Allahabad HC: Service Tax Appeal Time-Barred, No Relief

Arun Enterprises Vs Union of India And 3 Others (Allahabad High Court)

Allahabad High Court has dismissed a writ petition filed by Arun Enterprises against the Union of India and others, upholding orders that confirmed a service tax demand and rejected the firm’s appeal as time-barred. The court’s decision, delivered after considering arguments from both sides and reviewing various judicial precedents, emphasizes the strict adherence to statutory limitation periods in tax matters and the principle of alternative efficacious remedy.

Arun Enterprises, a partnership firm engaged in providing manpower for maintenance work to Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (PVVNL), challenged an order dated March 31, 2017, which confirmed a service tax demand. The firm also sought the quashing of subsequent appellate orders that dismissed their appeal as time-barred and a refund of over Rs. 2.23 crore in deposited amounts along with interest and penalty.

Background of the Dispute

The core of the dispute originated from an agreement executed on December 9, 2010, between Arun Enterprises and U.P. Power Corporation Limited. According to the petitioner, Clause 29 of this agreement stipulated that service tax was to be paid by the department (PVVNL) to the external agency, meaning Arun Enterprises. Despite this, a notice was issued to Arun Enterprises on October 18, 2016, demanding payment of short-paid service tax under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act.

Arun Enterprises contended that they were not liable to pay service tax, a position they maintained in statements recorded on March 16, 2016, and September 30, 2016. However, the authorities proceeded to pass the impugned order on March 31, 2017, confirming the demand.

The Limitation Hurdle

The significant hurdle for Arun Enterprises was the delay in filing their appeal against the March 2017 order. The firm asserted that the appeal was filed on January 13, 2021, a delay of 1325 days. They attributed this substantial delay to the personal circumstances of Shri Arun Kumar Sharma, one of the two partners, who was reportedly incarcerated from May 30, 2017, to August 2, 2017, and subsequently released on bail on July 15, 2019, finally coming out of jail on August 2, 2019. The other partner had reportedly resigned earlier. Arun Enterprises argued that these circumstances constituted “sufficient cause” for condoning the delay, citing the Supreme Court’s judgment in ITC Limited & Another Vs. Union of India & Others [(1998) 8 SCC 610].

Respondents’ Stance and Judicial Precedents

Counsel for respondent no. 2, Shri Gaurav Mahajan, countered these submissions, arguing that the impugned orders were correctly passed as the appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, which could not be condoned beyond the statutorily permissible extent. He further contended that the writ petition was not maintainable due to the availability of an equally efficacious alternative remedy of filing an appeal under Section 35-J of the Central Excise Act before the Division Bench of the High Court.

In support of their arguments, the respondents relied on several pronouncements from the Supreme Court and the High Court:

• United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Others [(2010) 8 SCC 110]
• Radha Krishan Industries Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others [(2021) 6 SCC 771]
• Varimadugu Obi Reddy Vs. B. Sreenivasulu & Others [(2022) 2 SCC 168]
• Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada Vs. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited [2020 (36) GSTL 305 (SC)]

These judgments generally underscore the principle that High Courts should exercise self-imposed restraint in entertaining writ petitions when an effective alternative remedy is available. The Supreme Court in Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (supra) particularly cautioned against entertaining writ petitions if filed beyond the statutory period for appeal, stating that such an action would be inconsistent with legislative intent and render statutory provisions otiose.

Regarding the condonation of delay, the respondents heavily relied on:

• Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Jamshedpur [2008 (221) ELT 163 (SC)]
• Superintending Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper & Another Vs. Excise & Taxation Officer [(2020) 17 SCC 692]
• Indian House Vs. Kishan N. Lalwani [(2003) 9 SCC 393]
• M/s Abhishek Trading Corporation Vs. Commissioner (Appeals) & Another [Writ Tax No. 1394 of 2023, decided on 19.01.2024]
• M/s Kumar Construction Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) & Another [Writ Tax No. 1368 of 2023, decided on 14.05.2024]
• State of Haryana Vs. Hindustan Machine Tools Limited [2015 (328) ELT 27 (P & H)]

The Singh Enterprises (supra) judgment, a key precedent, explicitly states that appellate authorities, being creatures of statute, are not vested with jurisdiction to condone delays beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. It clarified that while Section 35 of the Central Excise Act allows for an initial 60-day period for appeal and a further 30-day extension if sufficient cause is shown, there is a “complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act” beyond this 30-day window. The court in Hindustan Machine Tools Limited (supra) further emphasized that exercising extraordinary writ jurisdiction to condone delays beyond statutorily prescribed limits would amount to “doing violence to the statutory provision” and rendering legislative intent otiose.

The Allahabad High Court itself, in M/s Abhishek Trading Corporation (supra) and M/s Kumar Construction (supra), reiterated that special statutes like the Central Goods and Services Act or the Central Excise Act have inbuilt mechanisms for limitation, implying the exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act where specific provisions for condonation beyond a certain period are absent. These judgments stress the principle of statutory interpretation, upholding the legislature’s intent to create a self-sufficient legal framework with clear timelines to ensure certainty and efficiency.

Court’s Findings and Conclusion

The High Court acknowledged that the appeal was preferred 1325 days beyond the limitation period. Relying heavily on the precedents cited by the respondents, particularly Singh Enterprises (supra) and Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (supra), the court found that it could not interfere with the impugned orders under its extraordinary jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the application of limitation provisions under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act is strict, and appellate authorities lack the power to condone delays beyond the specifically prescribed additional period.

Furthermore, the court reiterated the principle that a writ petition is generally not maintainable when an equally efficacious alternative remedy exists. Given that Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act provides for an appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court, the present writ petition before a Single Judge was deemed not maintainable.

In light of the established facts and the consistent judicial pronouncements on statutory limitation and alternative remedies, the Allahabad High Court concluded that no interference was warranted with the impugned orders. The writ petition was consequently dismissed

FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

1.Heard Shri R.R. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Vikrant Rana, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Gaurav Mahajan, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 and Shri Gopal Verma, learned counsel for the Union of India.

2. The instant writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:-

“ i) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondent for quashing the impugned order dated 31.03.2017 passed in order in Original No. 90/AC/DMRT/2016-17 by the respondent no. 4 (Annexure No. 1 to this writ petition);

ii) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondent for quashing the impugned order dated 30.04.2021 passed in order in Appeal No. MRT/EXCUS/000/APPL – MRT/19 passed by respondent no. 3 (Annexure No. 2 to this writ petition);

iii) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondent for quashing the impugned order dated 28.02.2022 passed in Service Tax Appeal No. 70185 of 2021 passed by respondent no. 2 (Annexure No. 3 to this writ petition);

iv) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondent to refund the total deposit amount of Rs. 22,333,836/- and Service Tax along with interest and penalty from financial year 2011-12 and 2014­15 including the amount recovered under order impugned order dated 31.03.2017 along with interest from the date the amount deposited/recovered from the above said period till the finalization of the case;

v) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondent concerned not to take any coercive action against the petitioner firm in pursuance of the impugned orders passed by the respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4.”

3. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner firm is registered partnership firm, which deals in supply of manpower for maintenance work, attend complaints and line break downs, etc. of 11 KV feeder fed from 33/11 KV under various tenders from financial year 01.10.2010 to 31.03.2015 to Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited in different cities, locations, division and sub-divisions in the State.

4. He further submits that on 09.12.2010, an agreement was executed between the petitioner and the U.P. Power Corporation Limited to provide skilled labourer for the aforesaid purpose. As per clause 29 of the said agreement, the service tax had to be paid by the Department to external agency, i.e., by PVVNL to the petitioner as per Rules. He further submits that the proceedings were wrongly initiated against the petitioner for payment of service tax.

5. On 18.10.2016, a notice was issued to the petitioner for payment of duty short paid under section 73(1) of the Finance Act. In pursuance thereof, statement were recorded on 16.03.2016 and 30.09.2016, in which it was clearly stated that the petitioner is not required to pay service tax, but not being satisfied, the impugned order dated 31.03.2017 was passed confirming the demand, against which an appeal was preferred, which was also dismissed as barred by time vide order dated 28.02.2022.

6. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in ITC Limited & Another Vs. Union of India & Others [(1998) 8 SCC 610] and submits that the authority below is competent to extend the period of limitation.

7. He further submits that there were two partners in the petitioner – firm, namely, Shri Arun Kumar Sharma and Shri Gajendra Kashmira having 50% share each, but the other partner, Shri Gajendra Kashmira, resigned from the partnership firm. Therefore, the only surviving partner was Shri Arun Kumar Sharma, who has filed the instant writ petition. He further submits that the partner of the petitioner – Firm, namely, Arun Kumar Sharma, was languishing in jail from 30.05.2017 to 02.08.2017. Vide order dated 15.07.2019, he was released on bail and came out from the jail only on 02.08.2019. Due to the said fact, the petitioner could not submit or file any appeal against tax liability. He further submits that since the petitioner – firm consists of two partners, in which one partner has already resigned, therefore, the only responsible and surviving partner in the firm is Shri Arun Kumar Sharma filed appeal along with an application for condonation of delay. Therefore, the delay in filing the appeal should have been condoned as there was sufficient cause to condone the same.

8. Rebutting the said submissions, Shri Gaurav Mahajan, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submits that the impugned orders have rightly been passed as the appeal was preferred beyond the period of limitation, which could not be condoned beyond the prescribed period.

9. He further submits that against the impugned order, the petitioner has equally, efficacious alternative remedy of filing an appeal under section 35-J Central Excise Act before the Division Bench of this Court. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the following judgements of the Apex Court as well as this Court:-

(1) United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Others [(2010) 8 SCC 110] (paragraph no. 43),

(2) Radha Krishan Industries Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others [(2021) 6 SCC 771] (paragraph nos. 27.3 and 27.5),

(3) Varimadugu Obi Reddy Vs. B. Sreenivasulu & Others [(2023) 2 SCC 168] (paragraph no. 36), and

(4) Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada Vs. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited [2020 (36) GSTL 305 (SC)].

10. He further submits that since the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), Central Excise, Meerut was filed beyond the period of limitation, therefore, the authority has no power to condone the delay beyond the period prescribed under the Act. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance on the following judgements of the Apex Court as well as the High Court:-

(1) Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of C. Ex., Jamshedpur [2008 (221) ELT 163 (SC)],

(2) Superintending Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper & Another Vs. Excise & Taxation Officer [(2020) 17 SCC 692],

(3) Indian House Vs. Kishan N. Lalwani [(2003) 9 SCC 393],

(4) M/s Abhishek Trading Corporation Vs. Commissioner (Appeals) & Another [Writ Tax No. 1394 of 2023, decided on 19.01.2024],

(5) M/s Kumar Construction Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) & Another [Writ Tax No. 1368 of 2023, decided on 14.05.2024], and

(6) State of Haryana Vs. Hindustan Machine Tools Limited [2015 (328) ELT 27 (P & H)].

11. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has perused the record.

12 . It is not in dispute that after service of the impugned order dated 31.03.2017, the appeal should have been preferred within limitation, but the appeal has been preferred beyond the period of 1325 days. Admittedly, the impugned order dated 31.03.2017 was received by the petitioner. The appeal has been preferred on 13.01.2021 beyond the period of 1325 days.

13. This Court, under extra ordinary jurisdiction, cannot interfere with the impugned orders as the application of limitation does not apply to section 35 Central Excise Act.

14. The Apex Court, after considering the judgement of ITC Limited (supra), in the case of Singh Enterprises (supra) has specifically held as under:-

“8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short ?the Limitation Act?) can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days’ time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days’ period.”

15. Further, the Supreme Court in Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (supra) has held as under:-

“11. In the backdrop of these facts, the central question is: whether the High Court ought to have entertained the writ petition filed by the respondent? As regards the power of the High Court to issue directions, orders or writs in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the same is no more res integra. Even though the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order or direction passed/action taken by the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, it ought not to do so as a matter of course when theaggrieved person could have availed of an effective alternative remedy in the manner prescribed by law (see Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari vs. Antarim Zila Parishad now Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar8 and also Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of India & Ors.9). In Thansingh Nathmal & Ors. vs. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri & Ors.10, the Constitution Bench of this Court made it amply clear that although the power of the High Court underArticle 226 of the Constitution is very wide, the Court must exercise self-imposed restraint and not entertain the writ petition, if an alternative effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person. In paragraph 7, the Court observed thus:

“7. Against the order of the Commissioner an order for reference could have been claimed if the appellants satisfied the Commissioner or the High Court that a question of law arose out of the order. But the procedure provided by the Act to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court was bypassed, the appellants moved the High Court challenging the competence of the Provincial Legislature to extend the concept of sale, and invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and sought to reopen the decision of the Taxing Authorities on question of fact. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles.

But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self imposed limitations. Resort that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.”

(emphasis supplied)

We may usefully refer to the exposition of this Court in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of Orissa & Ors. 11, wherein it is observed that where a right or liability is created by a statute, which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute must only be availed of. In paragraph 11, the Court observed thus:

“11. Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate redress against the wrongful acts complained of. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the Prescribed Authority under subsection (1) ofSection 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub­section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford [(1859) 6 CBNS 336, 356] in the following passage:

There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute. . . . But there is a third class, viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it…. The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.

The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. (1919 AC 368) and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in AttorneyGeneral of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co. Ltd. (1935 AC 532) and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. (AIR 1940 PC 105). It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.”

(emphasis supplied)

In the subsequent decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.12, this Court went on to observe that an Act cannot bar and curtail remedy under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. The Court, however, added a word of caution and expounded that the constitutional Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise its jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment. To put it differently, the fact that the High Court has wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not mean that it can disregard the substantive provisions of a statute and pass orders which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed by the statute.

15. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), which had adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors.19 and also of the Karnataka High Court in Phoenix Plasts Company vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (AppealI), Bangalore20. The logic applied in these decisions proceeds on fallacious premise. For, these decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as Section 31 of the 1995 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court underArticles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a given case, the assessee may approach the High Court before the statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the assessment order by way of writ petition 19 AIR 2015 Guj 97 20 2013 (298) ELT 481 (Kar.) on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in flagrant disregard of law and rules of procedure or in violation of principles of natural justice, where no procedure is specified. The High Court may accede to such a challenge and can also nonsuit the petitioner on the ground that alternative efficacious remedy is available and that be invoked by the writ petitioner. However, if the writ petitioner choses to approach the High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation period of 60 days prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act, the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course. Doing so would be in the teeth of the principle underlying the dictum of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (supra). In other words, the fact that the High Court has wide powers, does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed underSection 31 of the 2005 Act. That would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose.

18. Suffice it to observe that this decision is on the facts of that case and cannot be cited as a precedent in support of an argument that the High Court is free to entertain the writ petition assailing the assessment order even if filed beyond the statutory period of maximum 60 days in filing appeal. The remedy of appeal is creature of statute. If the appeal is presented by the assessee beyond the extended statutory limitation period of 60 days in terms of Section 31 of the 2005 Act and is, therefore, not entertained, it is incomprehensible as to how it would become a case of violation of fundamental right, much less statutory or legal right as such.”

16. Further, the Supreme Court in Hindustan Machine Tools Limited (supra) has held as under:-

“19. The power conferred under Articles 226/227 is designated to effectuate the law, to ensure that rule of law is enforced and the statutory authorities and other organs of the State act in accordance with law. It is not to be invoked whereby authorities are directed to act contrary to law. Wherever, the extent of condonable period is specifically prescribed by a statute, it would not be appropriate even under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution to entertain the writ petition so as to breach the express provision in the statute and act contrary to the mandate of the legislature. It is for the legislature to prescribe the limits or not to do so for condoning the delay. Exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India would amount to doing violence to the statutory provision and rendering the same otiose. In other words, the legislative intent is clear that the Parliament never intended that delay beyond specified period in filing the appeal could be condoned. It is not for the High Court to re-write the statute in the garb of exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. The view which has been expressed by us herein above, is supported by various judicial precedents.”

17. This Court in M/s Abhishek Trading Corporation (supra) as held as under:-

“7. The Central Goods and Services Act is a special statute and a self-contained code by itself. Section 107 of the Act has an inbuilt mechanism and has impliedly excluded the application of the Limitation Act. It is trite law that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply only if it is extended to the special statute. Section 107 of the Act specifically provides for the limitation and in the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, one cannot apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the aforesaid provision.”

18. Further, in M/s Kumar Construction (supra), this Court Court has held as under:-

“8. It is a trite law that the power of Section 5 of the Limitation Act will be available only if it is extended to a special statute. The adjudication of matters involving statutory timelines often raises questions regarding the interplay between general statutes such as the Limitation Act and special statutes with their own prescribed limitations.

9. Special statutes such as the Finance Act, 1994, or the Central Excise Act are enacted to address specific areas of law comprehensively. These statutes often contain detailed provisions governing procedural aspects, including timelines for initiating legal proceedings, such as appeals. Courts have consistently held that when a special statute contains provisions governing limitation periods, it impliedly excludes the application of general statutes such as the Limitation Act. The rationale underlying this principle is rooted in the notion that the legislature, in enacting a special statute, intends to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive regime governing all aspects of the relevant legal domain.

10. The principle of statutory interpretation embodies a fundamental tenet of legal reasoning: fidelity to legislative intent. In the context of limitation under special statutes, this principle assumes paramount importance, guiding courts in their adjudicative function. While the court retains discretionary authority in certain matters, the primacy accorded to limitation under special statutes operates as a circumscribing principle delineating the boundaries within which judicial discretion may be exercised.

12. The jurisprudential foundation supporting the primacy of limitation under special statutes over general statutes is multifaceted. Firstly, it recognizes the legislature’s intent to create a cohesive and self-sufficient legal framework tailored to the specific nuances of the relevant legal domain. By providing detailed provisions governing limitation period, the legislature ensures certainty and predictability in legal proceedings, thereby promoting efficiency and expeditious resolution of disputes. Moreover, the exclusion of general statutes like the Limitation Act from the purview of special statutes serves to maintain the integrity and coherence of the legislative scheme, preventing potential conflicts and inconsistencies in statutory interpretation. “

19. That in the judgements, referred to herein-above, it has been held that the delay cannot be condoned beyond the period what is prescribed under the respective Act as the language of the section specifically provides for condonation of delay of additional period mentioned therein only.

20. Further, since the petitioner has equally, efficacious alternative remedy of filing an appeal under section 35-G of the Central Excise Act before the Division Bench of this Court, writ petition before the Single Judge is not maintainable in view of the judgements of the Apex Court in United Bank of India (supra), Radha Krishan Industries (supra), Varimadugu Obi Reddy (supra) and Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (supra).

21. In view of the facts & circumstances of the case as well as the law laid down by the Supreme Court as well as this Court as referred to above, no interference is called for in the impugned orders.

22. The writ petition fails and it is hereby dismissed.