Mergers in Digital ERA: The New Battlefield

1. Introduction: Killer Acquisitions and Market Concentration

Businesses have been reshaped by the digital economy, with data-driven models and platform ecosystems emerging as the new source of competitive advantage. The result is a new class of so-called “killer acquisitions,” in which dominant players acquire emerging competitors in order to eliminate future threats and strengthen their own monopolistic power in various sectors of the economy. These acquisitions present particular challenges in relation to the enforcement of competition law principles, especially with respect to assigning value to intangible assets such as data and network effects.[1]

Killer acquisitions are characterized by their anticompetitive purpose. They happen when a large incumbent buys a small company that threatens to shake up the market. The digital native provision of developing their international expansion through investments in the market leader start-up is extremely common and due to the nature of these markets, their ability to compete later on niche innovations.

The example of a killer acquisition that has most often been discussed is Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp the 19 billion US dollars in 2014. WhatsApp at the time was also a fast-rising star in the messaging market, with more than 450 million active users. This acquisition enabled Facebook to absorb WhatsApp’s users and data into its platform, thereby removing a top potential rival.[2]

That deal faced some regulatory scrutiny as well, but again ended up being approved as WhatsApp’s revenues didn’t meet the thresholds for concern under existing antitrust measures. The case underlined the inadequacies of current merger control regimes in dealing with mergers based on prospective potential as opposed to present-day effects in the market.

 Killer Acquisition’s examples:

(a) Diapers: Amazon’s Acquisition com Quidsi)

The acquisition of Quidsi, the parent company of Diapers, by Amazon.com, is a classic example. Prior to the acquisition, Quidsi faced fierce price competition from Amazon trying to undercut its market share. After buying Quidsi for $545 million, Amazon raised the prices of its bulky items, showing that the deal’s anti-competitive intent was real.[3]

(b) Google’s Acquisition of Waze

Google’s​ $1.1 billion acquisition of Waze in 2013 also raised the specter of a mapping service being​ crushed​ in a forceful embrace. With real-time data from Waze integrated, Google Maps cemented its lead in the navigation arena.[4]

(c) Instagram Acquisition — Facebook (Meta)

Facebook’s purchase of Instagram in 2012 for $1 billion gave the company a fast-growing platform in the photo-sharing sector. Critics say this deal suffocated competition because it stopped Instagram from growing into a full-scale rival.[5]

Acquisitions Driven by Data and Network: Valuation Dilemma

Datashould rather be seen as the currency of the digital economy, where a company’s worth is based less on profits than on growth potential in light of network effects. This poses specific challenges for regulators:

Data is the new oil of the digital economy because buying a company usually comes with its data stores, you get a way to improve your algorithms, customize offerings and cement your grip on an already beaten-down market. Google’s 2021 acquisition of Fitbit, for example, gave it access to vast amounts of health-related data — but it raised similar privacy and market concentration concerns[6].

Network effects refer to a phenomenon in which the value of a good or service increases as more people use the same good or service. In digital markets, these effects create winner-takes-all dynamics, with one speller achieving total dominance. In such a scenario, acquiring a competitor with a growing user base serves to magnify these effects, effectively ending any hope of competition from newcomers.

2. Regulatory Hurdles in Pricing the Takeovers

2.1. Probabilistic Limitations of Revenue-Based Thresholds

Most merger control regimes set financial thresholds for whether a deal should be reviewed. Nevertheless, most digital start-ups that have been the subject of killer acquisitions have been low-revenue companies, despite their strategic importance. That lets deals avoid regulatory scrutiny. For instance, WhatsApp’s revenues were so low when Facebook acquired it that regulators were able to sidestep tighter oversight[7].

2.2. Harder to Judge What the Future Holds

Conventional tools of regulation are poorly suited to assess the future competitive viability of nascent firms. An elaborate understanding of innovation cycles and market dynamics is required to make any predictive statement of how exactly a star-up will disrupt the market.

2.3. The Role of Algorithms and AI

Often, the acquiring firm deploys advanced algorithms to scout for potential threats within start-ups. Because these strategies are grounded in decision-making algorithms, it is difficult for regulators to see if they have anti-competitive intent.

2.4. Concentration Have Implications for the Market

Killer acquisitions carry important implications for market concentration, especially in digital markets:

• Reduced Innovation

The acquisition of potential competitors makes dominant firms less likely to innovate. Start-ups are often only focused on being acquired rather than competing, resulting in a more stagnant market.

• Higher Barriers to Entry

Heavy data and network effects establish high barriers to entry. Building Modes: Dominant firms can use their resources to protect their position against competition.

• Consumer Harm

Killer acquisitions ultimately limit consumer choices and will likely increase prices in the long run — even if consumers see lower prices and integrated services in the near term. Deals like the Quidsi takeover, in fact, show how consumers can be hurt when these acquisitions are not opposed, as with Amazon’s actions after the purchase of Quidsi.[8]

3. Regulatory Responses and Proposals

3.1. Expanded Merger Guidelines

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA)[9] and the U.S. updated merger guidelines again highlight the need to consider data assets and potential competition in merger analysis.

3.2. Market Share-Based Thresholds

Some other countries (Germany, for example) have also applied market share and their own strategic considerations as thresholds, not just revenues. The goal of that approach is to capture acquisitions that have the potential for disproportionate effects for competition.

3.3. Retrospective Reviews

US regulators like the Federal Trade Commission, for example, have started looking back at older mergers to analyze their effect on competition.

4 India’s Response: Catching Up

India’s history and application of the digital economy has become a game-changer for the country by shaking up the way consumers behave, the way the market works, and the industrial business models. However, the speed of innovation often surpasses the evolution of regulation, which creates voids in dealing with anti-competitive practices. Founded in 2003 under the Competition Act, 2002[10], the Competition Commission of India (CCI) has had to take on the formidable task of regulating a fast-changing digital landscape comprising mergers, acquisitions, and platform-based business models. From the expansion strategy of Jio (including high-profile acquisitions such as Flipkart-Walmart and Zomato-Uber Eats) to regulatory challenges that loom large in the backdrop, this section explores India’s response to the competition in the digital marketplace.

4.1. Reliance Jio’s Data Acquisitiveness and Market Strategy

Reliance Jio has been at the helm of India’s digital transformation, shaking up old telecom and digital service players with its zestful pricing, broad reach and myriad takeovers.

The acquisition of Radisys Corporation by Reliance Jio in 2018 helped it enhance its technology prowess and also becomes a leader in 5G innovation. Radisys, a US-based provider of open telecom solutions, was instrumental in the beginning of this evolution for Jio towards more advanced digital services. This acquisition showcases how companies use strategic investments to consolidate their dominance of emerging markets.[11]

Beyond Radisys, Jio also has acquired Saavn (music streaming service) and a large stake in Haptik (a conversational AI platform), both of which hint at the company’s larger plans to stitch together an integrated digital ecosystem that spans entertainment, e-commerce, and AI-based services. These vertical and horizontal integrations play a gigantic barrier for competitors to match Jio’s reach and scale.[12]

These acquisitions have allowed Jio absolute dominance of data and user activity across platforms, a veritable data monopoly. Jio is moving towards providing telecom services, content platforms, even AI tools for consumers with its various offerings, which decreases consumers’ dependence on competitors, signalling the possibility of a long-term anti-market competition and consumers’ welfare issue.

On the one hand, Jio’s dominance has allowed consumers to reap benefits through lower prices and better services, but on the other hand, critics have argued that such monopoly might lead the company to engage in predatory pricing policies, resulting in the erosion of market competitiveness and hammering small-scale players. Jio’s free voice calling and super cheap data pricing, for example, prompted traditional telcos like Vodafone and Idea to merge and others like Aircel to exit the market altogether.

4.2. Flipkart-Walmart Deal

The Flipkart-Walmart deal, worth $16 billion in 2018, was one of the landmark acquisitions in India’s e-commerce landscape. Walmart’s acquisition of a 77% stake in Flipkart was the world’s largest e-commerce deal. The merger altered the entire landscape of e-commerce in India and brought about serious questions about competition, regulatory frameworks and impact on traditional retail.[13]

Walmart bought Flipkart last year to compete with Amazon in India, a rapidly expanding e-commerce market that’s expected to surpass $200 billion by 2026. It gave Walmart a direct foothold in India’s retail ecosystem that it could steward while also leveraging Flipkart’s extensive logistics network, consumer base, and market data.

In contrast, Flipkart got access to Walmart’s worldwide supply chain, financial capabilities, and know-how in retail operations. The underlying potential for such a partnership encouraged the hope that customer experience improvements, operational efficiencies, and widened product range would come as a result.

The deal was cleared by the Competition Commission of India (CCI), which said it would not materially restrict competition. However, there were concerns that Walmart might have some ability to engage in deep discounting, using its financial advantages to gain an edge over smaller players and traditional retailers.[14]

The deal raised alarm among traditional retail groups, such as the Confederation of All India Traders (CAIT), which said Walmart’s entry would mean the monopolization of India’s retail market. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) were afraid of being relegated to the sidelines because of Flipkart’s ability to offer lower prices.[15]

The Flipkart-Walmart merger highlighted the growing importance of data in competition. But by acquiring Flipkart, Walmart obtained access to enormous amounts of consumer data, which allowed the company to predict buying patterns, optimize inventory, and personalize customer experiences. This resulted into their biggest competitive edge over traditional retailers — the data.

4.3. Zomato-Uber Eats India Deal

In March 2020, Zomato acquired Uber Eats India for $206 million in cash, a watershed moment for the food delivery sector of India. This acquisition removed a primary competitor, leaving Zomato and Swiggy as the sole key players in the market.[16]

Uber Eats India had failed to capture a large portion of the market and had lagged behind its rivals, Zomato and Swiggy. The company sold its Indian operations to Zomato and exited the market while gaining a 9.99% share in Zomato. This innovative arrangement enabled Uber to concentrate on its primary ride-hailing business while retaining an interest in India’s thriving food delivery sector by owning equity in Zomato.[17]

The deal was approved by the CCI, which had noted Uber Eats’ stake in the declining market share and its failure to compete with Zomato or Swiggy. The consolidation, however, raised fears about less competition, resulting in:

More expensive service charges for restaurants, especially independent ones. Higher delivery fees for consumers, as duopolies typically offer less motivation to compete on price. Less innovation, because competition is often the spur to new technology and new ways to do business.

After the acquisition, Zomato solidified its foothold in the market, increasing its delivery coverage and customer reach. The move made it even harder for smaller players and startups to enter the market, consolidating Zomato and Swiggy’s dominance.

4.4. Amazon-Future Retail Dispute

The Amazon-Future Retail case reflects the complexities involved in regulating multi-channel success in retail and e-commerce in India. The case, which started in 2019, relates to an investment that Amazon made in Future Coupons, one of the companies affiliated with Future Retail, in which the American e-commerce giant took a 49% stake. It was a tactical move that gave Amazon an indirect stake in Future Retail, one of the biggest retail chains in India.[18]

In 2020, Future Retail signed a deal to sell its assets to Reliance Retail for ₹24,713 crore. Amazon objected, arguing that its deal with Future Coupons gave it a first right of refusal any sale of assets. Amazon’s argument was that the Future-Reliance deal breached this contractual clause, sparking an extended legal fight.[19]

• The dispute involved several court cases, including:

SIAC Arbitration: Amazon received a favourable interim award restraining Future Retail from consummating the Reliance transaction.

Indian Courts: The parties subsequently approached the Supreme Court of India, which affirmed the validity of the SIAC’s interim award, but primarily aimed for a resolution to the matter between the parties.

• Effects on Competition and Regulation:
• Mega-Brands Made Bigger: The tussle showcased how acquisitions and partnerships are being used by mega brands like Amazon and Reliance to capture online and offline retail channels. It also raises questions of market power, consumer choice and the viability of small retailers.
• Absence of Regulation: E-commerce does not fall easily into either category under Indian competition laws. The case highlighted the need for clearer guidelines about the competitive impact of cross-sector acquisitions.
• Consumer Welfare: Though these mergers and acquisitions are said to promise greater efficiency and a better customer experience, the long-term effects on everyone’s price, quality, and product diversity remain unclear.
• Outcome and Wider Impacts: Reliance Retail later acquired many of Future Retail’s outlets, underscoring the ability of real assets to change hands despite statutory rights under contract. Such a result highlights the necessity for regulatory changes that reflect the nuances of integrating traditional and digital retailing.

These cases showcase the sector-altering impact of mergers and acquisitions in India’s digital and retail sectors. These kinds of mergers spur innovation, efficiency and consumer savings but also bring in challenges of competition, data monopolies and regulatory efficiency. From the Flipkart-Walmart merger or Zomato-Uber Eats acquisition to Amazon-Future Retail dispute, there are sufficient indicators of why India needs a far more dynamic and data-oriented approach to its competition law.

5. New Dangers in India’s Digital Economy

5.1. The Data Monopoly Problem

As a result, companies such as Reliance Jio, Flipkart and Zomato — which control huge amounts of consumer data — tend to predict and shape market behavior in the digital economy. Existing competition laws, intended for old economy industries, fail to adequately tackle the implications of such data monopolists.

5.2. Role of Network Effects

Network effects make the market power of dominant platforms even more potent. The dominance of Jio in telecom, for instance, encourages the success of its digital platforms including JioSaavn and JioMart, just like a downward spiral ends up disadvantaging smaller players.[20]

5.3. Regulatory Lag

India has its own set of regulatory principles that often remain behind global norms. While the European Union’s Digital Markets Act[21] imposes preemptive obligations on gatekeepers, for example, the CCI follows up on “post-facto” investigations that might not be enough to tackle fast-paced anti-competitive practices.

6. Strengthening India’s Competition Law: Proposals

6.1. Revising Merger Thresholds

The CCI may then consider implementing transaction value–based thresholds to capture data-driven deals that might not be covered under traditional revenue-based SAS analysis. This way, even small but strategically meaningful acquisitions are reviewed, as is done in Germany or Austria.[22]

6.2. Increased Scrutiny of Data Controls

India’s regulators must first understand how data translates into market power. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), for instance, provides a base for the creation of frameworks analogous to data sharing and interoperability across sectors that will tackle data monopolies.

6.3. Ex-Ante Regulatory Tools

India may look to ex-ante regulations for these dominant platforms, mandating them to refrain from practices such as self-preferencing, unfair pricing, etc. That would bring India’s approach in line with international standards, including the EU’s Digital Markets Act.[23]

6.4. Sector-Specific Guidelines

India’s digital economy is diverse, and sector-specific guidance governing industries such as e-commerce, fintech and ed-tech may help mitigate specific competition issues.

7. International Perspectives

With the worldwide expansion of digital markets a new approach is now needed in merger control. As big-tech firms eat into their respective markets, jurisdictions globally have introduced new measures to tackle anti-competitive behaviour in the digital economy.

7.1. The EU Approach: The Digital Markets Act (DMA)

The European Union has led the way in regulating Big Tech with its novel Digital Markets Act (DMA), introduced in 2022. The DMA takes aim at “gatekeepers,” platforms with a large and entrenched presence that control important pieces of digital infrastructure. It sets higher thresholds for reporting mergers and acquisitions, especially those that could expand the gatekeepers’ market power through data aggregation or network effects.[24]

Under the DMA, companies that are identified as gatekeepers, including Google, Meta, and Amazon, have to meet a stricter standard of merger notification, irrespective of traditional revenue thresholds. This ensures that smaller but strategically important deals, often known as “killer acquisitions,” are subject to regulatory review.[25]

Google’s $2.1 billion purchase of Fitbit in 2021 was a case in point of the EU’s hawkishness. Although Google claimed that the agreement would increase competition in the wearables sector, the European Commission (EC) said it perceived the risk of Google using the health information of Fitbit’s users to further strengthen its hold on the digital advertising sphere. The agreement was ultimately cleared under tight behavioural commitments, and a series of limits on how personal data could be used and on how its hardware would interoperate with devices made by others.[26]

The DMA requires gatekeepers to comply with transparency norms and avoid practices such as self-preferencing or blocking data portability. These measures are designed to ensure that deals do not suppress competition or harm consumer choice.

The DMA’s regulatory model will serve as a template for regulating digital mergers around the world, including in the EU. It brings attention to the need for forward-looking regulation that considers the special characteristics of digital markets like network externalities and data pooling.

7.2. The United States:

Antitrust Enforcement in the Digital Era. The United States is the birthplace of most of the world’s largest technology companies, and its race to the legislative finish has been notable in many respects. Over the last several years, a growing group of US lawmakers and regulators has come to understand the limitations of US antitrust laws, in particular with regard to addressing the complexities of digital markets. Amazon-MGM Acquisition Amazon’s purchase of MGM Studios for $8.45 billion in 2021 was arguably the most high-profile case investigated by US regulators. The deal gave Amazon access to MGM’s extensive content library which it planned to use to further develop and enhance its Prime Video streaming platform. [27]

Critics raised concerns that this purchase would hinder competition in the digital and entertainment industries, forcing many smaller players out of the market and leading to less consumer choice. Even though the Federal Trade Commission conducted an investigation into the acquisition, it allowed Amazon to go through with the purchase, but the case raised a question about whether existing laws sufficiently prevent anti-competitive outcomes in digital and entertainment industries. FTC and DOJ’s Reform Initiatives. The Federal Trade Commission has adopted new guidelines for evaluating merger proposals that highlight the need to examine other aspects related to mergers, such as control over data, lack of incentives to innovate, and the possibility of market foreclosure. [28]

The United States Department of Justice called for the redefinition of market power in digital markets, arguing that the effect of mergers on innovation should be the central focus of enforcement bodies, rather than prices alone. Push for Legislative Reforms Several bills aimed at reining in Big Tech’s power and increasing merger restrictions have been introduced by US lawmakers. The Platform Competition and Opportunity Act[29] is intended to shift the burden of evaluating whether the acquisition of a dominant platform benefits competition from the government to the acquirer. The American Innovation and Choice Online Act[30] was designed to prevent dominant platforms from disadvantaging small competitors and banning innovative startups. Big Tech Investigations and the Role of Advocacy Various advocacy organizations became critical in pointing out the anti-competitive danger of mergers like Amazon-MGM. Such organizations have succeeded in achieving a significant influence over the public policy by arguing in favour of stricter regulatory actions against digital giants. Lessons from Other Jurisdictions Even though the EU and US have been leaders in digital competition enforcement, other jurisdictions also presented valuable lessons:

• The United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority has taken aggressive steps in addressing the digital market, sometimes acting without precedent from other jurisdictions and stopping Facebook’s acquisition of Giphy in 2021. [31]
• The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission proposed new regulations that analytical protocol thresholds are recognized to ensure the proper analysis of significant transactions involving digital platforms. [32]
• Japan’s Fair Trade Commission has made it clear that a data platform’s monopoly poses significant risks to a fair market in its merger assessments. Japan’s approach promotes competition on a fair basis and requires complete transparency in the digital marketplace.[33]

8. Rethinking Merger Control

8.1. Federal Trade Commission

The rapid growth of the digital economy and the dominance of a handful of technology giants have challenged the traditional merger control framework. These criteria, however, are challenged as a result of the evolution of digital markets and the need for regulators across the globe to reassess their philosophies around merger scrutiny and data-driven, innovation-focused narratives. Emerging Ideas/Strategies/Technologies for Redefining Merger Control in the Digital Age[34]

8.2. Making the Case for Data-Centric Merger Thresholds

The traditional competition law frameworks mainly use revenue-based thresholds to establish when a merger should face regulatory scrutiny. But in the digital economy, these thresholds do not reflect the competitive importance of some transactions, especially those involving startups, or the likes of data-rich firms.

8.3. Revenue-Based Thresholds: Insufficient Considerations

Many digital platform acquisitions are below traditional revenue thresholds, like Facebook’s $19 billion acquisition of WhatsApp in 2014, but can have serious implications for competition. Such agreements tend to prioritize the inking of data assets, user bases, or technology instead of immediate revenue.

8.4. Proposed Data-Centric Thresholds:

Some jurisdictions are looking at transaction value-based thresholds that account for the strategic importance of data. These thresholds are designed to identify acquisitions that could lead to an aggregation of data monopolies or network effects, even when the target opens the data market has not a large revenue.[35]

• Germany & Austria — Both have thresholds based on transaction value, meaning a review is triggered only in cases where the parties have substantial domestic activity and the transaction value exceeds €400 million.[36]
• India: In a nod to the shifting dynamics of digital markets, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) is considering similar thresholds to capture data-driven acquisitions.[37]

8.5. The Data-Centric Brick Wall:

Data-centric thresholds require the definition and quantification of data value which is speculative and obviously contextual and industry-specific. Privacy and data protection concerns will also need to be addressed by regulators, with the need for consistency between merger control frameworks and broader data governance policy.[38]

In the digital economy, innovation is key, startups that have the potential to disrupt the market are born every day, while technology is being updated rapidly. Merger control must, therefore, adopt an innovation-centric perspective to evaluate the long-term effects of transactions on the competitive process and innovation.

8.6. The Assessment of Innovation Ecosystems:

It focuses on innovation, analysing the impact of mergers on the larger innovation ecosystem, rather than just evaluating effects on the short-term market share. For example:

• Retaining Competition in Motion

A defining feature of digital markets is dynamic competition, where firms compete on innovation rather than price or output. They must guard against M&As that stifle this dynamic by squeezing out potential competitors or monopolizing innovation capabilities among a small number of leading players.

• Amazon’s Acquisition of Zoox

In July, Amazon’s acquisition of the autonomous vehicle startup Zoox with doubts whether it would stifle innovation in the self-driving car space. Critics contended that Amazon’s arrival could stifle other innovators from operating in the space.

8.7. Re-evaluating Market Definition in an Era of Digitalization

Traditional concepts of market definitions like the product dimension and geographic definition constructs pose challenges in digital economies. In the digital age and in modern markets, market boundaries disappear and competition often happens across multi-sided platforms and ecosystems.[39]

8.8. Multi-Sided Platforms

Multi-sided platforms, like Google or Amazon, serve multiple users at once. Evaluating competition in these types of platforms needs to consider network effects and interdependencies between groups of users.

8.9. Data-Driven Competition:

Data is a key competitive asset in digital markets. The definition of relevant market must integrate data aggregation and how it can lead to competitive advantages. For example, Facebook’s purchases of Instagram and WhatsApp vastly increased its capacity to aggregate user data and meld users’ experiences across its apps.

8.10. Global Coordination:

Some authors have suggested monitoring market definitions to make sure each market is assessed by the same definitions, issuing international guidelines to avoid regulatory arbitrage as digital markets are cross-border in nature. The OECD’s guidelines on digital competition and the International Competition Network (ICN) are efforts in this direction.[40]

8.11. Tackling Artificial Intelligence and Algorithmic Collusion

The continuously evolving glass box of the merger control process faces challenges in light of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine-learning. Algorithmic collusion is possible with these technologies, which means that firms seek to tacitly coordinate pricing or market behaviour through the use of algorithms without explicit agreements.[41]

8.12. Anticipating Future Risks

Antitrust scrutiny to mergers involving AI-driven platforms and incumbents breaking laws further facilitated by AI. Regulators lack the tools to anticipate and evaluate the implications of such technologies.[42]

8.13. Regulatory Sandboxes

Some jurisdictions (the UK and above all) have set up regulatory sandboxes to enable firms to experiment in a controlled regulatory environment. These sandboxes could also apply to merger reviews, allowing regulators to test the long-term impact of mergers on innovation.

8.14. Dynamic Remedies:

Divestitures and other traditional remedies may not always fit in digital markets. Regulators might consider more dynamic remedies, such as requiring interoperability or data-sharing requirements, to encourage competition while avoiding breaking up firms.

[1] Whish, R. & Bailey, D., Competition Law, Oxford University Press (9th ed. 2021).

[2] “Antitrust and Regulating Big Data,” 23 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1129 (2016), available at: https://gmlr.gmu.edu/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2020).

[3] Lina M. Khan, “The Separation of Platforms and Commerce,” 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1296 (2006), available at: https://harvardlawreview.org/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[4] Federal Trade Commission, “FTC Staff Reviews Google’s Acquisition of Waze,” FTC Press Release, 2013, available at: https://www.ftc.gov/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[5] Competition & Markets Authority, “Digital Competition Report: Lessons from Facebook’s Acquisition of Instagram,” CMA Publications, 2019, available at https://www.gov.uk/cma (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[6] Id at 21

[7] Id at 22

[8] Id at 20

[9] Digital Markets Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/(last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[10] Act 12 of 2003

[11] Reliance Jio Acquires Radisys, Reliance Press Release (2018), available at https://www.ril.com/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[12] Ibid

[13] “CCI Clearance for Walmart’s Flipkart Acquisition,” Economic Times (2018), available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[14] Pradeep S. Mehta, Competition Law and Policy in India, (2018) CUTS Institute for Regulation & Competition, available at https://www.cuts-ccier.org/ (last accessed 29 Dec, 2024).

[15] Ibid

[16] Competition Commission of India, “CCI Approves Acquisition of Uber Eats by Zomato,” CCI Press Release, March 2020, available at https://www.cci.gov.in/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[17] Ibid

[18] “Amazon-Future Retail Dispute,” LiveLaw (2021), available at: https://www.livelaw.in/ (last accessed Dec. 29, 2024).

[19] Ibid

[20] “Market Study on E-commerce in India”, Competition Commission of India (2020), accessible at https://www.cci.gov.in/ (last accessed Dec. 29, 2024)

[21] European Commission, “Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector (Digital Markets Act),” Official Journal of the European Union, 2022, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[22] CCI v. Google, Competition Commission of India, Case 39 of 2018.

[23] Digital Markets Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/(last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[24] European Commission, “Digital Markets Act,” Official Journal of the European Union, L 265/1 (2022), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024)

[25] Ibid

[26] European Commission, “Mergers: Commission Approves Acquisition of Fitbit by Google, Subject to Conditions,” Press Release, Dec. 17, 2020, available at https://ec.europa.eu/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[27] Khan, “Amazon-MGM Deal: Antitrust Challenges,” 128 Harv. L. Rev. 305 (2021), available at https://harvardlawreview.org/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[28] See Federal Trade Commission, “FTC Approves Amazon-MGM Deal Despite Concerns,” FTC Press Release (2022), available at https://www.ftc.gov/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[29] Platform Competition and Opportunity Act, H.R. 3826, 117th Cong. (2021), available at: https://www.congress.gov/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[30] American Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. (2021), available at: https://www.congress.gov/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[31] CMA Blocks Meta (Facebook)’s Acquisition of Giphy, CMA Press Release (Nov. 30, 2021), available at: https://www.gov.uk/cma (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[32] Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, “Digital Platforms Inquiry Final Report,” ACCC Publications (2021), available at: https://www.accc.gov.au/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[33] Japan Fair Trade Commission, “Guidelines on Business Alliances in the Digital Marketplace,” JFTC Publications, 2021, available at https://www.jftc.go.jp/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[34] Federal Trade Commission, FTC Challenges Illumina’s Acquisition of Grail (2022), available at https://www.ftc.gov/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[35] L. Khan, Innovation-Centric Merger Reviews in the Digital Age, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 905 (2021), available at: https://harvardlawreview.org/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[36] European Commission, “Innovation and Competition in Digital Markets,” EC Competition Policy Brief, 2022, available at https://ec.europa.eu/download/file/final_report_innovation_and_competition_in_digital_markets_2022-06-05_en_0.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2024).

[37] Competition Commission of India, “Competition Amendment Bill, 2023: Key Highlights,” available at https://www.cci.gov.in/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2024).

[38] Federal Trade Commission, “AI and Algorithmic Competition: Implications for Merger Control,” FTC Reports, 2022, available at: https://www.ftc.gov/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2024).

[39] Q. P. Marsden, “insensitive to radical changes in sampling methods,” 45 World Comp. L. Rev. 89 (2023).

[40] OECD, “Merger Control in Digital Markets: Policy Trends,” OECD Competition Working Papers (2023), available at: https://www.oecd.org/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2024).

[41] Federal Trade Commission, “AI and Algorithmic Competition: Implications for Merger Control,” FTC Reports, 2022, available at: https://www.ftc.gov/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2024).

[42] “Antitrust and Regulating Big Data,” 23 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1129 (2016), available at: https://gmlr.gmu.edu/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2024).