The second proviso to section 10B(1) cannot be construed to be a qualifying condition for claiming deduction. It just permits additional benefit which may be allowed provided domestic profit is within the limit prescribed in the proviso. On the panoply of this proviso deduction cannot be denied. The assessee would be entitled to partial deduction proportionately on export turnover in view of the provisions of sub-section(4) of section 10B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
This article summarizes a recent ruling of the Special Bench (SB) of the Mumbai Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) [ITA No. 7315/Mum/2007] in the case of DCIT vs. Manjula Shah (Taxpayer) which held that, in the case of gifted capital asset, indexation benefit is available to a donee from the year of its acquisition by the previous owner. The SB adopted a purposive construction of the definition of ‘Indexed Cost of Acquisition’ (ICOA) by looking at the scheme of the Indian Tax Law (ITL), which seeks to grant the benefit of cost and holding period of the previous owner to the donee.
This ruling provides guidance that withdrawal from a revaluation reserve is permitted to be reduced from the book profit, computed under the MAT provisions, only in a case where the book profit was increased by the amount of revaluation reserve in the year of creation.
In this case, we noted that the Assessing Officer has not brought out any specific charge for which the penalty has been imposed on the assessee under section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act. He has not brought out whether the assessee has concealed the income or whether the assessee has furnished the inaccurate particulars of income.
The income by way of royalty accruing to the Japanese company is liable to be taxed in terms of Article 12 of the DTAA between India and Japan at a rate not exceeding 10 per cent from the assessment year 2008-09 onwards.
Brief facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this issue are that the defendant no.1 company was a tenant in property no. 3 Amrita Shergill Marg, New Delhi. This property was leased by defendant no.5 M/s H.G.Gupta & Sons (HUF) to defendant No. 1 Company for residence of its officers. The company by a resolution in the meeting of Board of Directors held on 27.2.1974 allotted this property to late Lala Hansraj Gupta in his capacity as CEO/Chairman of the company. Late Lala Hansraj Gupta was father of plaintiff no. 2 and defendants no. 2-4 and grandfather of plaintiff no. 1.
While the statute is to be interpreted on the basis of the; plain language or terms of the sections need for interpretation when the words of the statute are ambivalent and do not manifest the intention of the Legislature. As explained above the interpretation canvassed by the assessee will lead to unintended results if the purpose for which the section is introduced is kept in mind. Therefore in our option a purposive approach has to be adopted in interpreting the provisions of sec 80 RR.
The services/activities provided by the American Institute to DRDO pursuant to the agreement entered into between FICCI and the American Institute do not fall within the purview of Article 12(4)(b) of the Indo-US DTAA and the payments received by the Institute under the agreement are not liable to be taxed as fees for technical services under the domestic law; consequently, FICCI is not required to deduct tax under section 195 for payments made by it to the American Institute.
The provisions of Explanation to section 73 do not distinguish between the transaction of trading in shares on actual delivery or without delivery basis. Admittedly the assessee does not fall under any of the exceptions provided in the Explanation and hence, the purchase and sale of shares traded during the year under consideration is in nature of speculation business within the meaning of proviso to section 73 of IT Act, 1961.
I have given my careful consideration to the rival contentions. The first issue, in my view, to be addressed in this case is as to the determination of annual letting value of the house property in accordance with the provisions of section 23(1)(a) of the Act. Once that issue is decided, then it will be easy to decide the second issue as to whether the earlier order of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case was necessarily to be followed or not.
