jurisdictional mandate rather than a directory prescription.”
It cannot go unnoticed that the Division Bench points out in para 35 that, “These Courts have consistently held that the provision is mandatory and that custodial death inquiries must be conducted by the Judicial Magistrate, thereby excluding the Executive branch to prevent any conflict of interest or departmental bias.”
Frankly speaking, the Division Bench specifies in para 36 stating that, “This legislative imperative has been further carried forward and reinforced under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). Section 196(2) of the BNSS replicates the mandate for a compulsory inquiry by a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate in cases of custodial death. However, it is pertinent to clarify that the term “Magistrate” as employed in Section 196 must not be broadly construed to include any category of Magistrate.”
While striking the right chord, the Division Bench observes in para 57 that, “At this juncture, we would also want to deal with the issue of compensation in cases of unnatural custodial deaths. The issue is no res integra, as the Hon’ble Apex Court, through a plethora of judgments, has explicitly recognised the rights of the kith and kin to be granted compensation. In the realm of public law, compensation is not merely a civil remedy but a tool for constitutional remediation when the State fails in its duty to protect the life of an individual in its custody. This right to monetary compensation is an inherent aspect of Article 21, serving as a balm to the bereaved family’s suffering and as a deterrent to the high-handedness of state actors.”
Truth be told, the Division Bench points out in para 58 that, “The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in landmark pronouncements such as Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, reported in (1983) 4 SCC 141, Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 746 , and D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., reported in (1997) 1 SCC 416, has unequivocally laid down that the State is vicariously liable for the acts of its public servants, and the defence of sovereign immunity is entirely inapplicable in cases of fundamental right violations.”
It certainly cannot go unnoticed that the Division Bench notes in para 59 that, “This legal mandate has been strictly enforced across various jurisdictions, with almost every High Court awarding compensation for unnatural deaths in custody. These constitutional courts have uniformly held that, whether the victim is an under-trial or a convict, their next of kin are legally entitled to compensation to redress the established invasion of human rights. Reference in this regard may be made to the dicta of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Nina Rajan Pillai v. Union of India, reported in 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2252; the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Kewalbai v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 773; the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in Madhuben Adesara v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 1956; and the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in Sabu E.K. v. State of Kerala, reported in 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 22210.”
Most remarkably, the Division Bench underscores in para 60 holding that, “Be that as it may, it is an admitted reality that the doors of this Court are often practically inaccessible to every litigant for the purpose of seeking compensatory remedies. While a robust framework already exists in the form of District Victim Compensation Committees, we find that its potential is seldom realised in cases involving custodial deaths. The bereaved families of Under-Trial Prisoners (UTPs) or convicts who have suffered an unnatural death in judicial or police custody should not be compelled to undergo the rigours of Writ litigation to secure their fundamental right to compensation.”
It would be instructive to note that the Division Bench hastens to add in para 62 noting that, “Before parting, we would like to state that the directions issued hereinafter are formulated solely to ensure that the Rule of Law is never compromised. The vision of our constitutional makers can only be realised when the Executive and the Judiciary, though clearly demarcated by the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, work in tandem, strictly adhering to the laws, rules, and regulations within their respective constitutional domains. Such institutional discipline is the bedrock of an egalitarian society. It is only through the shared commitment of these organs to remain within their prescribed spheres that the rights of the common person can be truly protected, and the promises of the Constitution fulfilled.”
Most significantly, the Division Bench encapsulates in para 63 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Accordingly, we dispose of this petition by issuing the following directions:
a) It is declared that an inquiry under S. 176(1-A) of the Cr.P.C. or S. 196(2) of the BNSS is required to be conducted by a Judicial Magistrate in accordance with the statutory mandate, and any inquiry conducted by an Executive Magistrate shall not operate as a substitute for such judicial inquiry.
b) The Principal District Judge of the concerned district and the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Prison & Disaster Management, are directed to enquire into and submit a compliance report before this Court within six months of the date of this judgment, explaining the failure to have at least 262 cases of custodial deaths enquired into by the judicial magistrates, as required by the statutory mandate, and instead to have them enquired into only by the Executive Magistrates; to identify the specific officers responsible for such lapses; and to show cause why this Court should not recommend the initiation of departmental inquiries against the said officers.
c) The Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Prison & Disaster Management, shall, within two months from the date of this judgment, prepare and circulate to all Principal District & Sessions Judges (including the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi) a district-wise list of all custodial death cases from the year 2018 onwards in which inquiries were conducted by Executive Magistrates, including the 262 cases disclosed in the State’s affidavit, along with copies of all existing records and reports.
d) Within 15 days of the receipt of such records, the concerned Principal District & Sessions Judge (including the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi) shall nominate a Judicial Magistrate for conducting a de-novo inquiry under S. 176(1-A) of the Cr.P.C. or Section 196(2) of the BNSS, as applicable. Such inquiries shall, as far as practicable, be completed within six months from the date of nomination.
e) Upon conclusion of the inquiry, the report shall be forwarded to the NHRC and the Jharkhand State Human Rights Commission. This report shall be accompanied by a covering letter from the concerned District Magistrate or Superintendent of Police, explicitly clarifying that the judicial inquiry has been conducted to fulfil the statutory requirement under Section 176(1-A) Cr.P.C./Section 196(2) BNSS in place of the earlier executive inquiry.
f) All Principal District & Sessions Judges (including the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi) shall submit a consolidated compliance report regarding these de-novo inquiries before this Court within eight (08) months from the date of this judgment.
g) The Chief Secretary and the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Prison & Disaster Management, shall, within thirty (30) days from the date of this judgment, issue a circular to all District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police in the State, clarifying that jurisdiction under S. 176(1-A) of the Cr.P.C. or S. 196(2) of the BNSS vests solely and exclusively with Judicial Magistrates, and any future deviation shall be treated as a willful violation of statutory law and the conduct rules.
h) The above-referred circular must also apprise the concerned officials that in every case of custodial death, disappearance, or custodial rape, the District Magistrate and/or Superintendent of Police shall intimate the NHRC, the State Human Rights Commission, and the concerned Principal District Judge (P.D.J.) within twenty-four hours of the occurrence.
i) Upon receipt of such intimation, the concerned P.D.J. (including the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi), must nominate a Judicial Magistrate within forty-eight hours of the intimation to conduct the inquiry. The inquiry shall ordinarily be concluded within two months. In cases of delay, the specific reasons shall be recorded by the concerned Judicial Magistrate.
j) All relevant records, including post-mortem reports, treatment records, CCTV footage, prisoner history, and allied materials, shall be supplied to the nominated Judicial Magistrate by the concerned Jail Superintendent or the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station within seven days of the receipt of a requisition.
k) The Director, Jharkhand Judicial Academy, shall, within four months from the date of this judgment, prepare and circulate a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and a model format for inquiry reports to all Judicial Officers in the State of Jharkhand. The SOP shall ensure the incorporation of NHRC guidelines and relevant judicial precedents to foster a uniform approach to judicial inquiries.
l) The State Government, in coordination with the Jharkhand Judicial Academy, shall consider organising an interdisciplinary conference/seminar involving Judicial Officers, District Magistrates, Superintendents of Police, Jail Authorities, and Medical Officers to ensure institutional synchronisation and effective compliance with the statutory mandate governing custodial death inquiries.
m)In cases where the inquiry report discloses unnatural death, custodial violence, or negligence, the concerned P.D.J. (including the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi), as Chairperson of the District Victim Compensation Committee, shall suo motu place the matter before the Committee for consideration of compensation under the applicable Victim Compensation Scheme, preferably within thirty days of the submission of the inquiry report.”
For sake of clarity, the Bench then clarifies in para 64 stating that, “It is further clarified that the above directions are not exhaustive. Consequently, they shall in no manner preclude the respondent authorities from taking additional measures to ensure full compliance with the statutory mandate of Section 176(1-A) of the Cr.P.C. or Section 196(2) of the BNSS.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 65 that, “Let a copy of this judgment be forwarded forthwith to all the respondent authorities, the Principal District and Sessions Judges of all districts in the State of Jharkhand, including the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, the Director of the Jharkhand Judicial Academy, and the District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police of all districts for immediate and necessary compliance. The institutional district heads are further directed to share this judgment with all Magistrates, whether Judicial or Executive, for their information and necessary action.”
Finally, the Division Bench then aptly concludes by directing and holding in para 66 that, “This petition stands disposed of in the above terms. Pending I.A.s, if any, will not survive and are disposed of. No costs.”
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