Chandan Banerjee Vs Krishna Prosad Ghosh (Supreme Court of India)
Conclusion: In present facts of the case, the circular issued by Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) was challenged which prescribed separate conditions for diploma and degree holder Sub-Assistant Engineers (SAE) for supernumerary appointments as Assistant Engineers (AE). The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in matters of public policy and public employment, the legislature or its delegate must be given sufficient room to decide the quality of individuals it seeks to employ as against different positions. As long as these decisions are not arbitrary, this Court must refrain from interfering in the policy domain.
Facts: In present facts of the case, the Appellants, who are SAEs (Sub-Assistant Engineers) possessing a diploma in engineering, filed a writ petition challenging the circular dated 3 July 2012 and gradation list on the ground that classification within the same cadre of SAE for the purpose of appointment to supernumerary posts violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. By a judgment dated 6 October 2015, the Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and held the circular to be arbitrary and unconstitutional. In a Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench, reversed the decision of the Single Judge and held that classification made on the basis of educational qualifications for supernumerary appointments to the higher post of Assistant Engineer, is valid.
The Single Judge of the High Court held that when persons having different educational qualifications are subject to a common recruitment process and are selected thereafter, a subsequent classification in that cadre would be in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Single Judge also observed that the classification for promotion was not made to reward those SAEs who had improved their educational qualification during service, but instead was a benefit granted to all degree holders. On the contrary, in appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court upheld the validity of the impugned circular and gradation list and while reversed the order of Single Judge by relying upon the Judgment of State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Shri Trilokinath Khosa (1974) 1 SCC 19, wherein it was held that that a classification made on the basis of educational qualifications to achieve administrative efficiency is not arbitrary or impermissible under Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution. The classification made by KMC to increase efficiency by removing frustration amongst stagnated SAEs is also a similar policy decision, which must not be interfered with.
The petitioner relied upon the Judgments of Union of India v. Atul Shukla & Ors. (2014) 10 SCC 432; Co. AS Iyer & Ors. v. Bala Subramanyan & Ors. (1980) 1 SCC 634; Punjab State Electricity Board & Anr. v. Ravinder Kumar Sharma & Ors. 1 (1986) 4 SCC 617, and submitted that once persons have become members of a service, they are equals and cannot be differentiated for the purpose of salary, seniority, promotion and conditions of service. A career advancement scheme is an incentive and a class amongst a class cannot be created to grant this benefit. The impugned order of the High Court failed to appreciate the ratio of Trilokinath Khosa (supra), where this Court had upheld separate channels of promotion for degree holders and diploma holders as they had been recruited through different channels on the basis of their qualifications. In this case, the selection was through a common channel.
The Respondent submitted that even where persons having different qualifications are given an opportunity for promotion, absolute equality cannot be maintained as the administration may consider giving the lesser qualified a promotional opportunity on different terms, rather than prohibiting them altogether.
Further, it was submitted that the present case is similar to the decision in Roop Chand Adlakha, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 116, where the category of Junior Engineers comprised of both graduates and diploma holders and a rule providing for different length of qualifying service for promotion was challenged. This Court upheld the rule, holding that differences in educational qualifications could be compensated by difference in length of experience required in the feeder post.
The Hon’ble Supreme observed that the challenge to the classification made for the purpose of promotion rests on the ground of equality and equal treatment in matters of public employment guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Judgments of Trilokinath Khosa (supra), State of Mysore v. P Narasing Rao, AIR 1968 SC 349; Ganga Ram v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 377 Union of India v. Dr (Mrs) SB Kohli, (1973) 3 SCC 592 and Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889, Roop Chand Adlakha v. Delhi Development Authority (supra) and Food Corporation of India v. Om Prakash 6 (1998) 7 SCC 676, were taken into consideration by the Hon’ble Apex court and on the basis of it, the following observations were made:
(i) Classification between persons must not produce artificial inequalities.
The classification must be founded on a reasonable basis and must bear nexus to the object and purpose sought to be achieved to pass the muster of Articles 14 and 16;
(ii) Judicial review in matters of classification is limited to a determination of whether the classification is reasonable and bears a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Courts cannot indulge in a mathematical evaluation of the basis of classification or replace the wisdom of the legislature or its delegate with their own;
(iii) Generally speaking, educational qualification is a valid ground for classification between persons of the same class in matters of promotion and is not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution;
(iv) Persons drawn from different sources and integrated into a common class can be differentiated on grounds of educational qualification for the purpose of promotion, where this bears a nexus with the efficiency required in the promotional post;
(v) Educational qualification may be used for introducing quotas for promotion for a certain class of persons; or may even be used to restrict promotion entirely to one class, to the exclusion of others;
(vi) Educational qualification may be used as a criterion for classification for promotion to increase administrative efficiency at the higher posts; and
(vii) However, a classification made on grounds of educational qualification should bear nexus to the purpose of the classification or the extent of differences in qualifications.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dismissing the Appeal observed that the Recruitment Regulations were modified again by a circular dated 20 February 2002. By this amendment, the proportion of AEs to be recruited directly was reduced from 45 per cent to 35 per cent. The advantage of this 10 per cent reduction was given to both sets of promotees, that is, the reservation for degree-holder SAEs was enhanced to 15 per cent, while the balance 50 per cent was to be filled by promotion from SAEs (either diploma or degree holders) having ten years of experience. This circular was challenged unsuccessfully before the High Court.
The Recruitment Regulations and their subsequent amendments by KMC suggest that the administration has continued to create a distinction between degree and diploma holder SAEs for the purpose of promotion. In regular promotion, this distinction is made by way of a quota for degree-holder SAEs, while in terms of supernumerary promotion, it has been by way of difference in eligibility conditions. Be it one way or the other, it is evident that the administration has sought to employ a higher number of degree holders at the position of AE than diploma holders. In 1994, when the Recruitment Regulations were introduced, 50 per cent of posts were for direct recruits, who were degree-holders and in the balance 50 per cent which was to be filled by promotees it can be presumed that there must be some SAEs who were holding degrees. Thus, in total more than 50 per cent of AEs were to be degree-holders. When these Regulations were modified in 1997, 45 per cent of AEs were to be direct recruits holding degrees, 10 per cent of AEs were to be degree-holding SAEs, and the balance 45 per cent of posts were to be filled by degree/diploma holding SAEs. Thus, it was stipulated that more than 55 per cent of AEs would be degree holders. The reason for the increase in degree-holders for the post of AEs could be due to circumstances such as the higher level of technical expertise required for the superior post, increase in managerial and technical workload, and enhancement in supervisory functions. It is not amiss to draw a conclusion that a higher educational degree, coupled with stipulated years of experience, could bring in certain benefits to the position of an AE that the management desires. In any case, it is not for this Court to decide whether a higher educational qualification would fulfil the objectives of the management, as long as the nexus between the educational qualification and the need for higher efficiency is not absurd, irrational or arbitrary. In a line of decisions, this Court has held that educational qualifications may be linked to higher administrative efficiency and thus classification on this basis is not in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
It was observed that it cannot be denied that SAEs once promoted to the post of an AE in these supernumerary posts would be performing the task and functions of an AE. Thus, it is not merely a change in the designation of an SAE to an AE, but involves an increase in workload, supervisory functions, and performance of the regular functions of an AE. By the very reason that these posts are supernumerary and depend on the number of eligible persons, a fixed number of positions could not have been anticipated. It is perhaps for this reason that KMC sought to digress from the regular method of granting promotion and opted to introduce separate eligibility conditions. Therefore, we find that the separate eligibility conditions for promotion to supernumerary AE posts on the basis of educational qualification is in line with the past promotion practices of KMC and is not an unreasonable classification.
Another aspect to be considered is that while creating supernumerary posts, KMC has not completely restricted the promotional avenues of diploma-holder SAEs who have stagnated in their service. It has provided adequate opportunity to them to advance in their career, although on different terms and conditions. Thus, the promotional policy of KMC for supernumerary posts is not irrational or arbitrary or to the detriment of diploma holder SAEs. In matters of public policy and public employment, the legislature or its delegate must be given sufficient room to decide the quality of individuals it seeks to employ as against different positions. As long as these decisions are not arbitrary, this Court must refrain from interfering in the policy domain.
FULL TEXT OF THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT/ORDER
The appeal arises from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta dated 25 January 2019. The Division Bench upheld a circular dated 3 July 2012 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation1 which prescribed separate conditions for diploma and degree holder Sub-Assistant Engineers2 for supernumerary appointments as Assistant Engineers3. The gradation list dated 5 July 2012 prepared in pursuance of the impugned circular has also been upheld.
2 The appellants, who are SAEs possessing a diploma in engineering, instituted a writ petition before the High Court challenging the circular dated 3 July 2012 and gradation list on the ground that classification within the same cadre of SAE for the purpose of appointment to supernumerary posts violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. By a judgment dated 6 October 2015, the Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and held the circular to be arbitrary and unconstitutional. In a Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench, reversed the decision of the Single Judge and held that classification made on the basis of educational qualifications for supernumerary appointments to the higher post of Assistant Engineer, is valid.
A Facts
3 KMC, the twentieth respondent, has two distinct service cadres in the Engineering Department : (i) Subordinate Engineering Service and (ii) Engineering Service. The entry post in the Subordinate Engineering Service is a Sub-ordinate Assistant Engineer (SAE), for which the minimum qualification is a diploma in engineering in civil/mechanical/electrical branches. Although the minimum requirement is that of a diploma, a person holding a degree in engineering is also eligible to participate in the selection process. The selection process involves a written examination, followed by an interview conducted by the Municipal Service Commission. Pursuant to this, a merit list is prepared. The cadre of Subordinate Engineering Service comprises of persons holding a diploma or degree in engineering, many of the degree holders having acquired the qualification after appointment. The first promotion from the post of SAE is as an Assistant Engineer (AE), after which an SAE can aspire for successive promotions, right up to the post of Chief Engineer. The AE is the entry level post in the Engineering Service cadre, for which direct recruitment is conducted from persons holding an engineering degree. Thus, the post of AE may be filled through direct recruitment or through promotion of SAEs.
4 On 23 December 1994, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Services (Common Cadres) Regulations4 were notified under Section 20 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act 1980. The Recruitment Regulations apply to the employees under all departments and offices and provide for the management and control of common cadres; seniority and recruitment, among other conditions of service. Rule 9 of the Recruitment Regulations provides the method of recruitment for the post of AE and SAE, which is contained in the table below:
