Apex Court held that till the amendment in 1995, the compensation received on surrendering the tenancy rights could not be assessed to capital gains. Thus, on the fact position as found by the Tribunal and which form the very basis of the order under Section 263 that the assessee was treated as tenants as per the document dated 25.02.1994, the genuineness of which was never questioned by the Revenue, we have no hesitation in confirming the order of the Tribunal. In the above circumstances, we reject the questions raised by the Revenue.
The assessee herein sought for withdrawal of the appeal to go before the Settlement Commission, which dismissed the petition on the ground that there was no appeal pending, a mandatory requirement as on the date of taking up a required application.
Law is well-settled that in cases where the company court sells the properties in accordance with various provisions of the Companies Act and the Rules framed thereunder, such sale can be interfered with only in cases where there is a total irregularity or the sale is effected against the provisions of the Companies Act or the Rules framed thereunder. On the factual matrix, it is not the case of the appellant that there has been any irregularity or the sale has been effected in gross violation of the provisions of the Companies Act. T
In view of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioner, as well as the respondents, and on a perusal of the records available, it is noted that an appellate remedy is available to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order passed by the third respondent, on 27.3.2012, under Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994.
Given the definition of ‘lease or tenancy’ and the definition of ‘rent’ as appearing in Section 194 I Explanation, unless the payment is with reference to the use of any specified land or a building, payment made for availing of the services as in the nature landing or parking, as available in the present case before us, cannot be construed as ‘rent’.
The question as to whether the expenditure would fall for consideration under section 35AB or the question as to whether the expenditure is on account of revenue or capital has to be decided by taking note of the facts and circumstances leading to the said expenditure. As pointed out by the Bombay High Court, in the case of CIT v. Kirloskar Tractors Ltd.[1998] 98 Taxman 112, in order to arrive at a just and proper conclusion, one must look at the nature and character of the advantage in a commercial sense having regard to the purpose of the outlay and its intended object and effect. As pointed out by High Court if the expenditure is for carrying on or conduct of the business, then it may be regarded as an integral part of the profit making process, and the expenditure qualifies for being considered as a revenue expenditure.
The assessee-company initially filed u/s 139(1), a return supported by regular accounts, and showing substantial book profit and offering MAT. However thereafter its accounts came to be inspected by the Registrar of Companies who gave certain directions to modify its Annual Accounts. On the basis of those directions the assessee revised its profit and loss account and balance sheet which resulted in its income being negative. The corrected accounts were placed before the shareholders for their approval. Note no.7 of the Notes attached and forming part of the accounts was approved by the shareholders in the annual general meeting. The assessee however filed the revised return based on the revised accounts, showing a book loss, beyond the time limit prescribed in section 139(5).
It is no doubt true that the Tribunal as well as the Assessing Officer had recorded the fact that the assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting. Hence, the accrual theory of interest income was to be assessed in the year in which it had accrued and had become due. As already pointed out by the Apex Court, in the mercantile system of accounting, even though the principle of accrual is followed, the real income theory, nevertheless, has its relevance to find out the assessability of an income.
We agree with the assessee’s contention that the written down value of the assets at the hands of the amalgamated company will be the written down value at the hands of the amalgamating company for the immediate preceding previous year arrived at after reducing the depreciation actually allowed in the said preceding previous year and Explanation 3 will have no relevance for the purpose of finding out the written down value of the amalgamating company, which, in turn, is that of the amalgamated company.
. Given the fact that the assessee had not owned the property in her name only to the exclusion of anybody else including the husband, but in joint name with her husband, we agree with the submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the assessee herein that unless and until there are materials to show that the assessee is the exclusive owner of the residential property, the harshness of the proviso cannot be applied to the facts herein. Apart from that, 50% ownership is with reference to the clinic situated in the ground floor. As such, the entire property is not an exclusive residential property. Hence, we are inclined to agree with the assessee’s contention that the joint ownership of the property would not stand in the way of claiming exemption under Section 54F.
