Section 269UA(f) does not operate differently merely because the licencee under different agreements is the same. It is always open to a licensor and a licencee to enter into different agreements for different periods. There is nothing in the above provisions that warrants the periods under the various agreements being clubbed.
Unfortunately, this court has failed to engage the respondents’ attention on such aspect of the matter despite several reminders in course of the hearing. Instead, the respondents have veered off course to emphasise on single-line orders of adjournment to impress that the settlement had never been worked out. But the settlement or the adequacy of the consideration for the transfer of shares is not germane to the issue.
As per Section 6 of the SICA, the member/Chairman can hold an office for a period of not exceeding 5 years or till he or she attains the age of 65 years. ACC is the competent authority, who has to take decision out of the proposal made by the concerned Ministry. In the present case, note prepared by the Secretariat of ACC and proposal sent by the Ministry were put up before the ACC. After perusing the same, the ACC approved the appointment of respondent no. 4 till he attains the age of 65 years or till abolition of BIFR or until further orders, whichever event occurs the earliest.
This court vide order dated 15.9.2006 gave a clear mandate to the respondent no.4 to seek permission of the court before entering into any sale transaction but the respondents no.1 to 4 in utter disregard and blatant defiance of the said injunction order kept on selling its lands to various buyers who are also now facing the brunt of contumacious and contemptuous conduct of the respondents no. 1 to 4.
In the aforesaid view, no illegality is committed by the Tribunal in giving option to the respondent-assessee under the Proviso to section 11AC of the Act. It is held that the benefit of payment of reduced penalty can be availed by the assessee at the appellate stages also and it is not the import of the said provision that such benefit can be availed of only within 30 days from the communication of original order.
Facially the provision of section 12AA would suggest that there are no restrictions of the kind which the revenue is reading into in the instant case. In other words, the statute does not prevent or enjoin the Commissioner from registering a trust based only on its objects, without any activity, in the case of a newly registered Trust. The statute does not prescribe a waiting period, for a trust to qualify itself for registration.
It was for the Assessing Officer to examine whether the disallowance offered by the assessee itself was sufficient on facts and circumstances of the case, notwithstanding the view he took regarding the applicability of rule 8D. It is not expected of him to take piecemeal decisions regarding the merits of the disallowance.
A reading of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CWT v. Vysyaraju Badreenarayana Morthy Raju [1985] 152 ITR 454 shows that the computation of the net wealth of an assessee calls for a determination of his assets and debts as on the valuation date. Whether the system of accounting, whether mercantile or cash or hybrid, is not relevant for the purpose of determining the assets of the assessee. This is clear from the definition of ‘net wealth’.
In the present case, this Court notices that the Assessing Officer went into great lengths to verify the genuineness of these transactions. He issued summons to the share applicants- only 9 could be served; none actually responded through their authorized or principal officer. Even during remand, 16 of the 18 share applicants could not be served.
Whether the view taken by this Court in case of Sureshchandra Durgaprasad Khatod (HUF) (supra) that the instructions of 2011 of the Board providing for revised monetary limits for filing the appeals to the Tribunals, High Courts and Supreme Court, would apply to all pending cases irrespective of the date of filing of such appeals is correct, particularly, in view of express language used in paragraph 2 of the instructions which provides for revised monetary limits for filing of the appeals and paragraph 11 thereof which provides inter-alia that such instructions will apply to appeals filed on or after 9th February 2011?
