It was clear that despite knowing the fact that Managing Director (MD) was not allowed under the CWA Act, the Respondent had accepted the position of MD and also protecting the same.
V. Ajay Vs Disciplinary Committee, ICAI (Appellate Authority) 1. This Order deals with the above mentioned two appeals filed by the Appellant before this Authority. First appeal has been filed against an Order dated 20th January, 2017, passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India under section 21B(3) of the Chartered Accountants Act, […]
Being aggrieved by the Report dated 14thOctober, 2015 and Order dated 27 th May, 2017 (Impugned Order), passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India under Section 21B (3) of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 read with Rule 19 (1) of the Chartered Accountants (Procedure of Investigation of Professional and Other Misconduct and Conduct of Cases) Rules, 2007, CA. Is
Appellant was undoubtedly involved in arranging bogus bills through dummy concerns and charged commission for the same and therefore he was rightly held guilty under the aforementioned clauses for committing the Professional and Other Misconduct by the Board of Discipline of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.
Ramchandra Y. Kulkarni Vs Disciplinary Committee of icai (Appellate Authority) complainant is an Asset Reconstruction Company and the only grievance of the Complainant is that the Appellant who was auditor of M/s AV Forging Private Limited, a company which had taken loans from M/s Axis Bank amounting to Rs. 22.70 Crores approximately, which were taken […]
We are of the considered view that punishment awarded to the Appellant in the present matter is certainly on the higher side, enormous and harsh in comparison with the punishment awarded to the errant members of the Institute by the Disciplinary Committee for the violation of same professional misconduct in other cases.
In this case Nothing has been pointed out that the bank was not within its right to firstly levy those charges or that it was acting beyond the rules. In levying those charges, the bank has fully justified as it relied on the Reserve Bank Rules and the banking practice. After all the bank had to maintain the accounts and it was by way of an agreement between the complainant and the bank that the bank was levying Rs. 250 per bill per quarter. Therefore, on this account there was no fault on the part of the bank.
In so far as the specific instances of the abuse of agreement in question are concerned, it is obvious that there has been a settlement between the original complainant and the respondents. Because the complainant does not have any more complaint/grievance of any boycott or the compulsory undertakings which he is to give under the authority of either FMC or FDC so that question will clearly be foreign to the present enquiry.
There was nothing to show that unfair pricing was done by Microsoft in selling identical licence at different prices. No evidence was brought. The respondent was not tying its OEM with new computers. The purchase of personal computer has the choice to have the programme of Microsoft Office or Words getting installed in its computer if he so chooses. This cannot be, therefore, an example of tying up. There was no compulsion on the appellant to purchase Microsoft software to purchase the computers only as the OEM licensee was free to sell their product, i.e., personal computer even without the warranty that would clearly end the argument about the tying up.
Considering the Section and its language plainly, it is apparent that the agreement to allow concessions and benefits including allowances, discounts, rebates or credit have to have a nexus with the dealings of the respondent. The said dealings would not cover a uniform policy by the respondent to sell its product. We agree with Shri Makheeja when he says that if there is a discrimination between authorized dealers inter se, it would amount to a restrictive trade practice but in that case, it will be that the dealing of the respondent with a particular dealer was discriminatory in comparison to its dealing with another dealer. Such is not the case here.
