Case Law Details
Malikie Innovations Ltd. & Anr. Vs Xiaomi Corporation & Ors. (Delhi High Court)
Delhi High Court ordered Xiaomi entities to secure ₹272 crore because SEP implementers cannot continue exploiting standardized patented technology without furnishing interim security during FRAND disputes, even before final determination of infringement or royalty rates.
In a significant judgment on Standard Essential Patent (SEP) enforcement and FRAND licensing disputes, the Delhi High Court has examined the circumstances in which an alleged implementer of standardized technology may be directed to furnish pro tem security pending adjudication of infringement and licensing claims. The dispute arose from allegations concerning unlicensed use of patents said to be essential to 3G, 4G and 5G cellular standards in mobile devices sold in India. The plaintiffs sought interim monetary protection on the ground that the defendants continued to manufacture, import and sell standard-compliant devices while negotiations for a FRAND licence remained unresolved.
The Court’s judgment deals in depth with the nature of FRAND obligations, the conduct expected from both SEP holders and implementers during licensing negotiations, the relevance of comparable licence agreements at the interim stage, and the power of courts to create temporary balancing arrangements in complex patent disputes. Ultimately, the Court directed furnishing of security of approximately ₹272 crore, while clarifying that the order was not a final adjudication on infringement, validity, essentiality or FRAND royalty rates, but an interim measure intended to balance equities between the parties during the pendency of the suit.
Background of the Dispute
The plaintiffs asserted a portfolio of cellular Standard Essential Patents acquired from and licensed through arrangements involving BlackBerry. The asserted patents included Indian patents relating to cellular communication technologies that were stated to be essential or potentially essential to standards governing 3G, 4G and 5G telecommunications. According to the plaintiffs, these patents formed part of a wider SEP portfolio offered to implementers on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms.
The plaintiffs contended that they approached the defendants in October 2023 to commence negotiations for a FRAND licence covering the use of the cellular SEP portfolio. They stated that over an extended period they provided technical information, claim charts, licensing rationale, royalty computation methodology, and other materials to enable the defendants to evaluate the proposed licence terms. Confidentiality arrangements were also entered into and renewed to facilitate exchange of commercially sensitive information. The plaintiffs further stated that they offered dispute resolution mechanisms, including arbitration, as a route to resolve disagreements over licensing terms.
Despite this, the plaintiffs alleged that negotiations remained inconclusive for a prolonged period while the defendants continued selling devices compliant with 4G and 5G standards in India and globally. According to the plaintiffs, this reflected a pattern of delay, procedural objections and “hold-out” conduct—where an implementer continues commercial exploitation of standardized technology without taking a licence or making corresponding royalty payments. On that basis, the plaintiffs sought pro tem security pending full adjudication of the suit.
Plaintiffs’ Case: Alleged Hold-Out and Need for Interim Protection
The plaintiffs’ central submission was that the defendants were making continued commercial use of technology covered by the asserted SEPs without paying royalties, despite acknowledging through negotiations the need for a licence and making counteroffers during the licensing discussions. The plaintiffs emphasized that the defendants’ products were marketed as compliant with 4G and 5G standards and that claim charts had been provided to demonstrate the mapping of the asserted patents to those standards. They argued that no alternative technology had been identified by the defendants to explain how compliance was being achieved without use of the patented technology.
The plaintiffs submitted that SEP licensing frameworks impose reciprocal obligations. While SEP holders are expected to make FRAND offers and negotiate transparently, implementers also bear obligations: they must engage meaningfully, respond with counteroffers where necessary, disclose relevant sales information, and furnish appropriate security if negotiations remain unresolved while commercial use continues. According to the plaintiffs, an implementer cannot indefinitely continue using SEPs royalty-free during drawn-out negotiations or litigation.
They also relied on the defendants’ filing of proceedings before the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court in China seeking FRAND rate-setting for Chinese patents. The plaintiffs argued that such proceedings constituted recognition that the portfolio contained SEPs requiring licensing against royalty payments, reinforcing the case for interim security.
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that pro tem security was not equivalent to final royalty fixation, nor did it require full merits determination on all issues. Instead, it was described as a temporary balancing mechanism intended to protect the SEP holder from prolonged uncompensated exploitation pending final adjudication.
Defendants’ Case: No Interim Security Without Prima Facie Findings
The defendants opposed the application on both procedural and substantive grounds.
First, they argued that the suit suffered from non-joinder because BlackBerry had not been impleaded, despite its continuing association with portions of the broader portfolio. According to the defendants, statutory requirements required joining the patentee in such proceedings. The plaintiffs, however, maintained that the specific suit patents had been assigned to them, and therefore they had the right to sue in their own name.
Second, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs had not established patent validity, essentiality or infringement, and that no judicial determination existed holding the asserted patents essential to the relevant standards. They submitted that granting pro tem relief without prima facie findings on these issues would effectively presume validity and essentiality contrary to patent law principles.
Third, the defendants emphasized the absence of comparable third-party licence agreements and valuation evidence supporting the royalty demands made by the plaintiffs. According to them, without disclosure of comparable licences, there was no objective basis to evaluate whether the plaintiffs’ offers were FRAND-compliant or whether the defendants’ counteroffers were unreasonable. They contended that willingness or unwillingness to license could only be judged after determining what rate was in fact FRAND.
The defendants also argued that Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be used to grant substantive interim monetary relief where specific provisions governing injunctions and security already existed. They characterized pro tem applications as essentially interim injunction applications in another form.
Finally, the defendants denied that proceedings in China amounted to admission of essentiality or infringement in India, stating that the Chinese proceedings related only to Chinese patents and China-wide licensing terms.
Court’s Examination of Pro Tem Relief in SEP Litigation
The Delhi High Court examined prior judicial decisions dealing with SEPs, FRAND obligations and interim protective arrangements. The Court noted that earlier Delhi High Court rulings had recognized the power of courts to create pro tem arrangements as temporary measures designed to balance equities between parties while complex SEP disputes remain pending. These arrangements were distinguished from final adjudication on infringement or FRAND rates.
The Court reiterated that in patent infringement involving SEPs, the financial harm to the patent holder is often represented by royalties that would have been received had a licence been executed. If implementers continue exploiting standard-compliant technology without payment during lengthy proceedings, SEP holders may suffer revenue deprivation while implementers gain market advantage.
Reciprocal Nature of FRAND Obligations
A major theme in the judgment is the reciprocal nature of FRAND obligations.
The Court observed that FRAND duties are not one-sided obligations imposed only on SEP holders. While licensors must make FRAND offers and provide necessary information, implementers also have obligations. They cannot remain silent, delay indefinitely, or continue unrestricted commercial use of standardized technology without offering meaningful security or demonstrating willingness to conclude a licence on appropriate terms.
The Court emphasized that the SEP framework seeks to balance interests of innovators and implementers. It is designed neither to allow excessive royalty demands nor to permit continued royalty-free exploitation of essential technology during prolonged negotiations.
Comparable Licence Agreements Not Decisive at Interim Stage
One of the defendants’ principal objections was that the plaintiffs had not produced comparable third-party licence agreements. The Court, however, distinguished between final FRAND adjudication and interim protective relief.
It observed that at the pro tem stage, the Court was not determining final royalty rates or conclusively deciding whether a particular offer was FRAND-compliant. Therefore, non-production of comparable licence agreements was not treated as fatal to the request for interim security. The absence of such agreements did not, by itself, prevent the Court from crafting a temporary balancing arrangement.
Commercial Advantage from Royalty-Free Use
The Court recognized that implementers who continue marketing standard-compliant products without paying royalties may gain substantial commercial advantages:
- improved cash flow,
- pricing flexibility,
- competitive edge over licensed competitors,
- ability to delay payment while continuing market expansion.
Such advantage, in the Court’s view, could upset competitive neutrality in markets built on standardized technology ecosystems. Pro tem security was therefore viewed as a mechanism to restore interim balance rather than a premature determination of final liability.
Quantification of Interim Security
The Court did not wholly accept either side’s monetary position. Instead of adopting the plaintiffs’ claimed amount or the defendants’ counteroffer, it fashioned its own balancing formula.
The Court considered the Indian market share figure of 19.12% and applied it to the mean average of the plaintiffs’ second lump-sum offer and the defendants’ second counteroffer. Using this methodology, the Court quantified pro tem security at US$28.7 million, approximately ₹272 crore.
The defendants were directed to comply within six weeks either by:
- depositing the amount with the Registrar General of the Delhi High Court to be kept in an interest-bearing fixed deposit, or
- furnishing an unconditional bank guarantee of equivalent value from an Indian bank.
Clarification on Scope of the Order
The Court expressly clarified that the order:
- does not finally determine infringement,
- does not finally determine patent validity,
- does not conclusively determine essentiality,
- does not fix final FRAND royalty rates, and
- does not decide ultimate liability.
It is a temporary protective arrangement intended to preserve fairness and commercial balance during the pendency of litigation.
Implications of the Judgment
The ruling is significant for SEP litigation in India because it strengthens the principle that interim monetary balancing mechanisms may be ordered even before final trial where standardized patented technology continues to be commercially exploited.
It also reinforces that:
- FRAND obligations are reciprocal;
- implementers must actively engage and cannot rely on prolonged inaction;
- courts may adopt pragmatic valuation approaches for interim protection;
- absence of final FRAND determination does not automatically bar temporary security orders; and
- pro tem relief has become an important judicial tool in SEP disputes.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court’s judgment represents an important development in Indian SEP jurisprudence. By directing approximately ₹272 crore in pro tem security, the Court has emphasized that while final questions of validity, infringement and FRAND rates may require detailed adjudication, commercial exploitation of standardized patented technology during prolonged disputes cannot remain economically consequence-free. The judgment underscores that FRAND is built on reciprocal conduct, and interim judicial balancing may be necessary where licensing disputes remain unresolved despite continued market use of the underlying technology.


