It is therefore necessary that there must be debt due and the company must be unable to pay it. If the debt is a disputed debt and the defence is substantial one order of winding up should not be passed. It is also note worthy that after the petitions were admitted no other persons have raised any claim and, therefore, this Court finds that the debt being disputed and there exists a bona fide dispute.
In our view, therefore, once the conditions of further proviso of section 194C(3) are satisfied, the liability of the payee to deduct tax at source would cease. The requirement of such payee to furnish details to the income tax authority in the prescribed form within prescribed time would arise later and any infraction in such a requirement would not make the requirement of deduction at source applicable under sub-section (2) of section 1 94C of the Act.
On a conjoint reading of the provisions of section 69 and section 142A of the Act, it appears that for the purpose of resorting to the provisions of section 142A of the Act, the Assessing Officer would first be required to record a satisfaction that the assessee has made investments which are not recorded in the books of account.
In the present case, therefore, the fact that the assessee had completed the construction well before 31st March, 2008 is not in doubt. It is, of course, true that formally BU permission was not granted by the Municipal Authority by such date. It is equally true that explanation to clause (a) to section 80-IB(10) links the completion of the construction to the BU permission being granted by the local authority.
Amount written off was a loan advanced during the course of business and that the interest thereon had been taxed as business income by the Department in accordance with the assessee’s declaration under VDIS. The Tribunal also recorded a finding that the certificate accepting the VDIS declaration was issued by the Commissioner after consultation with the Central Board of Direct Taxes
Sub-section (3) of section 10A either before or after its substitution does not contemplate a break in the five succeeding assessment years in relation to which an assessee is entitled to avail of benefit under section 10A of the Act. Thus, in case of an assessee who had already started availing the benefit of section 10A of the Act in any assessment year prior to the coming into force of the substituted sub-section (3),
Section 179(1) provides for a vicarious liability of the director of a public company for payment of tax dues which cannot be recovered from the company. However, such liability could be avoided if the director proves that the non recovery cannot be attributed to any gross negligence, misfeasance or breach of duty on his part in relation to the affairs of the company.
Court finds that the petitioner has followed the required procedure as contemplated under Sections 100 and 101 of the Act for the proposed reduction of capital. The Court also finds that Article 8 of the Articles of Association of the petitioner-Company permits reduction of capital. It also appears that as there was no outlay of funds, the interest of the creditors is not adversely affected, therefore, the procedure as contemplated under Section 101(2) of the Act is not required to be followed.
The petitioner having already paid up the service tax even before collection in a particular quarter, cannot be asked to pay such tax all over again in the following quarter on the same service on the ground that such tax had to be deposited in the later quarter but was deposited earlier. Any such action would be without authority of law.
In the present case, the expenditure is incurred for the purpose of sub-division of the shares. However, we do not see how the observations made by the Apex Court in the ratio laid down in case of General Insurance Corporation (supra) can be distinguished in view of such difference in facts. In case of sub-division of the shares also, there is no increase in the share capital of the company.
