The question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the goods manufactured by hundred percent EOU (Export-Oriented Undertaking) when sold in India can be subjected to levy of Education Cess under the Central Excise Act.
Wallfort Shares & stock Brokers Ltd v ITO Where the assessee bought units of a mutual fund, received tax-free dividend thereon and immediately thereafter redeemed the units and claimed the difference between the cost price and redemption value as a loss and the same had been upheld by a Five Member Special Bench of the Tribunal as a genuine loss,
SET Satellite (Singapore) vs. DDIT (Bombay High Court) – Where the assessee had a ‘Dependent Agency Permanent Establishment’ (‘DAPE’) (“SET India”) in India and it was admitted by the Revenue that the assessee had paid ‘arms length’ remuneration to the said dependent agent but the Tribunal still held (106 ITD 75) that notwithstanding the taxability of the said dependent agent in accordance with domestic law, the assessee had to be assessed in respect of the profits attributable to the said DAPE, held, reversing the judgment of the Tribunal that
CCE vs. Shruti Colorants (Bombay High Court) – As s. 35-G of the Central Excise Act (and s. 130 of the Customs Act) provides that an appeal to the High Court shall be filed within 180 days of the receipt of the order appealed against and there is no provision for condonation of delay the court has no power to condone delay.
CIT vs. Dodsal Ltd (Bombay High Court) – It is not possible to accept the submission of the Revenue that once the AO comes to the conclusion that there is a breach of the mandate of Section 158BFA(1), then the penalty has to be mandatory imposed. The terminology of section 158BFA makes it clear that the AO has a discretion in the matter of levy of penalty.
In our view, once all the material was before the AO and he chose not to deal with the several contentions raised by the petitioner in his final assessment order, it cannot be said that he had not applied his mind when all material was placed by the petitioner before him.
Tarun Ghia Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others The Petitioner is a Chartered Accountant in practice and claims to be qualified to undertake the audit of societies as contemplated under Section 81 (1)(a) and 81(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. He was on the panel of auditors maintained by the Divisional Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies – Respondent No.3. According to the Petitioner the powers of empanelment, removal and other matters relating to functioning of the Chartered Accounts in contemplation to those provision was arbitrary and discretionary; and the Respondents were acting in a very unfair manner. On these 2 premises the Petitioner prayed for an issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction directing Respondent No.3 to produce the entire records in connection with the list of societies with basic details like turnover, working capital, audit fees of the previous year and the Respondents be directed to prepare proper guidelines introducing transparency and fairness in empanelment of the auditors for awarding of auditing work in the co-operative societies. The Petitioner has further prayed that Respondent No.3 should publish the list and the consideration for empanelment should be objective and not supported by extraneous criteria.
The interesting question raised in this petition is, where a company deducts tax at source (TDS) from the salary payable to an employee, but fails to deposit the said amount into the Government treasury, whether, the revenue can recover the TDS amount with interest from the employee concerned in spite of the express bar contained in section 205 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Argument of the learned counsel on behalf of the Food Corporation of India that since the amount of Rs. 10,31,344 has admittedly been paid on account of interest, it retains its character as interest and, therefore, the Food Corporation of India must be allowed to deduct interest thereon at the rate in force, is not tenable
The short point which arises for consideration in this appeal is : Whether notional interest on interest-free deposit received by the assessee against letting of property could be taken into account in cases falling under section 23(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) In other words, whether notional interest would form part of actual rent received or receivable under section 23(1)(b) ?
