It is clear to us that the Supreme Court did not hold anything contrary to what was held in the previous judgments to the effect that even if a claim is not made before the assessing officer, it can be made before the appellate authorities. The jurisdiction of the appellate authorities to entertain such a claim has not been negated by the Supreme Court in this judgment. In fact, the Supreme Court made it clear that the issue in the case was limited to the power of the assessing authority and that the judgment does not impinge on the power of the Tribunal under section 254.
There is no much substance in the first argument as to aspect of lack of jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Magistrate’s Court to entertain the criminal complaint of respondent No.2. This is so, in view of the factual position as to major transaction between the complainant and the accused took place at Mumbai though the complainant is resident of Rajkot, so also the accused Nos. 1 to 4, 8,9,13 to 18 are resident of Kolkata
Whether on the facts and in the circumstance of the case and in law the Hon’ble Tribunal was right in deleting the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer of interest paid by the Assessee Company on borrowed funds amounting to Rs.241.10 lakhs overlooking the fact that the borrowed funds were used by the Assessee Company to invest in the Capital of another Partnership Firm and since profits derived by the Assessee Company from a Partnership firm were exempt from tax u/s.10(2A) of the Income-tax Act, the interest expense related to such tax free profits is to be disallowed u/s.14A of the Income Tax Act?
The expression ‘reasonable cause’ used in Section 273B is not defined under the Act. Unlike the expression ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 249(3), 253(5) and 260A(2A) of the Act, the legislature has used the expression ‘reasonable cause’ in Section 273B of the Act. A cause which is reasonable may not be a sufficient cause. Thus, the expression ‘reasonable cause’ would have wider connotation than the expression ‘sufficient cause’. Therefore, the expression ‘reasonable cause’ in Section 273B for non-imposition of penalty under Section 271E would have to be construed liberally depending upon the facts of each case.
This Court had the occasion to consider similar issues in a Judgment delivered in the case of DIT (Exemption) v. Chembur Gymkhana [Income Tax Appeal No. 5568 of 2010, dated 13-2-2012]. This Court, following the law laid down by the Supreme Court, has held that the fact that the membership of the club is open to a section of the community would not detract from the fact that the club has been constituted for the advancement of any other object of general public utility.
The Principal Judge, Small Causes Court, Pune, and thereafter the District Judge, Pune, negatived the contention of the Corporation holding that profession of Chartered Accountant is neither a trade nor a business. Advocate for the Respondents drew my attention to the judgment reported in Current Tax Reporter Volume 80 Phillipos & Company, Chartered Accountants & Ors. versus State. This is the Judgment of the Karnataka High Court, wherein it is held that Office of the Chartered Accountant or of a firm of a Chartered Accountant is not an establishment within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1961, it is neither a shop nor a commercial establishment.
TDS on the charges you pay to a Barber? The word ‘carrying out any work’ in section 194C is limited to any work which on being carried out culminates into a product or result. The word ‘work’ in s.194C is limited to doing something with a view to achieving the task undertaken or carry out an operation which produces some result. The facilities/amenities made available by a hotel to its customers is not covered under any of the categories specified in the term ‘work’ in Explanation III to section 194C; consequently, the Circular No.681, dated 08-03-1994 to the extent it holds that the services made available by a hotel to its customers are covered u/s 194C must be held to be bad in law.
The parties cannot be deprived of their rights to challenge the award on the ground that there is a delay of 2 years and four months and the Award as declared after such a long period, in our view, can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. The party cannot be remedy-less. Even under Section 16, the objection even if decided, can be re-agitated under Section 34 of the Act. There is no such scheme for the delayed action of the Arbitrator. Considering the aforesaid aspects, in our view, the award is bad in law.
The assessee, during the course of assessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2004-2005, had not furnished any intimation to the Assessing Officer about the alleged misappropriation of funds. Though the FIR was lodged by the Assessee on 16 March, 2006 and the assessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2004-2005 were completed thereafter on 22 December, 2006, the filing of the FIR was not disclosed to the Assessing Officer.
The Court upheld Section 48(5) of the MVAT Act, ruling that input tax credit cannot exceed tax actually deposited in the Government Treasury. It held that the provision is constitutionally valid and does not violate Article 14.
