ITAT has chosen to disregard the plea of the Revenue for further investigation into the matter though there was sufficient material, which was referred to by the Assessing Officer, to suspect the motives of the assesses in claiming such huge expenditure by way of interest under Section 57(iii) of the Act.
The assessee received a donations which was not anonymous donations within the meaning of Section 11(3) of the Act because the receipts issued by the assessee trust were still in the custody of the department as the receipt books were impounded in the course of the survey and no confirmations were required to be filed by the assessee.
In proceedings under Article 226, and that whether the presumption of liability can be rebutted under Section 179 has to be gone into before the tax authorities. Nonetheless, the Court here has to deal with the assessee’s fundamental argument that he is not liable to pay anything more than the tax (i.e. not liable to pay penalty or interest).
The assessee had filed and furnished all details and particulars relating to the royalty payment including agreements, calculation and the approval. There was no failure on the part of the assessee to furnish true and correct all material facts. The facts were available before and were within the knowledge of the Assessing Officer. The new Assessing Officer as per the reasons recorded on the basis of the same facts, has observed that royalty payment should have been disallowed as it was capital in nature. This is a question of legal inference or interpretation which has been drawn from the same material facts on record. There is no allegation that there was failure or omission on the part of the assessee to furnish and state all material facts.
It is a cardinal principle of construction that when a legislation confers power, its amplitude cannot be cut down by instructions or rules or regulations made by subordinate authorities. Instructions and Rules can only supplement but can never supplant or limit the width of the statutory powers. In this case, the AO – as is evident from a reading of the impugned order – has not applied his mind at all to the facts much less considered what are the circumstances which either justify the grant of relief or its refusal. Furthermore, even the petitioner does not appear to have been given any opportunity to make even a briefest submission in support of its case.
The ratio of the judgment in Beejay Engg. (P.) Ltd., In re [1983] 53 Comp. Cas. 918 (Delhi) as also as is evident from the definition of a director under section 2(13) no distinction has been made between a nominated director or any other director. Thus, the first argument propounded by the petitioner that the applicant was only a nominee director will not by itself be a ground to absolve the said person from the liability of complying with the direction contained in section 454(2).
Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the rent free accommodation provided by Maruti Udyog Ltd. to the Assessee, an employee of Suzuki Motors Corporation (Japan) is not a perquisite in the hands of the Assessee under Section 17(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and if the answer to this is in the negative whether the Assessee is entitled to the benefit of the exemption provided by Section 10(14) of the Act?
As per Section 6 of the SICA, the member/Chairman can hold an office for a period of not exceeding 5 years or till he or she attains the age of 65 years. ACC is the competent authority, who has to take decision out of the proposal made by the concerned Ministry. In the present case, note prepared by the Secretariat of ACC and proposal sent by the Ministry were put up before the ACC. After perusing the same, the ACC approved the appointment of respondent no. 4 till he attains the age of 65 years or till abolition of BIFR or until further orders, whichever event occurs the earliest.
This court vide order dated 15.9.2006 gave a clear mandate to the respondent no.4 to seek permission of the court before entering into any sale transaction but the respondents no.1 to 4 in utter disregard and blatant defiance of the said injunction order kept on selling its lands to various buyers who are also now facing the brunt of contumacious and contemptuous conduct of the respondents no. 1 to 4.
Facially the provision of section 12AA would suggest that there are no restrictions of the kind which the revenue is reading into in the instant case. In other words, the statute does not prevent or enjoin the Commissioner from registering a trust based only on its objects, without any activity, in the case of a newly registered Trust. The statute does not prescribe a waiting period, for a trust to qualify itself for registration.
