These two cross appeals – one by the assessee and the other by the Revenue – arise out of the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) on 05.08.2010 in relation to the assessment year 2007-2008. Since common issues are raised in these appeals, we are, therefore, proceeding to dispose them off by this consolidated order for the sake of convenience.
It was found from the assessment order for assessment year 1985-86 and from the order of Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) that the assessee had made payments to schools other than those promoted by it which fact has not been discussed either in the Order of ITAT or in the Order of the High Court.
In this case, there is no dispute that even though the bill is in the name of company C/o employee’s name, the payment for the service has been made by the company only. I also find that the submission of the appellant that employee’s name was put for internal purpose is also reasonable since the company has to know who is utilizing the telephone so that they can monitor the utilization and also ensure that phone is not misused.
Merely because his opinion may not be acceptable, he cannot be mulcted with the criminal prosecution, particularly, in the absence of tangible evidence that he associated with other conspirators. At the most, he may be liable for gross negligence or professional misconduct if it is established by acceptable evidence and cannot be charged for the offence under Sections 420 and 109 of IPC
In the absence of a finding rejecting the accounts of the assessee, the reference to the DVO could not have been made by the Assessing Officer in the first place. It is evident that the valuation in the instant case was uncritically accepted by the Assessing Officer. As can be seen from a comparison of the valuation by the assessee, with that of the DVO, the variation is 3.86 per cent. This is a very minor variation, having regard to the large amounts involved.
It is important to bear in mind uncontroverted claim of the assessee that there were sufficient reserves and surplus, which were eligible for distribution as ‘dividend’, and the NIPL had sufficient cash balances as well. The nature of amounts distributed as dividend has not been altered as a result of, what the revenue authorities describe as, colourable device to evade taxes.
The deduction under section 80-IA(4)(iv)(c) is allowed for a period of ten years. The dispute in the present appeal is as to whether assessment year 2005-06 should be the first year in which the deduction should be allowed. It was clarified at the time of hearing of the appeal that from the assessment year 2006-07, the assessee has been getting the deduction under section 80-IA(4).
The economic problems of milk producers are such that the Parliament/CBDT felt it necessary to incorporate that milk producer should be free to receive payments in cash. Of course, such exclusion from the rigour of the provisions of section 40A(3), is subjected to certain conditions.
There may be cases where the Assessing Officer does not and may not raise any written query but still the Assessing Officer in the first round/ original proceedings may have examined the subject matter, claim etc, because the aspect or question may be too apparent and obvious. To hold that the assessing officer in the first round did not examine the question or subject matter and form an opinion, would be contrary and opposed to normal human conduct. Such cases have to be examined individually.
Interest expenses directly attributable to tax exempt income as also directly attributable to taxable income, are required to be excluded from computation of common interest expenses to be allocated under rule 8D(2)(ii).
