In the present case, what is apparent is that the lessee (assessee) paid a substantial amount (Rs. 2.53 crores) in 1989 at the time of entering into the transaction. It was a precondition for securing possession; the amount was one-time consideration in terms of the lease condition. In addition, the lessee has to pay 2.5% of the said amount as annual rent, which is subject to increase periodically. No doubt, the assessee argues that the annual rent is depressed, and does not reflect the market rent.
1. That part of the enhancement of lease rent, which is attributable to Mehta Charitable Trust surrendering its right to purchase khair wood in favour of the assessee company constitutes revenue expenditure. 2. That part of the enhancement of lease rent, which is attributable to improvement and modernization of plant and machinery carried out by the Trust in the year 1989-90, constitutes revenue expenditure. 3. The enhancement in lease rent, if any, which is attributable to normal appreciation, if any, in line with the lease rentals prevailing in the market constitutes revenue expenditure.
Yet another issue involved in this appeal is as to whether the capital gain tax, in this case, would be leviable at the normal rate of 20% or at the rate of 10%. Admittedly, capital gain tax at the rate of 10% was payable only in case of ‘listed securities’. Since, these shares had been transferred to the applicants in the public offer, by 5.1.2006 before they were actually listed on the stock exchanges on 6.1.2006, they were not ‘listed securities’ at the time of sale by the appellant and consequently, the transaction would not be eligible for payment of capital gain tax at the lower rate of 10%.
We may also notice that the proviso to Section 147 of the Act is fully applicable as the assessee had disclosed all the materials facts at the time of original assessment. Even if the materials/evidence was not enclosed with the return, full and true details/material was disclosed during the course of the original proceedings. The turnover or sales made to DMRC has not been disputed.
If the argument of the appellant were to be accepted, it would make the provisions of compulsory registration under the Registration Act redundant and otiose. Thus the appellant, in the absence of any valid agreement can neither seek a direction to the Official Liquidator nor will any purpose be served in granting permission to the appellant to sue the company-in-liquidation for specific performance when as per the admitted facts, the appellant is unable to prove and/or is prohibited from proving the agreement.
Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. UOI There is no provision like section 4(7) of the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act in Delhi VAT Act. The entire case of the petitioner was that there should have been a provision like this in Delhi VAT Act as well, otherwise it is leading to various difficulties. Even if one presume that the provision like section 4(7) in Andhra Pradesh VAT Act makes it a better legislation in comparison with Delhi VAT Act but absence of such a provision, cannot be a ground for declaring statute as arbitrary or ultra vires. Bad legislative drafting, if at all, cannot furnish a ground for judicial review of the legislative action. It has to be shown that a particular provision is either beyond the legislative competence and is thus ultra vires or is unconstitutional viz. namely it offends some constitutional provision.
Learned counsel for the petitioner-management had also argued that right to transfer an employee is implicit in every contract of service and therefore, the respondent-workman could still be transferred from one office of the petitioner-management to another.
Talluri Srinivas v. ICAI (Delhi HC)- Section 21B(3), read with rule 18 of the Rules makes it clear that the Disciplinary Committee is obliged to offer the member, whose conduct is under examination, an opportunity of being heard and to comply with the principles of natural justice. In the instant case, the period during which the interim stay of the disciplinary proceedings remained in force, the petitioner cannot be faulted for delaying the proceedings. The petitioner was entitled to agitate his legal rights, and merely because that led to deferment of the disciplinary proceedings, the said fact cannot be held against the petitioner.
In the present case, the wording of Clause 7.1 of the lease reflects the intention of the parties that it is the Petitioner who would bear the incidence of all taxes. In light of the decisions in Numaligarh Refinery Ltd. v. Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. M/s. Dewan Chand Ram Saran, the view of the learned Arbitrator that in terms of Clause 7.1 of the lease deed, the service tax liability is that of the service provider, i.e. the Petitioner, is a plausible one.
Although there is no automatic closure or quashing of the criminal complaint, in the event, there is a favourable verdict in the departmental or the adjudicatory proceedings in favour of an accused but in case the adjudicatory proceedings culminate into a favourable order in favour of the accused on merits and the criminal complaint is in sum and substance based on the same facts then, obviously the Apex Court has observed that it would be a gross abuse of the processes of law to continue with the criminal complaint.
