On verification of the records, we find that the details submitted by the applicants on 14.05.2007, does not cover the amount of tickets sold prior to 01.05.2006 for the journey carried out on or after 01.05.2006. We find that this is a suppression of fact on the part of the applicants prima facie therefore, the extended period of limitation has rightly been invoked. We further find that there is no dispute on the liability of service tax.
On a perusal of the definition of ‘Business Auxiliary Service’ as it stood during the material period, we are of the prima facie view that the appellant was functioning as a commission agent for AAI by collecting PSF for AAI and remitting the collections to them. It is not in dispute that the collection charges at the rate of 2.5% on PSF
we find that the appellant’s claim that they have produced some records and the documents, indicating that the income mentioned in the balance sheet may not be totally out of the income as a recovery agent is borne out from the Chartered Accountant’s certificate and adjudicating authority has recorded the same in the submissions made by assessee. It is also seen that the adjudicating authority has recorded that the appellant has produced a Chartered Accountant’s certificate. Suffice to say that the adjudicating authority should have given a finding on this issue, we are of the view that the entire issue needs to be re-considered by lower authority. We also find that the issue involved in this case also needs to be appreciated from the factual matrix, as regards the receipts indicated in the balance sheet of the appellant and the certificate issued by Chartered Accountant to that extent. It our opinion, this exercise is better left to the adjudicating authority to appreciate all the evidences available and that may be produced by the appellant.
There is no dispute about the fact that the appellant has taken CENVAT credit of the duty paid by them. Whether the duty is paid rightly or wrongly, is not the concern of the appellant who is only a recipient of the goods/service. So long as duty is paid either on the goods or the service, appellant is rightly entitled for the credit. This Tribunal in their own case for the previous period has allowed such credit. There is nothing on record to show that the department has appealed against that order of the Tribunal. In view of the position, I allow the appeal with consequential relief, if any.
The short question for consideration in this case is which is the place of removal in respect of exports? Is it the factory premises or is it the port of shipment? In the case under consideration, the appellant has availed service tax credit on GTA service, which was utilised for transportation of goods from the factory to the port of shipment.
The appellant/assessee herein filed a refund application with the authorities on the ground that the service tax paid by them should not have been paid. The adjudicating authority after following the Principles of natural justice, rejected the refund claim on various grounds, including the ground of unjust enrichment.
The appellant/assessee availed the benefit under the Works Contracts Composition Scheme in respect of contracts entered into prior to 1-6-2007. The respondent/department issued show cause notice proposing service tax, interest and penalty on the ground that the petitioner was not eligible to avail the benefit under the Composition Scheme. Being aggrieved, the petitioner went in appeal under Section 35B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (the Act).
It is seen from the records that the first appellate authority has rejected the appeal filed by the appellant on the question of limitation. It is undisputed that the appellant had received the order in original on 28.8.2010 and the appellant had a right to file an appeal within three months from the date of receipt of the order and he also gets further period of three months for seeking condonation of delay from the first appellate authority.
The appellant/assessee provided services of Authorized Service Station and Business Auxiliary Services. They had acted as agent for promoting vehicle loans for which the Bank paid them commission. Out of the commission paid by the Bank, they were in fact paying some amount to the loan seekers as an incentive for taking the loan through them.
Question involved in the appeal is whether the duty paid by the job worker on goods, received back by the appellant can be availed as Cenvat credit by the appellant. I find that the issue involved in the appeal is clearly covered by the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High court in the case of Nestle India Ltd. (supra). Once the duty has been paid by job worker on goods sent back to appellant, there is no reason to deny benefit of Cenvat credit to the appellant.
