In the facts and circumstances of this case, the determining of date when the loss was incurred will have to be derived from the admitted facts. It is not a matter of dispute that the fire which resulted in destruction of the stock of the applicant-assessee took place on 26.3.1978. The aforesaid fire destroyed the stock/goods of the applicant-assessee lying with the PSWC
There was a divergent view of the various High Courts whether crushing of bigger stones or boulders into smaller pieces amounts to manufacture. In view of the divergent views, of the various High Courts, there was a bona fide doubt as to whether or not such an activity amounted to manufacture. This being the position, it cannot be said that merely because the appellants did not take out a licence and did not pay the duty the provisions of Section 11A got attracted.
In the instant case, the assessee claimed that an amount of Rs. 98,000 was received by him as gift from `M’ on account of love and affection by two drafts. Indeed, the amount of Rs. 98,000 was credited in the account books of the assessee for the previous year. `M’ appeared before the Commissioner (Appeals) and his statement was recorded
The provision of section 147 is not, in any manner, controlled by section 92 nor there is any limit to consideration of any material having nexus with the opinion on the issue of escapement of assessment of income; requirement of section 147 is fulfilled if the AO can legitimately form an opinion that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment; for forming such opinion, any relevant material can be considered and the order of TPO can certainly have nexus for reaching the conclusion that income has been incorrectly assessed or has escaped assessment; in such a situation, it cannot be held that the notice proposing reassessment is vitiated merely because one of the reasons referred to order of TPO.
This petition seeks a direction for releasing of 10 kgs. of silver jewellery, belonging to the petitioner but seized from his adoptive father on 20.11.1979 during search under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (
The assessee is a cable network operator through which it provides telecasting of programmes to the ultimate consumers/subscribers. The assessee in turn enters into a contract with the licensor of various TV channels. On the payment so made, Section 194C of the Act is attracted.
ANY business is a tricky ‘business’ for its doers ! It is tricky because of the presence of many parameters beyond the control of the doers. Under such circumstances, what is to be treated as normal expenditure of business is the sum of compensation which a business-doer has to incur as expenditure for paying damages in case of non-fulfilment of certain obligations under a contract. Now, the major question is whether such an expenditure can be treated as wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business as mandated by the provision of the Sec 37(1) of the Income Tax Act?
Even a conjoint reading of Section 36(1)(iii) as existing prior to the proviso thereto and Section 43(1) explanation 8 clearly shows that any interest paid on the capital borrowed for the acquisition of an asset cannot be allowed as a revenue expenditure. The capital might have been borrowed by an assessee for the purpose of business. However, once it is admitted that a part thereof was used by the assessee for the purpose of acquisition of an asset, which is not in the form of replacement or modernization the interest component thereon upto the date it is first put to use has to be dealt with in terms of provisions of Section 43 (1) explanation 8 as otherwise cost of the asset shown in the balance sheet will not depict its true picture. This is in conformity with law and the accounting principles.
The Tribunal has the discretion of granting stay and dispensing with the requirement of pre-deposit of duty. Secondly, the argument that under Section 35-C(2A) of the Act, the appeal is required to be heard within 180 days, would also be frivolous as the stay order is not co-terminus with the period prescribed for disposal of the appeal.
Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner is empowered to transfer any case from one or more Assessing Officers subordinate to him to any other Assessing Officer. It also deals with the procedure when the case is transferred from one Assessing Officer subordinate to a Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner to an Assessing Officer who is not subordinate to the same Director General, Chief Commissioner or Commissioner. The aforementioned situation and the definition of expression ‘case’ in relation to jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer is quite understandable but it has got nothing to do with the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal or High Courts merely because Section 127 of the Act dealing with transfer has been incorporated in the same chapter. Therefore, the argument raised is completely devoid of substance and we have no hesitation to reject the same.
