As per Article 56 of the Schedule to the ADB Act, the bank, its assets, property, income and its operations and transactions, shall be exempt from all taxation and from all customs duties. The Bank shall also be exempt from any obligation for the payment, withholding or collection of any tax or duty and Section 5 of the ADB Act clearly says that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law,
We find merit in the submission of Mr. Apte that the order dated 18.10.2012 directing the petitioner to deposit of Rs.35 lacs is non speaking order. The impugned order does not consider and/or examine submission made by the petitioner in support of its prima facie case to take a prima facie view.
With effect from 1st day of July 2003, section 108 of The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 specifically confers power on the High Court to condone delay beyond the period of 180 days, if the High Court is satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not filing the same within the said period. Section 108 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 while inserting sub-section (2)(a) in terms provides that sub-section (2)(a) shall be inserted and shall be deemed to have been inserted with effect from 1st day of July, 2003.
In this case, AO, made an addition of Rs.28,00,000/-, in respect of advances received from M/s Jot Agro Processors Pvt. Ltd. at Rs. 25 lacs and M/s Madura Agro Food Industries at Rs. 3 lacs/-. The main addition made by the AO pertains to non-furnishing of PAN and bank account number. However, in the course of appellate proceedings, appellant filed detailed submission which was found plausible explanation within the meaning of provisions of Section 68 and having regard to the factual matrix of the case.
A plausible manner in which WDV of an asset, thus, may be reckoned for the purpose of r. 14 is to reduce the depreciation at the rate as prescribed for the relevant block of the assets, i.e., under which the said asset falls, for the years for which depreciation has actually been allowed since its acquisition (though on the relevant block), to arrive at its’ WDV as at the relevant year-end, and which incidentally brings us to the second aspect of the matter.
There was no search carried out on the appellant. The seized papers were found in the possession of Shri Vikas A. Shah. The third person evidence cannot be base for addition on the basis of any entries therein.
We find that we are bound to follow the judgment of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Chennai ‘B’ Special Bench rendered in the assessee’s own case for the assessment years 1998-99 to 2002-03. In the said decision rendered in the case of Mahindra Holidays & Resorts (India) Ltd. (supra), the Special Bench has held that 40 percent of deferment of membership fee resorted to by the assessee is justified. The said decision of the Special Bench is rendered in the assessee’s own case in exactly similar circumstances. Therefore, the rule of precedence demands that the decision of the Special Bench must prevail.
It may be stated that the matter of classification was not jurisdiction of a single Member Bench of Tribunal as has been done by order dated 4.5.2006 in ST/03/2006 contrary to mandate of section 129C(4) of Customs Act, 1962 as adopted by section 83 of Finance Act, 1994. So also when service tax demand was Rs. 22,48,432/- (Ref: page 56 of appeal folder) in the earlier adjudication.
As far as conversion of limestone into limestone powder is concerned, The Apex Court has clearly held that the conversion into lime and lime dust or concrete by stone crushers can legitimately be considered to be a manufacturing process while the mere mining of limestone and marble and cutting the same would not be so considered. The observation of the Supreme Court cannot be termed to be ‘obiter dicta’ since the Supreme Court has held that the process of conversion of limestone into lime and lime dust is a manufacturing process.
Rule 3(1) allows a manufacturer of final products to take credit inter alia of service tax which is paid on (i) any input or capital goods received in the factory of manufacturer of the final product; and (ii) Any input service received by the manufacturer of the final product. The subordinate legislation in the present case makes a distinction between inputs or capital goods on the one hand and input services on the other other.
