The Court can condone the delay in spite of fact the delay is very enormous, if the Court is satisfied, with the reason stated in the affidavit

SUMMARY OF THE CASE LAWS

“In exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to condone delay for sufficient cause in not preferring an appeal or other application within the period prescribed, courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor and calls for a more cautious approach, in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The Court has to exercise its discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression “sufficient cause” the principles of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. The expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction. “

CASE LAWS DETAILSI

DECIDED BY: HIGH COURT OF MADRAS, IN THE CASE OF: Pay & Accounts Officer (East) v. ITO, APPEAL NO: Tax Case (Appeal) Nos. 745-748 of 2008, DECIDED ON July 8, 2008

RELEVANT PARAGRAPH

6. The law of limitation has been enacted only to give a finality to a proceedings and not destroy statutory appellate remedy. The Court can condone the delay in spite of the fact the delay is very enormous-, if the Court is satisfied, with the reason stated in the affidavit. At the same time, even a short spell of delay may stare at the appellant if the appellant is not able to give a cogent acceptable reason for the delay. It is also equally well settled that when technicalities and substantial justice are pitted against each other, the Court will always lien in favour of substantial justice. Hence, we are of the view that the delay can be condoned as the appellant has already remitted the entire demand.

7. Further, in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Armntnag and Another v. MST. Katiji and Others, 1987 (28) E.L.T. 185, the Supreme Court held that the legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts.

8. In the case of State ofHaryana v. Chandra Mani and Others, 2002 (143) E.L.T.249 (S.C.) = AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1623, the Supreme Court held thus:;

“When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-maridng^ file- ‘ pushing, and passing-on-the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by offices/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered ~ . process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for -. considerable time causing delay mtentional or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not inv ^permissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach injustice-oriented process..-”

9. Further, the law of limitation is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae at sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, (vide of Bharat Auto Center v. Commissioner of Income-Tax and Another, reported in (2006) 282ITR 366 (Allahabad).

10. In the case of Vedabai Alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil and Others – 2001 (132) E.L.T. 15 (S.C.) = (2002) 253 ITR 799, this Court held thus: -—- -

“In exercising discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to condone delay for sufficient cause in not preferring an appeal or other application within the period prescribed, courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor and calls for a more cautious approach, in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The Court has to exercise its discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression “sufficient cause” the principles of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. The expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction. “

11. Further, some sort of latitude must be given wherever the petitions are filed by the Governmental organisation, as the Government being impersonal taking longer time in moving judicial forum, vide, Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Limited, 1988 (38) E.L.T. 739.

12. In the present appeals, the appellant i.e., the Pay and Accounts Officer is representing the Government of Tamil Nadu. It is an admitted fact that interest imposed on the appellant under Section 201(1 A) has been paid by the appellant on protest and pursued the appellate remedy by obtaining necessary sanction from the Government in G.O.Ms. No. 114 dated 27-3-2002. Thus, there is a delay of 701 days, which is explained as administrative delay. The said reason cannot be rejected as it is not sufficient cause. In the facts of the present case, every day’s delay cannot be explained and as such the pedantic approach should not be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. The delay in this case cannot be regarded as occasioned deliberately or on account of negligence or on account of mala fides. A litigant does hot stand to benefit by resorting to delay, but he runs a serious risk. Courts are not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. (See 2005 (3) SCC 752). Making a justice oriented approach from this perspective, there issue.

13. For the fore-going reasons and in the light of the above judgments, the order dated 4-4-2007 made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Chennai Bench C in I.T.A. Nos. 17 to 20/Mds/2004 is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for fresh consideration on merits.

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