The Tribunal, upon detailed examination of the nature of relationship between the assessee and the transporter, came to the conclusion that this is not a case of sub-contract. The Tribunal noted that none of the responsibilities of the contractor vis-a-vis the execution of the work were fastened on the transporters.
ITAT has committed an error in dismissing the appellant’s appeal merely by observing that while deciding the appeal of revenue the stand of the CIT (Appeal) has been upheld. We find that the appellant’s contention that the net profit at 2.5% could not have been applied by CIT (Appeal) was required to be decided by the ITAT and the appellant’s appeal could not have been dismissed summarily on the basis of the decision in revenue’s appeal without dealing with the appellant’s contention. It is evident from the order of ITAT that while deciding revenue’s appeal also the said question of applying of net profit rate at 2.5% was not dealt with by it.
The expenditure is incurred by the assessee not for generation of the scrap but for generation of the finished product. There is and cannot be any expenses which are incurred for generation of scrap. Scrap is bi-product of the manufacturing activity. Therefore, there are no expenses which could be excluded from the sale of scrap.
CLB has rendered a finding that the application for amendment was allowed for determination of the issues between the parties and for the purpose of framing issues for avoiding multiplicity of litigations.
Record shows that the name of the petitioner was never entered into the register of members as a holder of 52470 shares; his own case is that the share transfer forms were available with him in 1998; he however took no steps to get himself on to the register of members; fault was entirely of the petitioner;
In the present case, as stated hereinabove, admittedly original accused No. 2 was appointed as managing director of original accused No. 1-company and original accused No. 1-company had also the whole-time directors and the manager. The petitioner was arraigned as an accused only as a ordinary director.
Assessee has received a sum of Rs. 1348095/- after discontinuance of business and in view of Section 176(3A) of the Act, this income is required to be added to the total income of assessee. The rate of 12.5% on this income is not the only taxable income but whole of receipt is the income to be taken into consideration and by indirect interpretation the receipt which is required to be taken into total income of the assessee under Section 176(3A)
It is clear from section 140A that after taking into account the relevant factors as enumerated in sub-clauses (i) to (v) under sub-section (1) of section 140A, the assessee is liable to assess his income and to pay tax calculated according to the above provisions together with interest as payable under any of the provisions of the Act of 1961 and is required to pay tax in advance before furnishing returns and returns shall be accompanied with the proof of payment of such tax and interest.
So far exercise of jurisdiction vested upon the Company Court under Section 446(2) of the Act is concerned, in my view and also in view of the decisions cited by the learned Counsel appearing for the applicant, it is already settled that this Court have ample power to adjudicate and determine all questions that arises in winding up. Such questions include eviction of trespassers from property of the Company (in liquidation) and the Company Court also by a summary order can direct eviction of a trespassers from the Company property. But Company Court must follow the law of the land in regard to such eviction.
An application under Section 543 of the Companies Act, 1956 cannot be made in vague terms and it cannot be used as a power to conduct a roving enquiry in these proceedings and to ascertain as to whether there is any act of misfeasance on the part of erstwhile directors.
