A company cannot, at the post-advertisement stage, disturb or unsettle the finality of a finding as to the indisputable nature of a debt rendered at the admission stage of a creditor’s winding up petition. Even though the decision at the admission stage is final as between the company and the petitioning-creditor, others connected with the company who come in after advertisements may question the finding and the Court may not feel constrained that it is bound by the finding.
Whether on the facts and in the circumstance of the case and in law the Hon’ble Tribunal was right in deleting the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer of interest paid by the Assessee Company on borrowed funds amounting to Rs.241.10 lakhs overlooking the fact that the borrowed funds were used by the Assessee Company to invest in the Capital of another Partnership Firm and since profits derived by the Assessee Company from a Partnership firm were exempt from tax u/s.10(2A) of the Income-tax Act, the interest expense related to such tax free profits is to be disallowed u/s.14A of the Income Tax Act?
High Court Show Anguish Over step taken by Central Government to take steps to prevent generation and circulation of black money. The approach of the first appellate authority as well as the Tribunal was absolutely contrary to the scheme of block assessment under Chapter XIVB which can be made based on convincing evidence recovered in the course of search as provided under section 158BB. The assumption by the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as by the Tribunal that without the confirmation statement by the assessees undisclosed income cannot be assessed based on evidence gathered on search is wholly unrealistic and contrary to statutory scheme for assessment of undisclosed income under Chapter XIVB of the Act.
A Division Bench of this Court in Colourtex v. Union of India 2006 (198) ELT 169 (Guj.) has held that exact differences has to be formulated by members of the Division Bench of the Tribunal and it is not open to them to formulate a question as to whether the appeal is to be rejected or remanded for a fresh decision for determination of duty, confiscation and penalty etc. In the present case it is seen that the question formulated by the Division Bench does not specify the requirement of sub-section (5) of Section 129C of the Act. Therefore, the order passed by learned third member as well as the difference of opinion expressed, generally, by differing member without precise formulation of the point of difference of the Tribunal cannot be entertained. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The orders of the learned third member as well as the difference of opinion formulated by the differing members of the Division Bench are set aside.
We do not think we would be justified in preventing the Assessing Officer from collecting evidence which may be used by him for the purpose of bringing what in his opinion is the proper amount of capital gains on the sale of Okhla land. As to how he proposes to use the evidence against the assessee is a matter of speculation which we refrain from indulging in.
Assessee owned only 38 guntas of land when he started the construction, he acquired an extent of 1,440 sq. ft. of land adjoining the said land, thus making the total land in which the project was put up, to 44,470 sq.ft. more than 43,480 sq.ft. which is prescribed under the law. The modified housing project was approved in the year 2001 after the aforesaid provision was inserted. On 20.5.2003 occupancy certificate is issued. Therefore, the construction is within the 4 years period stipulated.
After taking into consideration the Instruction No. 5 of 2008, it is found that by virtue of the said Instruction, the revenue was prohibited from pre
We find that during original assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer himself had accepted the position that the assessee had maintained quantitative details and that the general profit was on the higher side. We further find that in remand report also, the Assessing Officer could not justify the lump-sum addition other than making a short statement that addition was justified on books, vouchers, etc. as produced before him. In such circumstances, both the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal below deleted the lump-sum addition in the absence of any basis on the part of the Assessing Officer and even after holding that competitive details were maintained and the general profit was favourable.
The expression ‘reasonable cause’ used in Section 273B is not defined under the Act. Unlike the expression ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 249(3), 253(5) and 260A(2A) of the Act, the legislature has used the expression ‘reasonable cause’ in Section 273B of the Act. A cause which is reasonable may not be a sufficient cause. Thus, the expression ‘reasonable cause’ would have wider connotation than the expression ‘sufficient cause’. Therefore, the expression ‘reasonable cause’ in Section 273B for non-imposition of penalty under Section 271E would have to be construed liberally depending upon the facts of each case.
In the said assessment year, the assessee had earned premium of Rs.12,26,140/- on sale of export quota. The Assessing Officer held that this premium is covered by Section 28 (iiia/b/c) and accordingly computed deduction under Section 80HHC but without giving benefit of provisos under sub Section (3) to Section 80HHC. He observed that the export turnover in the previous year was exceeding Rs.10 crores and the assessee had not complied with the several conditions mentioned in the provisos. The sale proceeds received from sale of quota rights were excluded from benefit under the provisos to Section 80HHC(3) as this was not the regular business income of the assessee.
