The Tribunal in the present case has come to the conclusion that where a running business is transferred lock, stock and barrel by one assessee to another assessee the principle of reconstruction, splitting up and transfer of plant and machinery cannot be applied. According to the Tribunal the benefit of Section 10A attaches to the undertaking and not to the assessee which owns the undertaking.
In KEC International Ltd. v. B.R. Balakrishnan (2001) 251 ITR 158., the Division Bench emphasised the importance of reasoned orders being passed on the applications for stay. The Assessing Officers consistently refuse to follow the law laid down in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. The Assessing Officers and the Appellate Authorities are duty bound to act in accordance with binding precedent and there is no reason or justification to act in the manner in which the applications for stay have been disposed of in this case.
Nishith Madanlal Desai vs. CIT (Bombay High Court) It was held that The power which is vested in the Assessing Officer under Section 220(6) and for that matter that which is conferred upon the CIT (Appeals) to grant a stay of demand is a judicial power. It is necessary for both the Assessing Officer as well as the Appellate Authorities constituted under the Income Tax Act, 1961, to have due regard to the fact that their function is not merely to act as tax gatherers, but equally as quasi judicial authorities, they owe a duty of fairness to the assessee.
No recovery of tax should be made pending (a) Expiry of the time limit for filing an appeal; (b) Disposal of a stay application, if any, moved by the assessee and for a reasonable period thereafter to enable the assessee to move a higher forum, if so advised. Coercive steps may, however, be adopted where the authority has reason to believe that the assessee may defeat the demand, in which case brief reasons may be indicated.
Whether where substantial investment has been made and the new plant and machinery is installed in the newly constructed building it can be said that assessee has set-up a new industrial undertaking and it is not the expansion of earlier unit and hence the depreciation of such unit is not to be set-off with the income of that unit which enjoys deduction u/s 80I.
Supreme Court in Vodafone International (dated 20 January 2012) considered its decisions in the matters of McDowell reported in (1985) 3 SCC 230, Azadi Bachao reported in (2004) 10 SCC 1 and the Mathuram Agarwal reported in (1999) 8 SCC 667 and concluded that where the transaction is not genuine but a colourable device there could be no question of tax planning. Supreme Court makes it very clear that a colourable device cannot be a part of tax planning.
An order of assessment in case of ICICI bank Ltd (ICICI) was passed in March 1999 u/s 143(3) wherein deduction claimed u/s Section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) and in respect of foreign exchange rate difference was allowed. The first reassessment was carried out in February 2000 for reworking a deduction under Sec 80M. Thereafter, a second reassessment was carried out in March 2001 for reworking of the deduction under Section 36(1)(viii). In March 2003, the Commissioner u/s 263 sought to revise assessment to disallow deduction u/s 36(1 )(vii) and 36(1 )(viia) and in respect of foreign exchange rate difference.
HC, ruling in favour of the assessee held that it was eligible to set off a loss incurred in tax holiday unit against the income arising from other units, under the same head of ‘profits and gains of business or profession’. HC observed that there was no specific prohibition in Sec 10B for such setting off of a loss. Under Sec 70, the assessee was eligible to set off loss from one source against income from any other source under the same head of income.
In an old judgement but useful Judgment Bombay High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Godavari Saraf held that until contrary decision is given by any other competent High Court, which is binding on a Tribunal in the relevant State, it has to proceed on the footing that the law declared by the High Court, though of another State, is the final law of the land. Which means that once a decision is given by any of the High Courts in the country and there is no contrary decision by any other High Court on the same issue then such decision of High Court will be binding on all the administrative authorities and Tribunals through out India.
Deemed fiction created in Ss.(1) and Ss.(2) of S. 50 is restricted only to the mode of computation of capital gains contained in S. 48 and S. 49 and does not apply to other provisions. A fiction created by the legislature has to be confined to the purpose for which it is created. Further, S. 54E does not make any distinction between depreciable assets and non-depreciable assets. Exemption available u/s.54E cannot be denied by referring to the fiction created u/s.50. Benefit of S. 54E is available to the assessee irrespective of the fact that the computation of capital gains is done either u/s.48 and u/s.49 or u/s.50. Legal fiction created by the statute is to deem the capital gain as short-term capital gain and not to deem the asset as short-term capital asset. Therefore, it cannot be said that S. 50 converts long-term capital asset into a short-term capital asset. Accordingly, the Tribunal was justified in allowing exemption u/s.54E in respect of the capital gains arising on the transfer of a capital asset on which depreciation had been allowed.
