It is an undisputed position that duty and penalty are arrears of the company. It was the company that was the person engaged in manufacture of goods and registered as manufacturer under section 6 of the said Act and therefore obliged to pay excise duty. Further under the Act and the Rules, the person liable to pay duty is the person who manufactures the goods in terms of rule 7 of the erstwhile Central Excise Rules, 1944 and rule 4 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, as now existing. Therefore the obligation to pay duty is on the company.
1. That part of the enhancement of lease rent, which is attributable to Mehta Charitable Trust surrendering its right to purchase khair wood in favour of the assessee company constitutes revenue expenditure. 2. That part of the enhancement of lease rent, which is attributable to improvement and modernization of plant and machinery carried out by the Trust in the year 1989-90, constitutes revenue expenditure. 3. The enhancement in lease rent, if any, which is attributable to normal appreciation, if any, in line with the lease rentals prevailing in the market constitutes revenue expenditure.
Yet another issue involved in this appeal is as to whether the capital gain tax, in this case, would be leviable at the normal rate of 20% or at the rate of 10%. Admittedly, capital gain tax at the rate of 10% was payable only in case of ‘listed securities’. Since, these shares had been transferred to the applicants in the public offer, by 5.1.2006 before they were actually listed on the stock exchanges on 6.1.2006, they were not ‘listed securities’ at the time of sale by the appellant and consequently, the transaction would not be eligible for payment of capital gain tax at the lower rate of 10%.
Land in question was declared surplus land under the Urban Land [Ceiling & Regulation] Act, 1976 which was having depressing effect on the value of the asset, the valuation had to be made on the basis of assumption that the purchaser would be able to enjoy the property as the holder, but with restrictions and prohibitions contained in the ULC Act and in such case value of the property or land would be reduced.
In the instant case, Amish Kumar Patel in his statement under Section 131 of the IT Act has nowhere said that the money in question belonged to the petitioner’s firm or was to be delivered to it. Instead, he has stated that the money in question was handed over to him by Praveen Bhai who was found untraceable at the address provided by Amish Kumar. This being so, the petitioners do not get any advantage of Vindhya Metal Corpn.’s case (supra), being distinguishable on facts.
We may also notice that the proviso to Section 147 of the Act is fully applicable as the assessee had disclosed all the materials facts at the time of original assessment. Even if the materials/evidence was not enclosed with the return, full and true details/material was disclosed during the course of the original proceedings. The turnover or sales made to DMRC has not been disputed.
If there is no dispute as to the company’s liability, it is difficult to hold that the company should be able to pay its debts merely by proving that it is able to pay the debts. If the debt is an undisputedly owing, then it should be paid. If the company refuses to pay, without good reason, it should not be able to avoid the statutory demand by proving at the statutory demand stage, that it is solvent. In other words, commercial solvency can be seen as relevant as to whether there was a dispute as to the debt, not as a ground in itself, that means it cannot be characterised as a stand alone ground
If the argument of the appellant were to be accepted, it would make the provisions of compulsory registration under the Registration Act redundant and otiose. Thus the appellant, in the absence of any valid agreement can neither seek a direction to the Official Liquidator nor will any purpose be served in granting permission to the appellant to sue the company-in-liquidation for specific performance when as per the admitted facts, the appellant is unable to prove and/or is prohibited from proving the agreement.
The refusal of OSIL to convert 35,00,000 warrants held by Bhushan Energy Limited into equal number of equity shares may amount to a breach of contract but such breach of contract cannot constitute the ingredients of a complaint under Sections 397, 398, 402 and 403 of the Companies Act. As decided in the case of Incable Net (Andhra) Ltd. (supra), such breach could give rise to an action of breach of contract under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1972.
Tribunal after examining the evidence upheld the order of CIT(A) and concluded that the respondent was an investor in shares and entitled to be taxed under the head capital gains in respect of purchase and sale of shares. The Tribunal after examining the facts found that the respondent had not borrowed any funds for its investments and that the long terms gains were attributable to only shares of 4 companies and 3 of them were held for a period of about 5 to 12 years. So far as short terms capital gains were concerned the Tribunal held that about 93% of the short terms gain/loss was attributable to shares of six companies and in any case all the shares were held for periods ranging in excess of 1 month.
