The plea of learned counsel for the OL that as and when the monies become available for disbursement as a result of the proceedings under the RDDB Act they should be placed at the disposal of the OL is different from the law explained by the Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Financial Corporation (supra). What appears from a careful reading of paras 16, 17 and 18 of the said judgment is that the OL has certainly to be associated in all the proceedings of sale by public auction or otherwise of the properties of the company in liquidation and the orders of the DRT. As noted hereinbefore, the DRT has issued notices to the OL at every stage. The Court is now informed that since 2012, the OL has been participating in the proceedings before the DRT and now before the DRAT. Therefore, there may be no apprehension that the orders might be passed in the proceedings under the RDDB Act without the participation of the OL. It is for the OL to diligently pursue those proceedings hereinafter.
Both the CIT(A) as well as the ITAT have set aside the penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the issue of deduction under Section 14A of the Act was a debatable issue.
We see no reason to take a different view from that adopted by the Bombay High Court. However, Mr Sabharwal, appearing on behalf of the revenue, raised a pointed question as to whether, in fact, the provision for payment of bonus in this case was actually an ascertained liability.
Minimum subscription would have to be calculated after taking into account the requests made for withdrawal of share application. There is another reason for coming to the same conclusion. Undoubtedly, in this case like in other public issues, there are rejections by a Registrar based on various technical grounds. If as per the clause of minimum subscription, the minimum subscription had to be calculated as on the date of closure, it would be well-nigh impossible to carry out that exercise as more often than not the rejections are made even after the date of closure.
The contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the reopening of the assessments was prompted by the opinion which the respondent formed while framing the assessment for assessment year 2007-08 that the licence fee payment was not an allowable deduction, cannot be accepted because, as we have observed earlier though the genesis of the issue can be traced to the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 2007-08, the reasons recorded show that the assessing officer took proceedings under Section 147 on the ground that the licence agreement was not filed by the petitioner in the original assessment proceedings. When there is a failure on the part of the petitioner to furnish the primary facts, it is futile to examine the question whether the re-assessment was prompted by a change of opinion based on the view which the assessing officer took in subsequent assessment proceedings.
In view of decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kettlewell Bullen & Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT: (1964) 53 ITR 261, It was held that the compensation received for loss of an asset of enduring value would be regarded as capital receipt.
In the present case, we find that the so-called information is undisclosed and what exactly that information was, is also not known. At one place in the affidavit of Deputy Director of Income-tax, it has been mentioned that he got information that there was a likelihood of the documents belonging to the DS Group being found at the residence of the petitioner. That by itself would amount only to a surmise and conjecture and not to solid information and since the search on the premises of the petitioner was founded on this so-called information, the search would have to be held to be arbitrary. It may also be pointed out that when the search was conducted on 21.01.2011, no documents belonging to the DS Group were, in fact, found at the premises of the petitioner.
In the present case, no irregularity or inaccuracy or falsity in the figures furnished by the appellant both on 05.02.2007 and in the rebate claims has been alleged. Moreover, it appears to us somewhat strange that none of the authorities below has demonstrated as to how the appellant could have complied with the requirement prior to the date of the export of the IT-enabled services.
It is not disputed by the assessee that the return of income was filed beyond the time limit prescribed by section 139(1) and even section 139(4). Under sub-section (4) of section 139 the assessee ought to have filed the return on or before 31-3-2000. However, the return was filed only on 10-10-2000. Under general principles, a refund of taxes can be granted only where the return of income is processed under section 143(1) or an assessment is made under section 143(3) after inquiry.
The documents have been perused. The CLB has noted the mismatching in the questioned and the admitted signatures yet on a perusal of the same and the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent which is to the effect that the signatures of a person do vary at different points of time which submission is not out of context.
