It is absolutely in the fitness of things that while striking the right chord, the Allahabad High Court which is the biggest High Court in not only just India among all the States, in not only just Asia, in not only just few continents, in not only just many continents but also in all the continents all over the world with maximum number of pending cases more than 12 lakhs among all the High Courts in India in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Radhey Shyam Yadav v. Sri Ashok Nath Tiwari, the District Inspector of Schools in Contempt Application (Civil) No.- 6468 of 2022 that was pronounced just recently on May 19, 2026 while holding the District Inspector of Schools guilty of contempt and highlighting the irrefutable fact that around 400 to 800 cases are listed every day before every Judge has minced absolutely just no words to hold indubitably that parties cannot be permitted to openly defy operative directions, as the administration of justice would descend into chaos and anarchy. It must be noted that the Allahabad High Court was considering a contempt application against the District Inspector of Schools pertaining to the non-payment of the salary of a teacher. It must be laid bare that while holding the opposite party guilty of committing contempt of the order, the Allahabad High Court Bench listed the case on July 8, 2026 for framing of charges.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Kshitij Shailendra of Allahabad High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “This application has been filed by the applicant with a prayer to implead Mr. Prakash Singh, presently posted as District Inspector of Schools, Ghazipur as opposite party No.4 in the array of parties of this contempt application.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 5 that, “An affidavit has been filed by Mr. Prakash Singh explaining the reason for non-compliance of interim order passed by this Court stating that stay vacation application has been filed on behalf of State of U.P. in the writ petition on 12.05.2022 and a listing application has also been filed on 13.05.2026 and therefore the order has not been complied with. A request has been made to defer further proceedings of the present contempt application till final outcome of the stay vacation application. It is also submitted that 25.05.2026 is the next date fixed in the writ petition.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 6 that, “Learned counsel for the applicant submits that current salary of the petitioner-applicant was never paid in pursuance of interim order dated 18.04.2022 passed by the writ Court and, therefore, the order has been deliberately flouted. The writ petition was filed in the year 2017 and interim order was passed in the year 2022. A Special Appeal No. 385 of 2022 filed there against was dismissed as withdrawn on 06.07.2022 with liberty to the Committee of Management, appellant therein, to file an application for recall of the order impugned.”
As we see, the Bench then observes in para 7 that, “Counsel for the applicant is not aware as to whether Committee of Management has filed any application in the pending writ petition or not, however, the stand taken by the DIOS in the affidavit filed today is that mere filing of stay vacation application at the instance of State of U.P. is a valid ground for non-compliance of the interim order, which may not have been vacated so far.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 10 that, “In the present case, period of four years has passed since when the interim order was passed and this contempt application is also pending for the last four years.”
Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 14 that, “There is nothing on record to indicate that State ever pressed its stay vacation application since 2022 and it is only on 13.05.2026, i.e., immediately after this Court directed personal appearance of DIOS in case of non-compliance within one month from 09.04.2026 that a listing application was filed in the writ petition on behalf of the State on 13.05.2026.”
Do further note, the Bench then also notes in para 15 that, “As far as order passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar Sisodiya (supra) is concerned, in that matter, the learned Single Judge of this Court observed that if till the next date of listing of contempt application, the Division Bench did not stay the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition, the alleged contemnor would be required to remain present before the Court and show cause as to why contempt proceedings might not be initiated against them.”
Further, the Bench states in para 16 that, “Before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was argued by learned Additional Advocate General for the State of U.P. that though various attempts had been made by the contemnors for moving the Division Bench to consider the application for stay of the order passed by the writ Court, the same could not be considered on account of huge pendency. In such circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made a request to the Division Bench to consider the application for stay filed by the State and deferred the contempt proceedings.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 17 that, “The facts of the present case are slightly different, as has been observed that stay vacation application being pending for the last four years and no effort having been made by the opposite parties to get the same listed or argued, request made at the stage when the Court is inclined to proceed with the matter on account of non-compliance of the order passed four years ago, the opposite party, would not get any benefit out of the orders relied upon which are distinguishable on facts.”
Practically speaking, the Bench points out in para 18 that, “The majesty of law does not survive merely by passing of judicial orders. It survives because such orders command obedience. An order of a Constitutional Court is neither a mere advisory opinion nor a decorative piece of paper to be admired and ignored at convenience. It carries with it the full authority of the Constitution and the solemn mandate of the rule of law. The moment litigants are permitted to treat judicial directions as optional, the very foundation of constitutional governance begins to erode.”
Quite forthrightly, the Bench propounds in para 19 holding that, “A person against whom an interim order operates, cannot be permitted to arrogate unto himself the authority to decide whether he shall obey the order or not merely because he has filed an application for recall, modification, clarification, or vacation of that order. Filing of such an application does not eclipse, suspend, neutralize or render dormant the subsisting order of the Court. Unless the competent Court modifies, stays, recalls, or vacates its earlier order, the order continues to operate with full binding force. Any other proposition would strike at the heart of judicial discipline. If mere filing of an application were treated as a license to violate Court orders, every contemnor would conveniently avoid compliance by instituting repetitive applications and then taking shelter behind the pendency thereof.”
Most strikingly and most alarmingly, the Bench points out in para 20 that, “In heavily burdened constitutional courts, like our Allahabad High Court, where around 400, 500, 600 and sometimes more than 800 cases are listed every day before every Judge, judicial proceedings may consume considerable time for disposal; sometimes years and sometime decades also. Still people all around may expect such overburdened judges to become ever-working super robots or super computers or superhuman beings? If during such pendency, parties are permitted to openly defy operative directions, the administration of justice would descend into chaos and anarchy. The law does not countenance such audacity.”
Most forthrightly, the Bench expounds in para 21 holding that, “Courts cannot permit litigants to take pride in disobedience by proclaiming: “I have filed an application for vacation of the order; therefore, I shall not comply until it is decided.” Such an approach is nothing short of a frontal assault upon the authority of the judiciary. It reduces solemn judicial orders into meaningless declarations and converts the process of law into an object of ridicule. The principle is fundamental: an order of the Court, right or wrong, must be obeyed so long as it subsists. Disobedience cannot be justified by subjective dissatisfaction with the order. No litigant can assume the role of an appellate authority over judicial commands. If Courts tolerate such conduct, it would amount to institutional self-destruction.”
Plainly speaking, the Bench points out in para 22 that, “The dignity and authority of Constitutional Courts is inseparably connected with public confidence in the justice delivery system. When judicial orders are openly violated without consequence, the common citizen begins to lose faith in the efficacy of law itself. The perception inevitably emerges that Court orders are incapable of enforcement and may safely be ignored until the end of endless litigation. Such a situation would indeed amount to making a mockery of the legal system and symbolically placing a slap upon the face of the judiciary.”
Most rationally, the Bench mandates in para 23 holding that, “Contempt jurisdiction exists precisely to prevent such collapse of judicial authority. The Constitutional Courts are guardians of legality and their orders cannot be permitted to become dead letters awaiting uncertain fate for years or decades while parties continue to act in brazen violation thereof. Therefore, normally unless an interim order is specifically stayed, modified, or vacated by a competent Court, absolute obedience remains the unqualified obligation of every litigant. Anything less would not only weaken the authority of Courts but would ultimately imperil the very survival of constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law. Nevertheless, situation in an exceptional case can always be looked into by the Court based upon nature of order, ongoing proceedings on day to day basis in both courts or other situations of a like nature.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 24 that, “The celebrated dictum of Mahatma Gandhi, as expressed in his seminal work MY EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH, that “no one can insult you without your permission,” bears profound relevance even within the realm of contempt jurisdiction. An order passed by a Constitutional Court, so long as it remains operative and unvacated, carries binding force and unquestionable sanctity. If such an order is openly disobeyed and yet the Court abstains from enforcing compliance or initiating contempt action merely because an application for recall, modification, or vacation of the interim order is pending consideration, the resulting erosion of judicial authority cannot be attributed solely to the contemnor. The majesty of the law stands diminished only when the Court permits its own command to be rendered ineffectual with impunity. In that sense, the continued non-enforcement of a subsisting judicial order amounts to a tacit permission for its violation, thereby attracting the very principle enunciated by Mahatma Gandhi-that insult survives not merely by the act of wrongdoer, but by the acquiescence of the authority which tolerates it.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench hastens to add in para 25 noting that, “Even when an interim order is subsequently vacated, recalled, or set aside, the law does not render such a successful party helpless. In such a situation, the well-established doctrine of restitution would immediately come into operation, whereby the parties would be restored, as far as practicable, to the position which prevailed prior to the passing of the order. The legal consequences and benefits flowing from the earlier order would accordingly stand neutralized, reversed or restituted in accordance with law. Thus, no irreparable prejudice can be said to visit a party merely because it complied with a subsisting judicial mandate. Therefore, while adjudicating contempt proceedings, courts must remain conscious of the principle that every operative order, whether interim or final, carries with it an obligation of immediate and faithful compliance unless duly suspended or annulled by a competent court; otherwise, the very purpose of granting interim protection or issuing judicial directions would be rendered wholly illusory and nugatory.”
As a corollary, the Bench then directs and holds in para 26 that, “In view of above discussion, at least this Court is not inclined to defer the proceedings of the present contempt application as the Court is more than satisfied that mere filing/pendency of the stay vacation application does not ipso facto amount to vacation of interim order and justification for non-payment of salary after a period of four years, taking shield of filing of stay vacation application in the writ petition cannot be accepted.”
Resultantly, the Bench then holds in para 27 that, “In view of the above discussion, the opposite party is found guilty of committing contempt of the order dated 18.04.2022 so as to warrant further proceedings in this matter.”
It would be worthwhile to note that the Bench notes in para 28 directing and holding that, “Connect with Contempt Application (Civil) No.6489 of 2022 and list this case on 08.07.2026 in top ten cases for framing of charges against the newly impleaded opposite party No.4 on which date he shall remain personally present in the Court.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 29 that, “The opposite party No. 4 may still comply with the order of the writ Court and purge the contempt, if so advised.”
In summation, the upshot of the above discussion is that Allahabad High Court has made it indubitably clear that parties can’t openly defy operative directions. There can be just no gainsaying that the work load on Allahabad High Court is staggeringly high and this all the more necessitates the creation of a High Court Bench in West UP which owes for majority of pending cases of Allahabad High Court and has been pending inordinately since a very long time and it merits closure and it also brooks no more delay any longer now! No denying it!
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