This appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 has been preferred by the appellant (for brevity ‘the husband’) to assail the legality and validity of the impugned judgement dated 28.04.2016 passed by the Family Court, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 208-A/2013, whereby his marriage with the respondent (for brevity ‘the wife’) has been annulled by issuing a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty.
These are the batch of Misc. Appeals filed under Section 20(1) of the Coal-Bearing Areas (Acquisition And Development), Act of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act 1957’), challenging the order passed by the Tribunal (Presided over by the District Judge) constituted under Section 15 (2) of the Act 1957.
This appeal is directed against the decree of judicial separation passed by the Family Court, Durg on 21.01.2014. 2. The appellant preferred an application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (henceforth ‘the Act, 1955’) on the pleadings that her marriage was solemnised with the respondent on 09.06.2003. After one and half years of marriage, the respondent lost his speech and thereafter other organs including the sexual organ became ineffective.
It is held that the petitioner has miserably failed to make out a case for interference in exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India within the four corners of law and yardsticks set out by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above-quoted judgements (supra) qua interference in contractual matter.
To ascertain as to whether a service can be classified as Deluxe service only on the ground that the seats in the vehicle have push back or reclining facility. It appears, there is no such provision that only on such facility being available in a vehicle it can be classified as a Deluxe service
The appellants herein namely Sunil @ Balikaran Sahu and Amit Gupta were awarded death sentence by the trial Court after having found them guilty for offences punishable under Sections 460 (three counts), 324 (three counts), 307 (three counts), 506 Part-II (ten counts), 397 (nine counts) and 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the IPC’). They were sentenced to death by hanging under sub-section (5) of Section 354 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘the CrPC’). Conviction and sentences imposed upon both the appellants are as follows: –
The petitioner/plaintiff is aggrieved by the order passed by the trial Court, which has directed the petitioner to pay ad valorem Court fees on the prayer made by him for declaring the sale deed dated 26-3-2012 executed by the respondents No. 1 to 5 in favour of the respondent No.6 as null & void and not benefiting the respondent No. 6.
This petition for winding up has been preferred by the company itself without referring to the relevant clause of Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 (‘the Act’ in short), however, in course of argument it was informed that the petition is under Section 433 (e) of the Act.
it would manifest that there has not only been wrong with the petitioner but he was discriminated in the matter of application of pre-amended 1991 policy of rehabilitation. For such denial, the respondent/SECL is taking shelter of its own wrong by continuing to remain in occupation of the petitioner’s land from 1994 without paying compensation till 2006 when repeated efforts of the petitioner compelled the respondents to initiate land acquisition proceeding and determine compensation.
The petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by the Additional District Judge, (FTC), Raigarh, dismissing his application under Section 387 of the C.G. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (in short “the Act”) on the ground that before moving an application under Section 387 of the Act, the petitioner has not served statutory notice under Section 387(1).
