Bar against initiation of CIRP applies to applications filed from 25.03.2020 even if application filed before date of amendment

Ramesh Kymal Vs Siemens Gamesa Renewable Power Pvt Ltd. (Supreme Court of India)

Bar against initiation of CIRP applies to applications filed from 25 March 2020 even if application filed before date of amendment

Conclusion:  Section 10A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) barred filing of applications for the commencement of the CIRP in respect of a corporate debtor for a default occurring on or after 25 March 2020, even if such application was filed before the date on which the amendment came into force i.e. 5 June 2020.

Held: The appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) had been invoked to challenge the judgement and order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) dated 19 October 2020. NCLAT affirmed the decision of the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT” or “Adjudication Authority”) dated 9 July 2020, holding that in view of the provisions of Section 10A, which have been inserted by Act 17 of 2020 (the “Amending Act”) with retrospective effect from 5 June 2020, the application filed by assessee as an operational creditor under Section 9 was not maintainable. The issue which falls for determination in the appeal was whether the provisions of Section 10A stand attracted to an application under Section 9 which was filed before 5 June 2020 (the date on which the provision came into force) in respect of a default which has occurred after 25 March 2020. It was held that the proviso to Section 10A stipulates that “no application shall ever be filed” for the initiation of the CIRP “for the said default occurring during the said period”. The expression “shall ever be filed” is a clear indicator that the intent of the legislature is to bar the institution of any application for the commencement of the CIRP in respect of a default which has occurred on or after 25 March 2020 for a period of six months, extendable up to one year as notified. The explanation which has been introduced to remove doubts places the matter beyond doubt by clarifying that the statutory provision shall not apply to any default before 25 March 2020. The substantive part of Section 10A is to be construed harmoniously with the first proviso and the explanation. Reading the provisions together, it is evident that Parliament intended to impose a bar on the filing of applications for the commencement of the CIRP in respect of a corporate debtor for a default occurring on or after 25 March 2020; the embargo remaining in force for a period of six months, extendable to one year.  the correct interpretation of Section 10A cannot be merely based on the language of the provision; rather it must take into account the object of the Ordinance and the extraordinary circumstances in which it was promulgated. It must be noted, however, that the retrospective bar on the filing of applications for the commencement of CIRP during the stipulated period does not extinguish the debt owed by the corporate debtor or the right of creditors to recover it. The object of the legislation has been to suspend operation of Sections 7, 9 & 10 in respect of defaults arising on or after 25th March, 2020 i.e. the date on which Nationwide lockdown was enforced disrupting normal business operations and impacting the economy globally. Indeed, the explanation removes the doubt by clarifying that such bar shall not operate in respect of any default committed prior to 25th March, 2020.

FULL TEXT OF THE SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT

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