Dismisses discharge plea of Forest Officer as disproportionate assets justified Presumption of Money Laundering u/s 24 PMLA

Digmber Singh @ Digamber Singh Vs Directorate of Enforcement (Jharkhand High Court)

1. The instant application is directed against the order dated 16.01.2026 passed by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-1^st -cum-Special Judge, PML Act, Ranchi in connection with ECIR Case No. 09 of 2023 arising out of ECIR/RNSZO/01/2017 registered for the offence Section 3 and punishable under Section 4 of PMLA, 2002 filed under Section 44 read with Section 45 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 whereby and whereunder, the Miscellaneous Criminal Application No.1084 of 2025 filed by the petitioner seeking discharge under Section 227 of Cr.P.C./Section 250 of BNSS, has been rejected.

Factual Matrix:

2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the instant petition which requires to be enumerated herein, read as under:

2.1 The petitioner joined the Forest Department, Government of Jharkhand, as a Forest Guard in the year 1978 and eventually retired as a Forest Range Officer on 31.12.2017. During his tenure, he predominantly served in the afforestation sections at Hazaribagh, Giridih, and Koderma, holding significant administrative and financial authority over forestry operations and public funds. It has been alleged that during this period the Petitioner systematically misused his official position to amass enormous wealth that was completely disproportionate to his known and lawful sources of income.

2.2 Consequently, an FIR bearing No. 49/2016 dated 14.06.2016 was registered against the Petitioner by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Ranchi, under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2.3 It has been alleged that upon thorough investigation of the aforementioned FIR, the ACB, Ranchi, conclusively found that the Petitioner had accumulated massive disproportionate assets. Accordingly, the ACB filed Charge Sheet No. 75/2016 dated 10.11.2016 against the Petitioner.

2.4 The said Charge Sheet has revealed a prima facie case of gross corruption and illegal accumulation of wealth against the Petitioner. Since the offences under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, are explicitly categorized as Scheduled Offenses under Part A of the Schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the Directorate of Enforcement duly recorded an ECIR bearing No. ECIR/RNSZO/01/2017 dated 25.08.2017, and a comprehensive statutory investigation under the PMLA was initiated to trace the laundering of these illicitly acquired assets.

2.5 It has been stated that the detailed investigation conducted under the PMLA conclusively established the staggering magnitude of the Petitioner’s illicit wealth. It was revealed that during the Petitioner’s entire service period (spanning from March 1978 to June 2016), the total gross salary received by him was a mere Rs. 57,12,468/- (with the net salary in hand being approximately Rs. 49,05,652/-). However, against this meager legitimate income, the total value of the properties identified in the name of the Petitioner and his family members stood at a colossal Rs. 4,04,64,404/-. When the known sources of income are deducted, the unexplained, disproportionate assets amassed by the Petitioner are strictly quantified at Rs. 3,47,51,936/-. This illicit wealth, which represents an astonishing 608% of the Petitioner’s total lifelong salary income, squarely and indisputably constitutes “Proceeds of Crime” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA, 2002.

2.6 The investigation traced and quantified these Proceeds of Crime across various asset classes to unearth the Petitioner’s financial footprint.

2.7 It has further been alleged that the illicit wealth of Rs. 4,04,64,404/-comprised vast movable properties valued at Rs. 2,71,47,407/-, which the Petitioner had systematically layered and clandestinely parked in multiple bank accounts, recurring deposits, high-value life insurance policies, and extensive investments in the Sahara Credit Co-operative Society. Furthermore, the Proceeds of Crime were heavily integrated into real estate, most notably utilized for the construction of a lavish residential building named “Ashirwaad” located at Saketpuri, Hazaribagh, which alone was valued at Rs. 80,71,812/- by the Building Division, Hazaribagh.

2.8 It has further been alleged that additionally, a massive cash hoard of Rs 31,50,040/- was recovered and seized by the ACB in physical currency during a search of the Petitioner’s private residential premises on 25.07.2016, alongside other movable properties including vehicles and household goods valued at Rs. 20,95,145/-.

2.9 It has been stated that the Petitioner did not merely acquire these Proceeds of Crime but actively and continuously engaged in the offense of money laundering by layering and integrating this tainted wealth into the formal financial system. To mask the illicit origin of the funds generated from his corrupt practices, the Petitioner systematically routed huge cash deposits through the bank accounts of his family members, particularly his wife, Smt. Reena Devi, who had no independent, verifiable source of income.

2.10 The Petitioner and his wife subsequently attempted to project this tainted money as untainted by fabricating explanations of agricultural income, dairy farming, and rental receipts-claims which utterly failed to withstand forensic financial scrutiny and lacked any credible documentary, revenue, or banking evidence. By structuring these transactions to conceal the illicit origin of the funds and deliberately fabricating a bogus facade to project them as legitimate family assets, the Petitioner has squarely committed the standalone offense of money laundering and fulfilled all the essential ingredients of Section 3 of the PMLA, 2002.

2.11 The petitioner filed the application for discharge being M.C.A. No. 1084 of 2025 which stood rejected vide order dated 16.01.2026 against which the instant revision application has been preferred.

Arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner:

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned orders:

3.1 The learned court below has committed a grave error of law in treating a sum of Rs 3,47,51,936/- as “proceeds of crime” without identifying any property that was derived or obtained from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, as mandated under Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA. The impugned finding is contrary to the statutory definition and therefore without jurisdiction.

3.2 The learned court below has completely ignored and brushed aside the categorical finding of the Investigating Officer in the scheduled offence case (Case No. 49/2016), wherein it has been expressly recorded that the wife of the petitioner has a legitimate, independent, and explained source of income amounting to approximately Rs. 3,05,48,806/-. Once such a finding exists in the predicate offence, the same could not have been disregarded while adjudicating the PMLA proceedings.

3.3 The learned court below has also failed to appreciate that proceedings under the PMLA are derivative and dependent upon the scheduled offence, as settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929.

3.4 The learned court below has committed a serious legal error in shifting the burden upon the petitioner to “explain” the lawful assets of his wife, thereby giving an impermissible and expanded interpretation to Section 24 of the PMLA as held in Vijay Madanlal Choudhury’s case. The reverse burden arises only after the prosecution establishes foundational facts, which are conspicuously absent in the present case.

3.5 It has been submitted that the impugned order is unsustainable as the learned court below has failed to record any findings regarding the essential ingredients of Section 3 PMLA, namely: existence of proceeds of crime; and involvement of the petitioner in any process or activity connected with such proceeds. In absence of these foundational ingredients, continuation of proceedings amounts to abuse of process of law.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is, therefore, a fit case where the impugned order needs to be interfered with.

Arguments advanced on behalf of the Opposite Party/Respondent:

5. While on the other hand, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the opposite party-ED has submitted that the Petitioner has fundamentally failed to appreciate the heavy statutory onus placed upon him by Section 24 of the PMLA, 2002. In the present case, the prosecution has established a formidable foundational fact: against a known net salary of Rs. 49 Lakhs, the Petitioner’s family amassed assets worth over Rs. 4.04 Crores-a staggering 608% disproportion. Once this prima facie generation and routing of “Proceeds of Crime” is established, a mandatory statutory presumption arises under Section 24 wherein the Court shall presume that such wealth is involved in money laundering, thereby shifting the burden entirely onto the Petitioner to prove during the trial that these funds are untainted. He cannot prematurely discharge this burden in revisional jurisdiction by merely attaching photocopies of unverified Income Tax Returns or departmental clean-chits.

6. It has also been submitted that the Petitioner’s reliance upon closure reports or final forms to seek discharge under the provisions of the PMLA is both factually misleading and legally untenable. The Petitioner has deliberately overlooked the material fact that in the principal Scheduled Offence, namely Vigilance P.S. Case No. 49/2016, a substantive Charge Sheet bearing No. 75/2016 has already been filed against him under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the said proceedings are presently pending before the competent court. The existence of this charge sheet clearly establishes that the Scheduled Offence subsists and has not been closed.

7. The closure report relied upon by the Petitioner pertains to a separate and subsequent FIR, namely Sadar P.S. Case No. 96/2017, which is distinct from the core Scheduled Offence. The same does not nullify, extinguish, or in any manner affect the pending proceedings arising out of Vigilance P.S. Case No. 49/2016. Therefore, reliance on such closure report is misconceived.

8. It is further submitted that the submission of a Final Form in respect of the Petitioner’s wife, Smt. Reena Devi, in the predicate offence does not absolve the Petitioner of liability under the PMLA, nor does it shield the Proceeds of Crime found parked in her bank accounts.

9. Learned counsel for the opposite party-ED has, therefore, submitted that the order impugned of refusal of the prayer of discharge and it cannot be said to suffer from an error since ample materials are available based upon which it cannot be said that no prima facie case is available against the petitioner leading to quashing of the entire criminal proceeding rather all these aspects are to be adjudicated in course of the trial.

10. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party-ED, on the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is, therefore, not a fit case where the impugned orders need to be interfered with.

Response of the learned Counsel for the petitioner

11. Abhishek Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, in response, has submitted by relying upon the judgment rendered in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) that whatever has been argued by Mr. Das, based upon the material collected as inserted in the ECIR, is nothing but mere presumption which has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as would be evident from the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Analysis:

12. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and has also gone through the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in the impugned order as also the various paragraphs of the prosecution complaint.

13. It is evident from record that the petitioner has been made accused in connection with ECIR Case no.09 of 2023 arising out of ECIR/RNSZO/01/2017 dated 25.08.2017 registered by the Respondent (ED) under provisions of the PMLA. The said ECIR/RNSZO/01/2017 dated 25.08.2017 was registered pursuant to lodging of FIR being Vigilance P.S. Case No. 49 of 2016 dated 14.06.2016.

14. The prosecution case in brief is that an FIR bearing No. 49/16 dated 14.06.2016 was registered under section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by ACB, Ranchi. Thereafter, ACB, Ranchi filed a charge sheet vide no. 75/2016 dated 10.11.2016 against present petitioner Digamber Singh under section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. As per the Chargesheet, the total amount received in the form of salary by the accused Digamber Singh from the office of Hazaribagh East Forest Division, Hazaribagh during the check period i.e. March, 1978 to June, 2016 is Rs. 57,12,468/-. The total value of properties identified in the name of Digmaber Singh and his family members is Rs. 4,04,64,404/-. All the bank accounts have been frozen by the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Ranchi. The difference between the value of properties/investments found during the check period and the salary received is Rs. 3,47,51,936/- which is six times of the salary receipt. Hence, the disproportionate assets acquired by the accused Digamber Singh are around 608% of the salary.

15. It was also revealed during investigation that the aforesaid assets were layered through multiple bank accounts and insurance policies, projected as untainted property. Thus, the scheduled offence under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, being listed in Part A of the Schedule to the PMLA hence, an ECIR/RNSZO/01/2017 dated 25.08.2017 was recorded on the basis of the above-discussed FIR No. 49/16 dated 14.06.2016 registered under section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption of Act, 1988 by ACB, Ranchi and the Final Report No. 75/2016 dated 10.11.2016 submitted therein by ACB, Ranchi under section13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption of Act, 1988 against Digamber Singh as section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption of Act, 1988 is scheduled offence under Part A of Schedule to the PMLA, 2002.

16. It has been alleged that during investigation it has come on record that accused/petitioner was a Government employee who worked at Hazaribagh East Division, Forest Department under Govt. of Jharkhand. He acquired huge movable and immovable assets by misusing his official position. He was posted in the afforestation section of the Forest Department during most of the time period of his service tenure. There is allegation that he acquired the ill-gotten funds or the proceeds of crime and arranged routing through the bank accounts of his family members and further utilizing those funds in acquiring immovable and movable properties in their name, thus, projecting tainted money as untainted.

17. Upon thorough investigation of the aforementioned FIR, the ACB, Ranchi, conclusively found that the Petitioner had accumulated massive disproportionate assets. Accordingly, the ACB filed Charge Sheet No. 75/2016 dated 10.11.2016 against the Petitioner before the Ld. Special Judge, ACB. The said Charge Sheet has already established a prima facie case of gross corruption and illegal accumulation of wealth against the Petitioner.

18. The Directorate of Enforcement duly recorded an ECIR bearing No. ECIR/RNSZO/01/2017 dated 25.08.2017, and a comprehensive statutory investigation under the PMLA was initiated to trace the laundering of these illicitly acquired assets.

19. The detailed investigation conducted under the PMLA reveals that during the Petitioner’s entire service period (spanning from March 1978 to June 2016), the total gross salary received by him was a mere Rs. 57,12,468/-(with the net salary in hand being approximately Rs. 49,05,652/-). However, against this legitimate income, the total value of the properties identified in the name of the Petitioner and his family members stood at a colossal Rs. 4,04,64,404/-. When the known sources of income are deducted, the unexplained, disproportionate assets amassed by the Petitioner are strictly quantified at Rs. 3,47,51,936/ This illicit wealth, which represents an astonishing 608% of the Petitioner’s total lifelong salary income, squarely and indisputably constitutes “Proceeds of Crime” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA, 2002.

20. The illicit wealth of Rs. 4,04,64,404/- comprised vast movable properties valued at Rs. 2,71,47,407/-, which the Petitioner had layered and clandestinely parked in multiple bank accounts, recurring deposits, high-value life insurance policies, and extensive investments in the Sahara Credit Co-operative Society. Furthermore, the Proceeds of Crime were heavily integrated into real estate, most notably utilized for the construction of a lavish residential building named “Ashirwaad” located at Saketpuri, Hazaribagh, which alone was valued at Rs. 80,71,812/- by the Building Division, Hazaribagh. Additionally, a massive cash hoard of Rs 31,50,040/- was recovered and seized by the ACB in physical currency during a search of the Petitioner’s private residential premises on 25.07.2016, alongside other movable properties including vehicles and household goods valued at Rs. 20,95,145/-.

21. The Petitioner, to mask the illicit origin of the funds generated from his corrupt practices, routed huge cash deposits through the bank accounts of his family members, particularly his wife, Smt. Reena Devi, who had no independent, verifiable source of income. The Petitioner and his wife subsequently attempted to project this tainted money as untainted by fabricating explanations of agricultural income, dairy farming, and rental receipts-claims which utterly failed to withstand forensic financial scrutiny and lacked any credible documentary, revenue, or banking evidence.

22. The petitioner, in view of the above, had filed the application for discharge being M.C.A. No. 1084 of 2025 by taking the ground that an amount of Rs.31,50,040/- which was recovered and the same was seized, the said seized amount It is worth mentioning here that the said amount of Rs 31,50,040/- was kept by the petitioner at the residential premises of his wife for security reasons and the same was to be distributed to the laborers as their wages. Further ground has been taken that there is a handsome income from the ancestral property inherited by the wife of the petitioner. The wife of the petitioner has rental income as well as from dairy business. She herself uses to file her ITR and everything has been reflected in the ITR. It has been further submitted that when the calculation of the petitioner’s income, expenditure, assets are calculated then the income comes to be more than the asset and expenditure and as such no Disproportionate asset case is made out against the petitioner U/s 13(1)(e) r/w section 13(2) of PC Act, 1988.

23. On the other hand, the ED has vehemently opposed the prayer of discharge made on behalf of accused/petitioner Digamber Singh before the special Judge by taking the ground that present petitioner joined as a Forest Guard in 1978 and retired on 31.12.2017 as a Forest Range Officer, predominantly serving in the afforestation section at Hazaribag, Giridih and Kodarma. He thus held significant authority over forestry operations, which he misused to accumulate assets grossly disproportionate to his known sources of income. During his service tenure, against a total gross salary of approximately Rs. 57,12,448/ (net around Rs. 49,05,652/-) earned over nearly four decades, Digamber Singh and his family members acquired movable and immovable properties valued at around Rs. 4,04,64,404/-.

24. The Spl. Judge PML Act while appreciating the rival contention has rejected the aforesaid discharge application of petitioner vide order dated 16.01.2026.

25. The aforesaid order dated 16.01.2026 has been assailed before this Court by way of filing the instant petition being Cr. Revision No. 281 of 2026.

26. In the background of the factual aspect stated hereinabove, the issues which require consideration are—

(i) Whether the order dated 16.01.2026 by which the application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been dismissed can be said to suffer from an error?

(ii) Whether on the basis of the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation, prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not?

27. Since both the issues are interlinked as such, they are taken up together.

28. This Court, before appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties deems it fit and proper to discuss herein some of the provisions of law as contained under the Act, 2002 with its object and intent.

29. The Act 2002 was enacted to address the urgent need to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof including vesting of it in the Central Government, setting up of agencies and mechanisms for coordinating measures for combating money-laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.

30. It is, thus, evident that Act 2002 was enacted in order to answer the urgent requirement to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof for combating money-laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.

31. It needs to refer herein the definition of “proceeds of crime” as provided under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act, 2002 which reads as under:

“2 (1) (u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property 3[or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country] 4[or abroad]; [Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence;]”

32. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.

33. In the explanation it has been referred that for removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. The aforesaid explanation has been inserted in the statute book by way of Act 23 of 2019.

34. It is, thus, evident that the reason for giving explanation under Section 2(1)(u) is by way of clarification to the effect that whether as per the substantive provision of Section 2(1)(u), the property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country but by way of explanation the proceeds of crime has been given broader implication by including property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.

35. The “property” has been defined under Section 2(1)(v) which means any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, wherever located.

36. The schedule has been defined under Section 2(1)(x) which means schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The “scheduled offence” has been defined under Section 2(1)(y) which reads as under:

“2(y) “scheduled offence” means— (i) the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or (ii) the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or (iii) the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule.”

37. It is evident that the “scheduled offence” means the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule.

38. The offence of money laundering has been defined under Section 3 of the Act, 2002 which reads as under:

“3. Offence of money-laundering.—Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. [Explanation.— For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that,— (i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:— (a) concealment; or (b) possession; or (c) acquisition; or (d) use; or (e) projecting as untainted property; or (f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever; (ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.]”

39. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that “offence of money-laundering” means whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.

40. It is further evident that the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.

41. The punishment for money laundering has been provided under Section 4 of the Act, 2002.

42. The various provisions of the Act, 2002 alongwith interpretation of the definition of “proceeds of crime” has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929 wherein the Bench comprising of three Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided the issue by taking into consideration the object and intent of the Act, 2002.

43. It is evident that the purposes and objects of the 2002 Act for which it has been enacted, is not limited to punishment for offence of money-laundering, but also to provide measures for prevention of money-laundering. It is also to provide for attachment of proceeds of crime, which are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceeding relating to confiscation of such proceeds under the 2002 Act. This Act is also to compel the banking companies, financial institutions and intermediaries to maintain records of the transactions, to furnish information of such transactions within the prescribed time in terms of Chapter IV of the 2002 Act.

44. The predicate offence has been considered in the aforesaid judgment wherein by taking into consideration the explanation as inserted by way of Act 23 of 2019 under the definition of the “proceeds of crime” as contained under Section 2(1)(u), whereby and whereunder, it has been clarified for the purpose of removal of doubts that, the “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence, meaning thereby, the words “any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence” will come under the fold of the proceeds of crime.

45. In the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) it has been held that the Authority under the 2002 Act, is to prosecute a person for offence of money-laundering only if it has reason to believe, which is required to be recorded in writing that the person is in possession of “proceeds of crime”. Only if that belief is further supported by tangible and credible evidence indicative of involvement of the person concerned in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, action under the Act can be taken forward for attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime and until vesting thereof in the Central Government, such process initiated would be a standalone process.

46. Now, after having discussed the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the issue of various provisions of the Act, 2002, this Court, is proceeding to discuss the principle governing discharge and framing of charge.

47. Section 250 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’ for brevity) provides for discharge in sessions cases. It reads as follows:

“250.Discharge (1) The accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under section 232 (BNSS). (2) If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so.”

48. Section 227 of Code of Criminal Procedure (‘CrPC’ for brevity) contemplates discharge by the Court of Session. The trial Judge is required to discharge the accused if the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Section 250(2) BNSS corresponds to section 227 CrPC. Section 250(1) BNSS stipulates a time limit of 60 days from the date of committal of the case within which an application for discharge should be filed by the accused.

49. Section 239 Cr.P.C. provides for discharge of accused in warrant cases instituted upon a police report. The power under section 239 Cr.P.C. is exercisable when Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. Section 262(2) BNSS is similar to section 239 CrPC but section 262 BNSS provides an opportunity to the learned Magistrate to examine the accused either physically or through audio – video electronic means. Section 262(1) BNSS stipulates a time limit of 60 days from the date of supply of documents under section 230 BNSS within which an application should for discharge should be filed by the accused.

50. Section 245 Cr.P.C. deals with warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. Section 245 CrPC corresponds to section 268 of BNSS. The power under section 245 (1) Cr.P.C. is exercisable when the Magistrate considers that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted would warrant his conviction. The Magistrate has the power of discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case under section 245 (2) Cr.P.C. Sections 227 and 239 Cr.P.C. provide for discharge before the recording of evidence on the basis of the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard. But the stage of discharge under section 245 Cr.P.C., on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred in section 244 is taken. Despite the difference in the language of the provisions of sections 227, 239 and 245 Cr.P.C. and whichever provision may be applicable, the Court is required to see, at the time of framing of charge, that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused. The main intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions as envisaged under sections 227 or 239 of Cr.P.C. is to assist the Court to determine whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial.

51. The issue of discharge was the subject matter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu, by Inspector of Police in Vigilance and Anti-Corruption v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, wherein at paragraphs no. 29, 32.4, 33 and 34 the Hon’ble Apex Court has been observed as under:—

“29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.

32.4. While passing the impugned orders [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 22 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)], [State v. K. Ponmudi, (2007) 1 Mad LJ (Cri) 100], the court has not sifted the materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but whether that would warrant a conviction. We are of the opinion that this was not the stage where the court should have appraised the evidence and discharged the accused as if it was passing an order of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation itself cannot be a ground for discharge. In our opinion, the order impugned [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)] suffers from grave error and calls for rectification.

33. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing on the trial. The surviving respondents are directed to appear before the respective courts on 3-2-2014. The Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage of charge in accordance with law and make endeavour to dispose of the same expeditiously.

34. In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the order of discharge with the aforesaid observations.

52. It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be a ground of discharge. A reference may be made to the judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191. For ready reference Paragraph no. 11 of the said judgment are quoted below:—

“11. While considering the legality of the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the law on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to.

11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 . (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 . (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 . (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under . (SCC p. 526)

“25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721], adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29)

‘29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.’”

53. Further it is pertinent to mention here that power to discharge an accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him. If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course. Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face. The opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715.

54. Further, the difference between the approach with which the Court should examine the matter in the discharge has been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, in the following words:—

“17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the “record of the case” and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.

30. We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has used the expression “there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence”. This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste. A Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to the meaning of the word “presume” while relying upon Black’s Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean “to believe or accept upon probable evidence”; “to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming”. In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence.

55. Thus, it is evident that the law regarding the approach to be adopted by the Court while considering an application for discharge of the accused person the Court has to form a definite opinion, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

54. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for framing of charge in the case of Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) wherein at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 it has been held as under:—

“11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.

12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of charge affects a person’s liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasised.

14. In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [(2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to several previous decisions held that : (SCC p. 342, para 7)

“7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.”

57. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC. The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para 21 as under:

“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:

(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”

58. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768, the above principles have been reiterated in para 17, 18, 28 to 31 and the Hon’ble supreme court has explained as to how the matters of grave suspicion are to be dealt with. The aforesaid paragraphs are quoted as under:

“17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and discern the following principles:

17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.

17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.

17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court.

17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”.

17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion.

17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.

17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true.

17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.

18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar). The expression, “the record of the case”, used in Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi).

28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC. The principle established is to take the materials produced by the prosecution, both in the form of oral statements and also documentary material, and act upon it without it been subjected to questioning through cross-examination and everything assumed in favour of the prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no offence, as alleged, is made out against the accused, it, undoubtedly, would ensure to the benefit of the accused warranting the trial court to discharge the accused.

29. It is not open to the accused to rely on the material by way of defence and persuade the court to discharge him.

30. However, what is the meaning of the expression “materials on the basis of which grave suspicion is aroused in the mind of the court’s”, which is not explained away? Can the accused explain away the material only with reference to the materials produced by the prosecution? Can the accused rely upon material which he chooses to produce at the stage?

31. In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused can only rely on the materials which are produced by the prosecution, it must be understood that the grave suspicion, if it is established on the materials, should be explained away only in terms of the materials made available by the prosecution. No doubt, the accused may appeal to the broad probabilities to the case to persuade the court to discharge him.”

59. It has been further held in the case of Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148, that mini trial is not expected by the trial court for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record at the time of framing of charge. It has been held at paragraph no. 18 of the said judgment as under:—

“18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.”

60. In the case of Asim Shariff v. NIA, (supra), it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the words ‘not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex-facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.

61. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. However, the defence of the accused cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge. The accused has no right to produce any document at that stage. The application for discharge has to be considered on the premise that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true.

62. Thus, at the time of considering an application for discharge, the Court is required to consider to the limited extent to find out whether there is prima facie evidence against the accused to believe that he has committed any offence as alleged by the prosecution; if prima facie evidence is available against the accused, then there cannot be an order of discharge.

63. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the prosecution or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused.

64. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

65. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of framing of the charge and / or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.

66. The test to determine a prima facie case against the accused would naturally depend on the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down the rule of universal application and if the material placed before the Court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in rejecting the discharge application and proceeding with the trial.

67. Thus, from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements it is evident that at the stage of considering discharge, trial court is not to examine and assess in detail the material placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons. Marshalling of facts and appreciation of evidence at the time of considering discharge is not in the domain of the court. Discharge application can be rejected even on the basis of strong suspicion founded upon materials before the court which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused.

68. It needs to refer herein that ingredients of offences should be seen in the material produced before the court and duty of court at the stage of considering the discharge is to see whether the ingredients of offences are available in the material produced before the court. Contradictions in the statements of witnesses or sufficiency or truthfulness of the material placed before the court cannot be examined at the stage of consideration of discharge. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence. Court has to consider material only with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offense and not for the purpose of arriving at a definite conclusion. “Presume‟ means if on the basis of materials on record, court can come to the conclusion that commission of the offense is a probable consequence, then a case for framing of charge exists.

69. Thus, it is well settled that at the time of considering discharge meticulous examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out to proceed in the case. Further the trial Court is not required to discuss the evidence for the purpose of conducting a trial but the discussion of the materials on record is required to reflect the application of judicial mind for finding that a prima-facie case is made out against the petitioner.

70. It is settled connotation of law that at the stage of discharge the probable defence of the accused is not to be considered and the materials, which are relevant for consideration, are the allegations made in the First Information Report/complaint, the statement of the witnesses recorded in course of investigation, the documents on which the prosecution relies and the report of investigation submitted by the prosecuting agency. The probative value of the defence is to be tested at the stage of trial and not at the stage of discharge and at the stage of considering discharge application minute scrutiny of the evidence is not to be made.

71. Further it is settled position of law that at the stage of discharge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and marshal the material available on record as to whether there is sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in conviction. The Court is prima facie required to consider whether there is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is sufficient for rejecting the discharge and the guilt or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the time of the trial after evidence is adduced and not at the stage of consideration of discharge and, therefore, at the stage of considering the discharge, the Court is not required to undertake an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the material.

72. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge.

73. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the prosecution or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused.

74. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

75. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.

76. Further, while considering the question of discharge, the Court has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the materials for the limited purpose for finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. In exercising the power, the Court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution.

77. The test to determine a prima facie case against the accused would naturally depend on the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down the rule of universal application and if the material placed before the Court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in rejecting the discharge application and proceeding with the trial.

78. In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Golconda Linga Swamy (2004) 6 SCC 522, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that at the stage of discharge, evidence cannot be gone into meticulously. It was held that it is immaterial whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence and a charge can be framed if there are materials showing possibility about commission of the offence by the accused as against certainty.

79. Thus, from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements it is evident that at the stage of discharge, trial court is not to examine and assess in detail the material placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons. Marshalling of facts and appreciation of evidence at the time of discharge is not in the domain of the court. Discharge application can be rejected even on the basis of strong suspicion founded upon materials before the court which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused.

80. It needs to refer herein that duty of court at the stage of discharge is to see whether the ingredients of offences are available in the material produced before the court. Contradictions in the statements of witnesses or sufficiency or truthfulness of the material placed before the court cannot be examined at the stage of discharge. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence. Court has to consider material only with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offense and not for the purpose of arriving at a definite conclusion. “Presume‟ means if on the basis of materials on record, court can come to the conclusion that commission of the offense is a probable consequence, then a case for framing of charge exists.

81. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this Court is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the conclusion as to whether the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation and brought on record, as would be available in the impugned order, prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not?

82. It is evident from the complaint that the investigation conducted by the respondent-ED reveals that Illicit cash aggregating to Rs. 90,84,988/- was systematically ‘placed’ into the bank accounts of the Petitioner and his wife Smt. Reena Devi across multiple banks (ICICI Bank, IDBI Bank, Union Bank of India, IndusInd Bank, State Bank of India) during the Financial Years 2008-09 to 2016-17. Insurance policies worth Rs. 70,22,260/ – were purchased in the names of the Petitioner, his wife, and his daughter Pallavi Singh across ICICI Prudential Life Insurance (Rs. 51,40,166/-), Ageas Federal Life Insurance (Rs. 14,21,740/-), and LIC (Rs. 4,60,354/-). An amount of Rs. 4,73,000/- was invested in 27 accounts at Sahara Credit Co­operative Society Ltd. Besides, 36 term deposit accounts and 22 savings accounts were maintained across banks in the names of the Petitioner and family members. The ultimate ‘integration’ of these laundered funds is evidenced by the construction of the residential building ‘Ashirwaad’ at Saketpuri, Hazaribagh, valued at Rs. 80,71,812/- and cash of Rs. 31,50,040/-was found and seized from the Petitioner’s residential premises. The flow of Proceeds of Crime has been meticulously traced – from cash deposits in bank accounts to establishing clear insurance policies, term deposits, and other investments placement, layering, and integration of the Proceeds of Crime, which are the essential hallmarks of money laundering under Section 3 of PMLA.

83. The investigation further reveals regarding agricultural income, Reena Devi claimed to earn Rs. 2,50,000/- to Rs. 5,00,000/- annually from agriculture on 35-40 acres of ancestral land; however, during her statement under Section 50 of PMLA recorded on 11.02.2019, 15.02.2019 and 07.12.2020, she could not explain the process and methods of agriculture, did not know the names of fertilizers used, was unaware of agricultural subsidies provided by the Government, and could not name the local shopkeepers from whom she purchased agricultural inputs. Significantly, neither the Petitioner nor Reena Devi declared agricultural income in any of their Income Tax Returns except Reena Devi’s Assessment Year 2015-16, which represents a colorable device filed post-facto to the registration of the FIR in a desperate attempt to manufacture a legitimate source of income. The agreement dated 05.02.2000, purportedly between Reena Devi and her sisters regarding farming on ancestral land, was not found during the ACB search on 25.07.2016, is not notarized.

84. It further reveals regarding the claim of dairy income, Reena Devi stated she earned dairy income from 4 cows (Jarsi breed) since 1993-94, but could not quantify her annual income from dairy farming. The dairy income record submitted on 29.12.2020 is fabricated, containing such glaring anachronisms as the insertion of the year ‘2020’ on a record purportedly pertaining to April 2009. This chronological impossibility establishes that the documents were manufactured in 2020 specifically for submission to the Directorate. The dairy farming also conveniently stopped in 2017, coinciding with the investigation period.

85. Regarding the claim of rental income, Reena Devi failed to submit any rent agreements pertaining to the check period (March 1978 to June 2016). The rent agreements submitted via her submission dated 29.12.2020 pertain to the years 2017 and 2018 after the check period and are therefore wholly irrelevant.

86. It has come that there are contradictions in the statements of the Petitioner and his wife. Reena Devi stated on 15.02.2019 that she did not know the details of her bank accounts, invested savings only in banks, had only one insurance policy (details of which she did not know), and did not know if she had invested in Post Office. She further stated that she made no assistance or contribution to the investments in her children’s accounts or insurance policies. However, the Petitioner, in his statements dated 09.08.2023 and 10.08 2023, claimed that all investments in Reena Devi’s and children’s accounts were made by Reena Devi from her own income. By claiming his wife had independent income while she admitted to being a housewife with no contribution to family savings, the Petitioner has failed to discharge the reverse burden under Section 24 of the PMLA.

87. The Petitioner’s reliance on the Vigilance Final Form exonerating Smt. Reena Devi in the predicate offense is wholly misplaced. The core Scheduled Offence against the Petitioner himself (Charge Sheet No. 75/2016) is still alive and pending trial. The mere fact that the ACB did not prosecute the wife for corruption does not legitimize the Proceeds of Crime parked in her bank accounts, nor does it absolve the Petitioner from his direct liability for laundering his illicit wealth through her.

88. It further has come during the investigation that the Petitioner was the sole earning member of the family during the check period, while his wife Reena Devi was a housewife, as per her own categorical admission of her employment status as ‘House wife’ in her ICICI Bank account opening form. Despite being a housewife with no independent source of income, Reena Devi deposited Rs. 54,44,488/ in cash in her bank accounts an impossible feat without the infusion of illicit funds from the Petitioner. The Petitioner himself, in his statements dated 09.08.2023 and 10.08.2023, admitted that the investments in bank accounts jointly held by him with his children are his investments which are admissible in evidence under Section 50 of the PMLA and clearly expose his modus operandi of utilizing family members as mere conduits for his Proceeds of Crime, thereby admitting layering of his proceeds through family members’ accounts. Furthermore, cash deposited in Reena Devi’s ICICI Bank accounts was directly transferred to ICICI Prudential Life Insurance policies held in the Petitioner’s name, demonstrating a classic ‘circular layering’ and integration of Proceeds of Crime through the conduit of the wife’s accounts to fund the Petitioner’s personal assets.

89. It has also come that the Petitioner earned a total salary of Rs. 57,12,468/-yet acquired assets of Rs. 4,04,64,404/-, thereby prima facie establishing that the excess assets of Rs. 3,47,51,936/- are Proceeds of Crime.

90. It also needs to refer herein the specific role attributed against the petitioner as has been referred in the ECIR. For better appreciation, the specific role of the petitioner in the commission of offence under PMLA is being reproduced as under:

“SPECIFIC ROLE OF THE ACCUSED/PERSONS ABETTING IN THE COMMISSIONOF OFFENCE OF MONEY LAUNDERING BY DIRECTLY/INDIRECTLY ATTEMPTING TO INDULGE OR KNOWINGLY ASSIST OR KNOWINGLY IS A PARTY OR IS INVOLVED IN CONCEALMENT/POSSESSION/ ACQUISITION OR USE IN PROJECTING OR CLAIMING PROCEEDS OF CRIME AS UNTAINTED PROPERTY IN TERMS OF SECTION 3 OF PMLA:-

a) Accused was a Government employee who worked at Hazaribagh East Division, Forest Department under Govt. of Jharkhand. He acquired huge movable and immovable assets by misusing his official position. He was posted in the afforestation section of the Forest Department during most of the time period of his service tenure.

b) He acquired the ill-gotten fund, or the proceeds of crime and arranged routing through the bank accounts of his family members and further utilized those funds in acquiring immovable and movable properties in their name, thus, projecting untainted money as tainted. Digamber Singh and his family are also found to be living a luxurious lifestyle which is not possible with the salary income of Digamber Singh who was the only earning member of his family. During the investigation, the claim of Digamber Singh regarding the agricultural income and money received against the agreement made for selling ancestral land was found misleading.

c) Therefore, Accused No. 1 i.e. Digamber Singh has a disproportionate asset to the tune of Rs. 3,47,51,936/-i.e., proceeds of crime acquired by misusing his post while working and posted in a different capacity at Forest Department, Government of Jharkhand.

d) The PoC acquired by the accused was deposited into a number of his and relatives’ bank accounts. Term Deposits were also created through a part of PoC by the accused in his name and in the name of his family members. The PoC was layered by the accused through a large number of bank accounts which was subsequently utilized in investments into various movable and immovable properties as mentioned in the preceding paras.

e) Further, he also projected cash deposits in his bank accounts and the bank accounts of his family members as untainted by filing ITRs and showing income from rent/business etc. which was found to be just a tool to project his tainted money as untainted. The accused person also projected a part of the PoC as untainted claiming it to be an income from agriculture and receipts against agreements to sell the ancestral lands. The accused also projected the cash of Rs. 31,50,040/- seized by the ACB during their search operation as untainted claiming the cash amount as government money.

f) Hence, the accused person Digamber Singh is directly involved in the activities connected with the proceeds of crime namely acquisition, possession, and concealment of the proceeds of crime and claiming and projecting the proceeds of crime as untainted properties. Thus, the accused person Digamber Singh has committed the offence of money laundering as defined under section 3 of PMLA, 2002 and is accordingly liable to be punished under section 4 of PMLA, 2002.”

91. Upon perusal of the materials contained in the prosecution complaint, it emerges that the accused, Digamber Singh, while serving as a Government employee in the Hazaribagh East Division of the Forest Department, Government of Jharkhand, abused his official position to acquire substantial movable and immovable assets. During his tenure, predominantly in the afforestation section, he is alleged to have amassed ill-gotten wealth, routed the same through the bank accounts of his family members, and invested in properties in their names, thereby projecting tainted money as untainted. The investigation further reveals that the claim of agricultural income and receipts from agreements to sell ancestral land was misleading. The accused and his family were found to be living a lifestyle disproportionate to his known sources of income, he being the sole earning member. The disproportionate assets have been quantified at ₹3,47,51,936/-, constituting proceeds of crime. These proceeds were deposited in multiple accounts, converted into term deposits, and layered through various banking channels before being invested in movable and immovable properties. Without any cogent evidence, the cash amount of ₹31,50,040/- seized by the ACB was claimed to be government money.

92. Thus, from the aforesaid prima facie it appears that the accused person Digamber Singh has committed the offence of money laundering as defined under section 3 of PMLA, 2002.

93. The charge sheet bearing No. 75/2016 records disproportionate assets of ₹3,47,51,936/- in the name of the accused and his family members. Against a legitimate salary income of ₹57,12,468/-, the accused was found in possession of movable assets worth ₹2,71,47,407/-, including bank balances, insurance policies, and investments in Sahara Credit Cooperative Society Ltd. Thus, an amount of ₹2,14,34,939/- represents proceeds of crime derived directly from criminal activity constituting a scheduled offence.

94. Apart from the above, cash of Rs. 31,50,040/- seized by ACB, Ranchi on 25.07.2016 at the residence of the accused and Rs. 80,71,812/ invested in the construction of building as per the valuation done by Bhawan Division, Hazaribagh are also the part of PoC derived directly from the criminal activity as a result of Scheduled Offence. The remaining part of PoC of Rs. 20,95,145/- available in the bank accounts of the accused Digamber Singh and his family members are taken as value thereof the PoC, as per section 2(1)(u) of PMLA, 2002, which are in their possession.

95. The cumulative facts and findings clearly establish that the accused misused his official position to generate proceeds of crime and subsequently invested them in movable and immovable properties. The valuation of assets and scrutiny of accounts, insurance policies, deposits, and investments confirm his direct involvement in acquisition, possession, concealment, and projection of tainted money as untainted. Accordingly, there exists sufficient material to hold prima facie that the accused has committed the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA, 2002.

96. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, together with the materials collected by the Enforcement Agency during the investigation of this case, this Court is of the considered view that there is sufficient material to prima-facie show the involvement accused/petitioner in committed the offence of money laundering as defined u/s 3 of PMLA, 2002 and there is sufficient material to proceed with the trial.

97. Thus, from the various paragraphs of the prosecution complaint it is evident that the Petitioner systematically placed and layered the proceeds of his corrupt activities into the bank accounts of his wife. A per the definition of proceed of crime as stipulated in the Act 2002 which has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs such acts constitute active involvement in processes connected with Proceeds of Crime and amount to a continuing offence under the PMLA. As settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1586), a person need not be an accused in the scheduled offense to be prosecuted for laundering the Proceeds of Crime. Consequently, the ACB’s decision not to prosecute the wife for corruption does not legitimize the tainted funds parked in her accounts, nor does it absolve the Petitioner.

98. The Petitioner has impressed upon this Court to evaluate his self-serving defense documents-such as belated applications by laborers, unverified income claims regarding his wife’s dairy and agricultural activities, and closure reports in distinct, subsequent, and entirely unrelated FIRs which have no bearing on the Scheduled Offence. The truthfulness, sufficiency, and acceptability of the Petitioner’s manufactured defense can only be tested during a full trial through cross-examination, not at the threshold stage of framing charges.

99. Further, the Petitioner has failed to explain the heavy statutory onus placed upon him by Section 24 of the PMLA, 2002. In the present case, as discussed hereinabove, the prosecution has established a difficult foundational fact: against a known net salary of Rs. 49 Lakhs, the Petitioner’s family amassed assets worth over Rs. 4.04 Crores-a staggering 608% disproportion. Once this prima facie generation and routing of “Proceeds of Crime” is established, a mandatory statutory presumption arises under Section 24 wherein the Court ‘shall presume’ that such of wealth is involved in money laundering, thereby shifting the burden entirely onto the Petitioner to prove during the trial that these funds are untainted. He cannot prematurely discharge this burden in revisional jurisdiction by merely attaching photocopies of unverified Income Tax Returns or departmental clean-chits.

100. It needs to refer herein that as per record, in the principal Scheduled Offence, namely Vigilance P.S. Case No. 49/2016, a substantive Charge Sheet bearing No. 75/2016 has already been filed against petitioner under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the said proceedings are presently pending before the competent court. The existence of this charge sheet clearly establishes that the Scheduled Offence subsists and has not been closed.

101. The closure report relied upon by the Petitioner pertains to a separate and subsequent FIR, namely Sadar P.S. Case No. 96/2017, which is distinct from the core Scheduled Offence. The same does not nullify, extinguish, or in any manner affect the pending proceedings arising out of Vigilance P.S. Case No. 49/2016.Therefore, reliance on such closure report is misconceive

102. Thus, from the aforesaid it appears that the Petitioner, Digamber Singh, is the prime beneficiary of the entire money laundering operation. As a public servant holding the substantive post of Forest Range Officer, the Petitioner was entrusted with significant administrative and financial authority over forestry and afforestation operations across Hazaribagh, Giridih, and Koderma. Instead of discharging his duties with integrity, prima facie it appears that the Petitioner grossly abused his official position to engage in widespread corrupt practices over several decades, thereby generating massive Proceeds of Crime. It has come on record that the Petitioner is not merely a passive recipient of illicit funds; rather, he actively, knowingly, and systematically orchestrated a sophisticated financial web to conceal, layer, and integrate the Proceeds of Crime, amounting to Rs. 3,47,51,936/-, into the formal economy.

103. From the aforesaid facts, a prima facie case arises that the accused has role in the offence of money laundering as defined under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

104. At this juncture, it needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Versus Directorate of Enforcement and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 560 has observed that as established in multiple judicial pronouncements, cases involving economic offences necessitate a thorough trial to unearth the complete chain of events, financial transactions, and culpability of the accused, therefore the material submitted by the respondent, coupled with the broad legislative framework of the PMLA, indicates the necessity of allowing the trial to proceed and not discharging the appellant at the nascent stage of charge framing and discharging the appellant at this stage would be premature and contrary to the principles governing the prosecution in money laundering cases, for ready reference the relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under:

“30. The PMLA was enacted with the primary objective of preventing money laundering and confiscating the proceeds of crime, thereby ensuring that such illicit funds do not undermine the financial system. Money laundering has far reaching consequences, not only in terms of individual acts of corruption but also in causing significant loss to the public exchequer. The laundering of proceeds of crime results in a significant loss to the economy, disrupts lawful financial transactions, and erodes public trust in the system. The alleged offences in the present case have a direct bearing on the economy, as illicit financial transactions deprive the state of legitimate revenue, distort market integrity, and contribute to economic instability. Such acts, when committed by persons in positions of power, erode public confidence in governance and lead to systemic vulnerabilities within financial institutions.

31. The illegal diversion and layering of funds have a cascading effect, leading to revenue losses for the state and depriving legitimate sectors of investment and financial resources. It is settled law that in cases involving serious economic offences, judicial intervention at a preliminary stage must be exercised with caution, and proceedings should not be quashed in the absence of compelling legal grounds. The respondent has rightly argued that in cases involving allegations of such magnitude, a trial is imperative to establish the full extent of wrongdoing and to ensure accountability.

32. The PMLA was enacted to combat the menace of money laundering and to curb the use of proceeds of crime in the formal economy. Given the evolving complexity of financial crimes, courts must adopt a strict approach in matters concerning economic offences to ensure that perpetrators do not exploit procedural loopholes to evade justice.

33. The present case involves grave and serious allegations of financial misconduct, misuse of position, and involvement in transactions constituting money laundering. The appellant seeks an end to the proceedings at a preliminary stage, effectively preventing the full adjudication of facts and evidence before the competent forum. However, as established in multiple judicial pronouncements, cases involving economic offences necessitate a thorough trial to unearth the complete chain of events, financial transactions, and culpability of the accused.

34. The material submitted by the respondent, coupled with the broad legislative framework of the PMLA, indicates the necessity of allowing the trial to proceed and not discharging the appellant at the nascent stage of charge framing. The argument that the proceedings are unwarranted is devoid of substance in light of the statutory objectives, the continuing nature of the offence, and the significant financial implications arising from the alleged acts. Discharging the appellant at this stage would be premature and contrary to the principles governing the prosecution in money laundering cases.”

105. Thus, from perusal of case record, statements of witnesses, materials available on record and in view of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that prima-facie sufficient materials are available on record against the present petitioner.

106. Accordingly, both the issues are answered herein.

107. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan and Another, (2001) 9 SCC 631 has observed that the revisional power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.

108. Thus, it is evident that the revisional power can only be exercised to correct patent error of law or procedure which would occasion unfairness, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be compared with the appellate power. A Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.

109. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency (P) Ltd. and Another v. CBI, (2018) 16 SCC 299 has held that interference in the order framing charges or refusing to discharge is called for in the rarest of rare case only to correct the patent error of jurisdiction.

110. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Soundirarasu and Others, (2023) 6 SCC 768 has held in paragraph 81 to 83 as under:

“81. The High Court has acted completely beyond the settled parameters, as discussed above, which govern the power to discharge the accused from the prosecution. The High Court could be said to have donned the role of a chartered accountant. This is exactly what this Court observed in Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi [CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, (2021) 18 SCC 135]. The High Court has completely ignored that it was not at the stage of trial or considering an appeal against a verdict in a trial. The High Court has enquired into the materials produced by the accused persons, compared with the information compiled by the investigating agency and pronounced a verdict saying that the explanation offered by the accused persons deserves to be accepted applying the doctrine of preponderance of probability. This entire exercise has been justified on account of the investigating officer not taking into consideration the explanation offered by the public servant and also not taking into consideration the lawful acquired assets of the wife of the public servant i.e. Respondent 2 herein.

82. By accepting the entire evidence put forward by the accused persons applying the doctrine of preponderance of probability, the case put up by the prosecution cannot be termed as “groundless”. As observed by this Court in C.S.D. Swami [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7] that the accused might have made statements before the investigating officer as to his alleged sources of income, but the same, strictly, would not be evidence in the case.

83. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act makes a departure from the principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden will always lie on the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the offences charged and never shifts on the accused to disprove the charge framed against him. The legal effect of Section 13(1)(e) is that it is for the prosecution to establish that the accused was in possession of properties disproportionate to his known sources of income but the term “known sources of income” would mean the sources known to the prosecution and not the sources known to the accused and within the knowledge of the accused. It is for the accused to account satisfactorily for the money/assets in his hands. The onus in this regard is on the accused to give satisfactory explanation. The accused cannot make an attempt to discharge this onus upon him at the stage of Section 239CrPC. At the stage of Section 239CrPC, the court has to only look into the prima facie case and decide whether the case put up by the prosecution is groundless.”

111. It requires to refer herein that the ambit and scope of exercise of power of discharge, are fairly well settled which has been elaborately discussed in the preceding paragraph and as per settled proposition of law no comprehensive assessment of the materials or meticulous consideration of the possible defence need to be undertaken at this stage nor any exercise of weighing materials in golden scales is to be undertaken at this stage. The only deliberation at the stage of discharge is as to whether prima facie case was made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not.

112. Further, it is well settled that the revisional power cannot be parallelled with appellate power. The Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as is undertaken by the Trial Court or the Appellate Court.

113. Now coming to the order passed by the learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi wherein after considering submissions advanced on behalf of both the parties and appreciating the evidence and materials brought on record, the learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi has observed in the order impugned that the undisputed fact that remains that the difference between the value of properties/investments found during the check period and the salary received is Rs.3,47,51,936/- which is six times of the salary receipt. This resulted in a quantifiable disproportionate asset of about Rs.3,47,51,939/-, clearly indicating that the same constitutes proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA, 2002. The investigation also established that the proceeds of crime were utilized for the acquisition and construction of a substantial residential property “Aashirwar” at Saketpuri, Hazaribagh, purchased in the name of Reena Devi. As per the valuation report of the Building Division, Hazaribagh cited in the charge-sheet, the construction cost alone was approximately Rs.80,71,812/-, far exceeding any legitimate means available to the accused or his immediate family. There is also material to suggest that the aforesaid assets were layered through multiple bank accounts and insurance policies, projected as untainted property.

114. Under such facts and circumstances, the learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi has observed that the court does not find any merit in the prayer of the accused/petitioner to discharge him in EICR Case No.09/2023 arising out of ECIR/RNSZO/01/2017. Accordingly, the prayer of discharge as made through petition dated 18.06.2025 stood rejected.

115. From perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the Ld. Special Judge has duly considered the rival submissions, examined the documents and statements placed on record, and thereafter passed a reasoned order. The discharge application filed by the Petitioner was rejected only after satisfaction that sufficient grounds exist to proceed against him.

116. Hence, on the basis of discussion made above and taking into consideration the settled position of law discussed and referred hereinabove and further taking into consideration the ratio of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Versus Directorate of Enforcement and Another (supra), this Court is of the considered view that there is no illegality in the impugned order dated 16.01.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge, PMLA Ranchi in connection with ECIR Case No. 09 of 2023 in ECIR/RNSZO/01/2017.

117. Accordingly, this Court do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 16.01.2026, consequently, the present criminal revision is hereby dismissed.

118. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

119. Before parting with the matter, it is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case one way or the other. The observations made hereinabove are confined solely to examining the legality of the order dated 16.01.2026, whereby the prayer of the applicant/appellant for discharge under the relevant provisions of the BNSS, 2023 was rejected by the learned Special Judge. As and when the matter proceeds to trial before the competent court, it shall be adjudicated independently on its own merits, uninfluenced or uninhibited by any observations contained in this order.