While sending a very loud and clear message to one and all that scandalous comments about the judiciary will not be tolerated, the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest oral judgment titled Court On Its Own Motion vs Shiv Narayan Sharma Adv And Ors Deepak Singh Adv And Anr in CONT.CAS.(CRL) 3/2025 & CRL.M.A. 2184/2026, CRL.M.A. 9152/2026, CRL.M.A. 15810/2026, CONT.CAS.(CRL) 4/2025 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:DHC:4423-DB that was pronounced just recently on 16.05.2026 has sentenced You Tuber Gulshan Pahuja to six months of simple imprisonment in two criminal contempt cases and Rs 2,000 as fine in each of the two contempt matters for scandalizing the judiciary and lowering the authority of the courts through his videos targeting judicial officers in his videos and in arguments before the Court. The sentences are to run concurrently. It merits noting that in default of payment of fine, the court imposed an additional one month’s simple imprisonment.
By the way, we need to also note that the Bench observed that the contemnor showed no remorse or course correction and instead compounded the contempt through his conduct during proceedings. It was also held by the Court that his actions had scandalized the institution and undermined public confidence in the judiciary. There has to be zero tolerance for any attempt to scandalize the institution of judiciary which enjoys an impeccable reputation and those who dare to indulge in scandalizing judiciary must be brought to book and punished most strictly! No denying it!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced oral judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Navin Chawla for a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Ravinder Dudeja sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “We, by our judgment dated 21.04.2026, had found the respondent no.2/Mr. Gulshan Pahuja (hereinafter referred to as ‘contemnor’) guilty of having committed criminal contempt of Court as defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and granted him an opportunity to make submissions on the punishment to be awarded to him under Section 12 of the said Act. We, accordingly, issued a notice under Rule 13(1) of the Contempt of Courts (Delhi High Court) Rules, 2025 to him for the same, granting him liberty to file his submissions on punishment within a period of two weeks therefrom.”
As we see, the Division Bench then states in para 2 that, “In response to the said notice, the respondent no.2 has filed an application being Crl. M.A. 15810/2026, praying for recall and setting aside of our judgment/order dated 21.04.2026 holding him guilty of having committed criminal contempt of Court. He further states that the conviction is vitiated and is violative of his rights under Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India and the principles of natural justice. He has also filed written submissions titled as ‘written submission for debate on the quantum of sentence’.”
As things stands, the Division Bench then specifies in para 3 that, “We have also granted him an opportunity of making oral submissions.”
Plainly speaking, the Division Bench then points out in para 4 that, “Mr. Pahuja, the contemnor, submits that our judgment dated 21.04.2026 suffers from a procedural irregularity inasmuch as he was not fully heard while holding him guilty of having committed criminal contempt of Court and that the case files on which he had made the comments in the subject videos were not summoned from the Trial Court nor were the judicial officers, who were named in the videos, produced as witnesses. He submits that he was not given any opportunity to cross-examine them. He further submits that the documents that had been filed along with his reply were not perused by this Bench before passing the said judgment. He also submits that the judgment passed by this Court is incorrect inasmuch as it is pronounced without giving any reasons for holding him guilty of having committed criminal contempt of Court. He submits that as these proceedings are of a criminal nature, the onus of proof always lies on the prosecution, that is, this Court, to show that he has committed contempt of court through his acts and that his statements were not true.”
Do note, the Division Bench notes in para 7 that, “We must herein note that during the course of his oral submissions, he again makes scandalous remarks inasmuch as he states that he expects no justice from the Indian judicial system and states ‘adaalaton ki manmarzi badhti jaa rahi hai aur main koi nyay ki umeed nahi kar raha’ and also states ‘manmarzi ka dusra arth taanashahi hota hai’.”
Do also note, the Division Bench then notes in para 8 that, “He submits that he will not ask for a reduction of sentence or expect justice from this Court. In fact, he started citing examples of freedom fighters and others who, on quantum of sentence, had taken a stand that they will not accept any leniency from the British government.”
Do further note, the Division Bench then notes in para 9 that, “He further submits that as far as the respondent no.1 in both these contempt petitions are concerned, they were let off by accepting their apologies, thereby denying him a chance to prove his innocence by cross-examining them.”
Be it noted, the Division Bench notes in para 14 that, “In the present case, as found in our judgment dated 21.04.2026, the contemnor, by his acts, has scandalized the court and lowered the authority of the Court. The contemnor shows no regret for the same. He also does not suggest any course correction. In fact, he maintains that what he did was with the intent of improving the judicial system.”
It cannot be lost sight of that the Division Bench points out in para 15 that, “As noted by us in this order hereinabove, he, in fact, compounds his contempt by making further scandalous submissions before this Court and thus, evidently he is neither repentant nor deserves any mercy.”
It also cannot be lost on us that the Division Bench explicitly states in para 16 that, “We also find that by not imposing adequate punishment on him, we may encourage him to repeat these acts in future and to embolden him in doing the same.”
Quite significantly, it would be instructive to note that the Division Bench then hastens to add in para 17 noting that, “As far as his submissions on our judgment dated 21.04.2026 are concerned, we cannot sit in review of the said judgment and the contemnor has full right and had an opportunity to challenge the same in accordance with law. We, therefore, do not deem it fit to revisit all his submissions in our present order. The judgments cited by him are, therefore, not applicable to the facts of the present case.”
Most significantly and as a corollary, the Division Bench encapsulates in para 18 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “As far as his submissions on our judgment dated 21.04.2026 are concerned, we cannot sit in review of the said judgment and the contemnor has full right and had an opportunity to challenge the same in accordance with law. We, therefore, do not deem it fit to revisit all his submissions in our present order. The judgments cited by him are, therefore, not applicable to the facts of the present case.”
Equally significant is that the Division Bench then points out in para 19 that, “As the contemnor has stated that he intends to challenge our judgment dated 21.04.2026 and the order passed today before the Supreme Court, we, exercising our power under Section 19(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, suspend the sentence awarded to the contemnor for a period of 60 days from today, subject to any further orders that may be passed by the Supreme Court. In case an order suspending the sentence of the contemnor is not passed by the Supreme Court, the contemnor shall on his own surrender before the Registrar General of this Court forthwith on expiry of the above-mentioned period.”
It is worth noting that the Division Bench notes in para 20 that, “These matters are disposed of in the above terms. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of in the aforesaid terms.”
Further, the Division Bench observes in para 21 that, “We again express our gratitude to both the learned Amicus Curiae and the learned APP for assisting us.”
Furthermore, the Division Bench then further directs and holds in para 22 that, “A copy of this order, as well as translated copy of the order in Hindi, be given dasti to Mr. Gulshan Pahuja.”
Finally, the Division Bench then aptly concludes by directing and holding in para 23 that, “Copy of this order be sent to the learned Registrar General for information and compliance.”
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