From the above circular, it would be clear that the amendment bringing self generated intangible assets such as trademark to capital gains tax only with effect from Assessments Year 2002-03 onwards. In this case, we are concerned with Assessment Year 1999-2000 and therefore, the amendment would not have any effect.
There was no fresh tangible material before the Assessing Officer to reach a reasonable belief that the income liable to tax has escaped assessment. The order passed originally on 29th March 2005 under Section 143(3) of the said Act was passed after the respondent had made adhoc claim for expenditure at 30% of the professional receipts in the revised return of income which was later withdrawn. In fact the reasons for reopening the assessment for the year 2002-03 itself records that the the claim of 30% adhoc expenses was withdrawn when the respondent assessee was asked to substantiate the claim.
It is an undisputed position that duty and penalty are arrears of the company. It was the company that was the person engaged in manufacture of goods and registered as manufacturer under section 6 of the said Act and therefore obliged to pay excise duty. Further under the Act and the Rules, the person liable to pay duty is the person who manufactures the goods in terms of rule 7 of the erstwhile Central Excise Rules, 1944 and rule 4 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002, as now existing. Therefore the obligation to pay duty is on the company.
Tribunal after examining the evidence upheld the order of CIT(A) and concluded that the respondent was an investor in shares and entitled to be taxed under the head capital gains in respect of purchase and sale of shares. The Tribunal after examining the facts found that the respondent had not borrowed any funds for its investments and that the long terms gains were attributable to only shares of 4 companies and 3 of them were held for a period of about 5 to 12 years. So far as short terms capital gains were concerned the Tribunal held that about 93% of the short terms gain/loss was attributable to shares of six companies and in any case all the shares were held for periods ranging in excess of 1 month.
It is clear to us that the Supreme Court did not hold anything contrary to what was held in the previous judgments to the effect that even if a claim is not made before the assessing officer, it can be made before the appellate authorities. The jurisdiction of the appellate authorities to entertain such a claim has not been negated by the Supreme Court in this judgment. In fact, the Supreme Court made it clear that the issue in the case was limited to the power of the assessing authority and that the judgment does not impinge on the power of the Tribunal under section 254.
There is no much substance in the first argument as to aspect of lack of jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Magistrate’s Court to entertain the criminal complaint of respondent No.2. This is so, in view of the factual position as to major transaction between the complainant and the accused took place at Mumbai though the complainant is resident of Rajkot, so also the accused Nos. 1 to 4, 8,9,13 to 18 are resident of Kolkata
Whether on the facts and in the circumstance of the case and in law the Hon’ble Tribunal was right in deleting the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer of interest paid by the Assessee Company on borrowed funds amounting to Rs.241.10 lakhs overlooking the fact that the borrowed funds were used by the Assessee Company to invest in the Capital of another Partnership Firm and since profits derived by the Assessee Company from a Partnership firm were exempt from tax u/s.10(2A) of the Income-tax Act, the interest expense related to such tax free profits is to be disallowed u/s.14A of the Income Tax Act?
The expression ‘reasonable cause’ used in Section 273B is not defined under the Act. Unlike the expression ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 249(3), 253(5) and 260A(2A) of the Act, the legislature has used the expression ‘reasonable cause’ in Section 273B of the Act. A cause which is reasonable may not be a sufficient cause. Thus, the expression ‘reasonable cause’ would have wider connotation than the expression ‘sufficient cause’. Therefore, the expression ‘reasonable cause’ in Section 273B for non-imposition of penalty under Section 271E would have to be construed liberally depending upon the facts of each case.
This Court had the occasion to consider similar issues in a Judgment delivered in the case of DIT (Exemption) v. Chembur Gymkhana [Income Tax Appeal No. 5568 of 2010, dated 13-2-2012]. This Court, following the law laid down by the Supreme Court, has held that the fact that the membership of the club is open to a section of the community would not detract from the fact that the club has been constituted for the advancement of any other object of general public utility.
The Principal Judge, Small Causes Court, Pune, and thereafter the District Judge, Pune, negatived the contention of the Corporation holding that profession of Chartered Accountant is neither a trade nor a business. Advocate for the Respondents drew my attention to the judgment reported in Current Tax Reporter Volume 80 Phillipos & Company, Chartered Accountants & Ors. versus State. This is the Judgment of the Karnataka High Court, wherein it is held that Office of the Chartered Accountant or of a firm of a Chartered Accountant is not an establishment within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1961, it is neither a shop nor a commercial establishment.
