Since the issue of LIBOR has been considered and decided by the Tribunal in various cases as relied upon by the assessee (supra); therefore, to maintain the rule of consistency, we follow the decision of the coordinate Benches of this Tribunal, and accept LIBOR for benchmarking interest on interest free loans to AEs. Since the LIBOR is a rate applicable in the transactions between the banks and further the loans advanced by the bank to clients are secure by security and guarantee; therefore, a loan which has been advanced without any security or guarantee as in the case of the assessee has to be benchmark by taking the Arm’s Length interest rate as LIBOR plus.
Whether Services in relation to erection, commissioning and installation of storage tank for storage of imported inputs/ammonia outside factory are eligible as input services?
As it appears from the portion highlighted by us, the question involved in that matter regarding the validity of the State Laws included in the Ninth Schedule cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. Regarding constituent power under Article 368, we have already relied upon the observations of the nine-bench-judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of I.R. Coelho [dead] by L.Rs. v. State of T.N. (supra) holding that by addition of the words ‘constituent power’ in Article 368, the amending body, namely, Parliament does not become the original Constituent Assembly. We, thus, find that the above decision relied upon by Mr. Champaneri does not help his client in any way.
It is noticed that the ancestral property was received by two brothers and the same was divided by two brothers by entering into an agreement between the two brothers. The assessee sold his share and shown the capital gain in the hands of HUF capacity. Whatever, the interest was received on sale consideration etc., the same was offered for taxation in his HUF capacity. The return was filed with the department, copy of the same is placed at page 70A along with computation of income as well as balance sheet. The same has been accepted by the department.
It is not in dispute that salary and wages accrue daily, weekly, fortnightly or monthly as per the contract of the employment. This is so as services is rendered in praesenti, the liability of the employer to compensate the employees for the services rendered also accrues in praesenti. A perusal of the Orders of the lower authorities show that what is actually in dispute is the quantification of compensation. As the assessee is a PSU, the pay revision depends upon the decision of the Government.
The law seems to be well settled that unless and until there is some other evidence to indicate that extra consideration had flowed in the transaction of purchase of property, the report of the DVO cannot form the basis of any addition on the part of the revenue. In the present case there is no evidence other than the report of the DVO and, therefore, the same cannot be relied upon for making an addition. In these circumstances, the question which has been framed is decided in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The appeal is dismissed.
At the outset, it is clear that as it is in the judgment of the Division Bench, which arose almost under similar circumstances, wherein the learned judge has abruptly dismissed the application for injunction on the ground that the company court has no jurisdiction to pass an interlocutory order or injunction or direction, except to safeguard the interest of the creditors.
t is settled position of law that the AO must have tangible material on the basis of which he can have a reason to believe that income has escaped assessment. In the present case, it is submitted that there was a total absence of any tangible material to form a belief. Rather the findings of the ITAT in wealth tax proceedings for the AYs 2001-02 to 2006-07 contradict the reasons recorded by the AO before issuing notice u/s 148 of the Act on 31.3.2011.
Regarding the applicability of the provision of section 2(24)(iv) of the Act, we find that the same is discussed at length in the order of this Tribunal in the case of Ashok W. Phansalkar (supra) it is the finding of the Tribunal that the similar concessions offered to the Director attract such provisions. The facts of the said case are that the assessee-Director purchased a flat from the company for Rs. 10 lakhs against the market value of Rs. 3.85 crores.
On a query put by the Court, learned counsel for the assessee accepts if the recourse to Section 143(3) would have been barred by time, there would have been no restriction to initiate the re-assessment proceeding under Section 147 of the Act. We may add that there is nothing on the plain language of Section 143 of the Act which may suggest that the recourse to Section 147 can be had only when the period of limitation to complete assessment proceeding has expired or the Assessing Authority should wait for the expiry of the said period. The said argument is ridiculous and not acceptable.
