Case Law Details
Giri Bahadur Vs Ward (ITAT Mumbai)
Introduction: The case of Giri Bahadur vs. Ward, adjudicated by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) Mumbai, revolves around the disallowance of late deposits of employees’ contributions towards Provident Fund (PF) and Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (ESIC). The ITAT’s decision emphasizes the significance of adhering to statutory deadlines in tax matters.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Background: The Assessing Officer (AO) made an addition of Rs. 8,10,552/- on account of late deposit of employees’ contributions toward PF and ESIC, citing a violation of the due dates prescribed in the relevant statutes.
2. AO’s Decision: The AO’s decision to disallow the deductions was based on the late deposits of employees’ contributions. This disallowance was upheld by the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (CIT-A).
3. The Legal Precedent: The ITAT’s decision aligns with the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT (2022) 448 ITR 518 (SC). The Supreme Court concluded that payments made toward employees’ contributions for PF and ESIC after the due date, as specified by relevant statutes, are not deductible under Section 36(1)(va) of the Income Tax Act.
4. Key Takeaways from Supreme Court Judgment:
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- Payments made after the due date as per statutory regulations are not eligible for deduction.
- The nature and character of the employer’s and employees’ contributions differ significantly.
- The employer’s contribution constitutes part of the employer’s income.
- Employees’ contributions, deducted from their income, are not part of the employer’s income.
- Timely deposit of employees’ contributions is a prerequisite for deduction.
- Section 43B of the Income Tax Act relates to ensuring timely payment of specific liabilities, defined by the statute.
5. ITAT Mumbai Decision: The ITAT Mumbai, considering the precedent set by the Supreme Court, upheld the disallowance of late deposits of employees’ contributions. The essence of the decision is that adherence to due dates specified in relevant welfare enactments is crucial, and deposits must be made on or before these due dates for deductions to apply.
Conclusion: The case of Giri Bahadur vs. Ward before the ITAT Mumbai reaffirms the principle established by the Supreme Court regarding the deductibility of late deposits of employees’ contributions toward Provident Fund and ESIC. The decision underscores the importance of timely compliance with statutory deadlines and regulations in the context of income tax assessments. In this case, the ITAT upheld the disallowance of late contributions, highlighting the need for businesses and employers to adhere to the due dates specified in relevant statutes. This judgment serves as a reminder for organizations to ensure timely compliance with their financial obligations under the law.
FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF ITAT MUMBAI
The Assessee has preferred this appeal against the order dated 30.09.2021 impugned herein, passed by National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), Delhi {in short ‘NFAC’}/Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (in short “Ld Commissioner”) u/s 250 of the Income Tax Act 1961 (in short ‘the Act’).
2. This is recalled matter. Though, the notice for the date of hearing on 05.10.2023 was issued to the Assessee however, the Assessee neither appeared nor filed any adjournment application, hence in the constrained circumstances, I am inclined to decide this appeal as ex-parte.
3. In the instant case, the AO/CPC vide intimation dated 11th Feb, 2020 u/s 154 of the Act, made addition of Rs. 8,10,552/- as disallowance on account of late deposit of employees’ contributions towards PF & ESIC before prescribed due dates as prescribed under the relevant statutes . The said addition was affirmed by the ld. CIT(A) against which the Assessee is in appeal before the tribunal.
4. Admittedly in the case under considerations, the Employees’ contributions for Provident Fund and ESI have been deposited after the last date, as prescribed in the respective statutes, which resulted into making the aforesaid addition/disallowance u/s 36(1) (va) read with section 2(24)(x) of the Act.
5. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CIT (2022) 448 ITR 518 (SC) has laid down the dictum that payment towards Employees’ contribution on account of PF/ESIC made after the due date as prescribed under the relevant statutes, is not allowable as deduction under section 36(1)(va) of the Act, by concluding as under:
“52. When Parliament introduced section 43B, what was on the statute book, was only employer’s contribution (Section 34(1)(iv)). At that point in time, there was no question of employee’s contribution being considered as part of the employer’s earning. On the application of the original principles of law it could have been treated only as receipts not amounting to income. When Parliament introduced the amendments in 1988-89, inserting section 36(1)(va) and simultaneously inserting the second proviso of section 43B, its intention was not to treat the disparate nature of the amounts, similarly. As discussed previously, the memorandum introducing the Finance Bill clearly stated that the provisions – especially second proviso to Section 43B – was introduced to ensure timely payments were made by the employer to the concerned fund (EPF, ESI, etc.) and avoid the mischief of employers retaining amounts for long periods. That Parliament intended to retain the separate character of these two amounts, is evident from the use of different language. Section 2(24)(x) too, deems amount received from the employees (whether the amount is received from the employee or by way of deduction authorized by the statute) as income – it is the character of the amount that is important, i.e., not income earned. Thus, amounts retained by the employer from out of the employee’s income by way of deduction etc. were treated as income in the hands of the employer. The significance of this provision is that on the one hand it brought into the fold of “income” amounts that were receipts or deductions from employees income; at the time, payment within the prescribed time – by way of contribution of the employees’ share to their credit with the relevant fund is to be treated as deduction (Section 36(1)(va)). The other important feature is that this distinction between the employers’ contribution (Section 36(1)(iv)) and employees’ contribution required to be deposited by the employer (Section 36(1)(va)) was maintained – and continues to be maintained. On the other hand, section 43B covers all deductions that are permissible as expenditures, or outgoings forming part of the assessees’ liability. These include liabilities such as tax liability, cess duties etc. or interest liability having regard to the terms of the contract. Thus, timely payment of these alone entitle an assessee to the benefit of deduction from the total income. The essential objective of section 43B is to ensure that if assessees are following the mercantile method of accounting, nevertheless, the deduction of such liabilities, based only on book entries, would not be given. To pass muster, actual payments were a necessary pre-condition for allowing the expenditure.
53. The distinction between an employer’s contribution which is its primary liability under law – in terms of section 36(1)(iv), and its liability to deposit amounts received by it or deducted by it (Section 36(1)(va)) is, thus crucial. The former forms part of the employers’ income, and the later retains its character as an income (albeit deemed), by virtue of section 2(24)(x) – unless the conditions spelt by Explanation to section 36(1)(va) are satisfied i.e., depositing such amount received or deducted from the employee on or before the due date. In other words, there is a marked distinction between the nature and character of the two amounts – the employer’s liability is to be paid out of its income whereas the second is deemed an income, by definition, since it is the deduction from the employees’ income and held in trust by the employer. This marked distinction has to be borne while interpreting the obligation of every assessee under section 43B.
54. In the opinion of this Court, the reasoning in the impugned judgment that the non-obstante clause would not in any manner dilute or override the employer’s obligation to deposit the amounts retained by it or deducted by it from the employee’s income, unless the condition that it is deposited on or before the due date, is correct and justified. The non-obstante clause has to be understood in the context of the entire provision of Section 43B which is to ensure timely payment before the returns are filed, of certain liabilities which are to be borne by the assessee in the form of tax, interest payment and other statutory liability. In the case of these liabilities, what constitutes the due date is defined by the statute. Nevertheless, the assessees are given some leeway in that as long as deposits are made beyond the due date, but before the date of filing the return, the deduction is allowed. That, however, cannot apply in the case of amounts which are held in trust, as it is in the case of employees’ contributions- which are deducted from their income. They are not part of the assessee employer’s income, nor are they heads of deduction per se in the form of statutory pay out. They are others’ income, monies, only deemed to be income, with the object of ensuring that they are paid within the due date specified in the particular law. They have to be deposited in terms of such welfare enactments. It is upon deposit, in terms of those enactments and on or before the due dates mandated by such concerned law, that the amount which is otherwise retained, and deemed an income, is treated as a deduction. Thus, it is an essential condition for the deduction that such amounts are deposited on or before the due date. If such interpretation were to be adopted, the non-obstante clause under section 43B or anything contained in that provision would not absolve the assessee from its liability to deposit the employee’s contribution on or before the due date as a condition for deduction.
55. In the light of the above reasoning, this court is of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the approach of the impugned judgment. The decisions of the other High Courts, holding to the contrary, do not lay down the correct law. For these reasons, this court does not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
6. Hence respectfully following the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, I do not have any hesitation to affirm the addition made by the AO and confirmed by the Ld. Commissioner.
7. In the result, appeal filed by the Assessee stands dismissed.
Order pronounced in the open court on 10-10-2023.
