In so far as the impugned order is concerned, there is nothing stated in the operative part which would seem to indicate that the CIC has come to the conclusion which it has, is based on the fact that, the economic interest of the country, will get effected. The CIC, in the operative part has merely recorded what has been conveyed to it vis-a-vis the procedure for selection of cases for scrutiny.
Merely because a financial loss would be suffered by the appellant qua the arbitration Awards which had been passed against him would not entitle him to come under the exception seeking a refusal of the restoration of the company. The position of the company vis-à-vis this stand is that a healthy company who was admittedly operational at the time when its name was struck off would be deprived of its right to function as a going concern and in the bargain would not be permitted to recover its dues which amounts have accrued to it under the Awards of the Arbitral Tribunal.
In the present case, there were undoubtedly three separate contracts entered into between the parties. One was for the supply of cables and the other two for supply of accessories, i.e., Jumpers, Connectors and Surge Arrestors. Both the parties have been dealing with each other for over seven years. The Petitioner itself being the manufacturer of cables and accessories knew that for the purpose of the business of the Respondent the mere supply of cables without the accessories could not be sufficient. The Respondent was in turn supplying cables and accessories to the telecom service providers including Tata Tele Services Limited (‘TTL’). The mere supply of cables to TTL would not have constituted a complete delivery of goods. The peak period in the telecom industry for the supply of cables was the first three months of the year. Therefore, the failure on the part of the Petitioner to supply the accessories would adversely affect the corresponding obligations of the Respondent to its customers.
It was observed by the CLB that if the Appellants failed to cooperate with NHEL for the determination of the value of the occupied premises, including land, plant and machinery and do not accept the fair value of the assets determined, the petition shall be deemed to have been dismissed. The impugned order thus makes it impossible for the Appellants to even question the valuation. Having succeeded in demonstrating oppression by the Respondents, the Appellants cannot be compelled to accept an arbitrary and unilateral determination of the fair value by the Respondents not based on any sound financial and accounting principles. The remedy provided by the CLB has thus been rendered illusory.
Supreme Court in the case of P. R. Prabhakar v. CIT [2006] 284 ITR 548 where the order of the Special Bench cited (supra) stands approved. It was clarified that the amendment made to clause (baa) of the Explanation below Section 80HHC which defines “profits of the business” in such a manner as to exclude receipts like interest, commission etc. which did not have an element of turnover, was introduced prospectively by the Finance (No.2) Act, 1991 w.e.f. the assessment year 1992-93 and the amendment did not operate retrospectively.
There is another aspect of the matter. The purport of unearned increase is to, in addition to the premium charged by the appellant DDA at the time of granting the lease, entitle the appellant DDA to share 50% of the increase in value of the leasehold rights from the date when the lease was given and till the date of transfer. The transfer of the leasehold rights in the present case, as aforesaid, is under the aegis of this Court. There is no doubt as to the consideration for the said transfer. It is not in dispute that the matter has throughout been pending in this Court on the issue of unearned increase. We are of the opinion that it would be highly unjust and unfair to ask the respondent M/s Aeroshine who though has purchased the leasehold rights at the rates of the year 1983-85, to pay unearned increase to the appellant DDA of the year 2004 or of today.
Counsel for the respondent is right in relying on sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 35EE to point out that in case the Central Government suo motu decides to issue notice to the assessee to enhance the penalty or fine or duty and after hearing the assessee decides to drop the proceedings, no grant of any opportunity to the Commissioner of Central Excise or any other officer executing the Act is envisaged.
The alternative prayer that RLB should be directed to be wound up, since its entire substratum has disappeared, will require a detailed examination of several relevant factors, all of which are not before the Court. Nothing precludes RLB from seeking winding up in accordance with law in appropriate proceedings by placing the full facts before the Court which can then be responded to by the OL, the RD and other interested parties including creditors. Given the pleadings in the present application, it is not possible to undertake that exercise at this stage.
This is a clear case where the primary facts were available before the AO, and therefore, the assessee cannot be held to have failed to disclose “fully and truly all material facts”. In our opinion, it was for the AO to draw the appropriate inference. The assessee is/was under no obligation to draw the inference of fact or law based on the primary facts available on record.
The original demand of Rs. 225.86 crores comprised of two components as per the petitioner. The two components were Rs. 114 crores towards the alleged principal tax liability and Rs. 110 crores towards the purported interest liability. We shall first consider the Rs. 110 crores interest liability. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the said figure of Rs. 110 crores can be broken up into three components.
