The Calcutta High Court held that GST authorities cannot seize or seal cash under Section 67 unless it is shown to be useful or relevant to proceedings, and ordered de-sealing of ₹24 lakh cash.
Court held that a retracted Section 132(4) statement cannot form the sole basis for block assessment when no incriminating material was found during search. The block assessment orders were struck down.
The Tribunal held that the SARFAESI notice constituted a valid invocation of the guarantee and admitted the insolvency process. It ruled that the arbitral award refreshed limitation and objections on maintainability could not stand.
The Delhi High Court held that an assessment order cannot be remanded to the AO without adjudicating the validity of the Section 144 order. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) to decide jurisdiction first.
The High Court held that a GST demand cannot exceed the amount specified in the show cause notice, setting aside the order for violating Section 75(7) and principles of natural justice.
The Bombay High Court ruled that pineapple slices, tidbits, and fruit cocktail preserved in sugar syrup and canned cannot be classified as “fresh fruits” under Entry A-23 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, denying tax exemption.
The Court held that once the State Authority initiated proceedings first, the Central Authority could not launch parallel adjudicatory action on the same subject matter. It directed compliance with summons but required coordination to prevent duplicate proceedings.
The High Court held that service of income tax notices on an email ID from a previous return was valid, dismissing the writ petition and directing the assessee to pursue statutory appeal remedies.
The Tribunal held that building construction for future educational use qualifies as charitable activity. The rejection of 80G approval solely due to absence of active operations was ruled unjustified.
The Tribunal held that a charitable trust’s 80G application rejected for late filing must be reconsidered after the trust seeks condonation under Section 119(2)(b). Procedural delay should not defeat substantive rights.
