Case Law Details
ACIT Vs Padmshree Dr. D.Y. Patil University (ITAT Mumbai)
Before us, the main plea of the Ld. CIT-DR was that the development fee collected by the assessee trust on the basis of a single fee receipt from the students, shows that the students didn’t had any option but to mandatorily give/remit the fees (including the development fees which is part of regular tuition fees). According to the Ld. CIT-DR, the assessee shows such development fees as corpus funds, but since such corpus funds had been collected compulsorily from the students, the same cannot be given benefit u/s 1 1(1)(d) of the Act. However, we note that the AO based on copy of fee receipt from which it was evident that development fees was also collected, has formed an opinion that the assessee is collecting the corpus fund involuntarily from the students. This action of the AO cannot be per-se treated as incriminating material, because the fee receipt in question is in public domain; and not discovered during search for the first time. And it is not the case of AO that assessee has been collecting the development fee without any receipt being given to the students and done the same secretly without accounting for it in its books; or neither, there was any complaint from the students/parents against giving this development fees nor the AO has made any inquiry after he discovered about assessee collecting development fee from students and has come to factual conclusion after inquiry that assessee was in fact compulsorily extracting the development fee/corpus in-voluntarily from students. In the absence of any complaint or inquiry as aforestated merely because copy of fee receipt was found during search which [ fee receipt] include the item of development fees, cannot be a ground to form an opinion that the same was compulsory extracted from the students and so, it is hit by the section 1 1(1)(d) of the Act. In such a scenario the same cannot be termed as incriminating material qua the asses see for these years (AY.2011-12 & AY.2012-13).
FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF ITAT MUMBAI
These are appeals preferred by the revenue against the order of the Ld. CIT(A)-49, Mumbai dated 13.03.2021 for A.Y.2011-12 & 2012-13. Since both the sides agree that issues are similar for both assessment years, the decision rendered in the lead case will determine the outcome of the other assessment year also. Therefore, we take up the grounds of appeals in respect of A.Y.201 1-12 as the lead case.
2. Ground No. 1 to 3 are preferred by Revenue against the action of the Ld. CIT(A) allowing exemption of Rs.4,86,28,2891- by not treating the developer fees collected from students by assessee as revenue in nature. The Ld. CIT(A) also did not accept the contention of the AO that the benefit of Section 1 1(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter “the Act”) was not available to the assessee since the development fee was not voluntarily given by the student to the assessee and was part of single receipt. The Ld. CIT(A) also did not accept the contention of the AO that the developer fees collected from the students was mandatorily collected from them and so, there was no choice for the students but to give it.
3. The brief facts of the case is that search and seizure operation u/s 132 of the Act was conducted by the Investigation Wing in the case of M/s. D.Y. Patil group on 27.07.2016 (AY. 2017-18). The assessee in these appeals is Padmashree Dr. D. Y. Patil University which is one of the main Trusts of the D.Y. Patil Group, Navi Mumbai. The premises of the assessee trust at Sector-7, Dr. D. Y. Patil Vidya Nagar, Nerul Navi Mumbai was covered under the Search operation. The assessee trust has been registered u/s 12A of the Act w.e.f 01.04.2006 by DIT (Exemption) vide order dated 21.03.2007. The primary object of the trust is to impart education; and the trust inter-alia runs a Medical College, Dental College, Physiotherapy, Biotechnology and Nursing College at Nerul, Navi Mumbai. The assessment for A.Y.2011-12 was previously completed u/s 143(3) of the Act on 18.03.2014 determining total income at Rs.Nil. And for assessment year 2012-13 also, the assessment was completed u/s 143(3) on 12.02.2015 determining total income at Rs.Nil. [ So, the assessments pertaining to both relevant AY’s were not pending before AO on the date of search on 27.07.2016, consequently un-abated as per second proviso to section 153A of the Act ]. Consequent to search u/s 132 of the Act, the AO issued notices u/s 153A for both the AYs on 21.02.2018. In response to the same, the assessee filed return of income for both the AYs on 28.05.0218 declaring Nil income. Thereafter, the AO completed re-assessments u/s 153A r.w.s. 143(3)
of the Act on 28.12.2018 making certain additions and disallowances.
4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the AO, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) who was pleased to delete the addition/disallowance after going through the remand report from the AO for the assessment years involved (A.Y.2011-12 & 2012-13) and taking note of the fact that both relevant AYs were unabated assessment years [because both assessments were not pending before the AO on the date of search on 27.07.2016 as per second proviso to section 153A of the Act] and therefore considering the well settled law laid by Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Kabul Chawla (2016) 380 ITR 571 wherein it was held that in assessment/reassessment under Section 153A of the Act, if it is found that the assessment year/years are un-abated assessment, then in that event, the AO has to reiterate the original assessment and can make additions/disallowance only with the aid of incriminating material qua assessee qua assessment year; and as a corollary, if there was no incriminating material qua the assessee qua the assessment year [which was unabated] then no addition/disallowanc can be resorted to or be sustained u/s 153A of the Act; and the SLP preferred by the Department against the aforesaid order of Hon’ble Delhi High Court was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court; and the Ld. CIT(A) taking note of the plethora of other decisions laying down similar ratio, he has held that since both the relevant assessment years (A.Y.2011-12 & 2012-13) being unabated, the AO could not have made any addition/disallowance in the absence of the incriminating material found during the course of search qua the assessee qua the assessment years involved and so he was pleased to delete the additions made by the AO for both the assessment years. Aggrieved by aforesaid action of the Ld. CIT(A), the revenue before us.
5. We have heard both the parties and perused the record. We note that pursuant to the search conducted at the assessee trust’s premises on 21.07.2016, the AO issued notice u/s 153A of the Act inter-alia, for both the assessment years also (A.Y.201 1-12 & 2012-13). Later assessment u/s 153A of the Act was framed and on the strength of the fee receipt wherein development fee was found to have been included in the common fee receipt, the AO held that the assessee was collecting the development fee which was nothing but mandatory/compulsive extraction from the students; and since the assessee has shown the development fee collected as corpus donation, according to AO, it is not allowable because section 1 1(1)(d) of the Act only allows benefits of corpus donation if it is voluntarily given by the donors, and since the development fees are compulsorily charged/extracted from the students, the assessee cannot be given the benefit of section 1 1(1)(d) of the Act and disallowed the claim that development fee should be treated as corpus fund and treated it as revenue receipt/tution fee etc and added Rs 4,86,28,207/-. On appeal, the Ld. CIT(A) taking note that both assessment year i.e. AY.2011-12 & AY.2012-13 are unabated assessments, applying the ratio of decision in Kabul Chawla (supra) deleted the additions on the ground that there was no incriminating material unearthed during search qua assessee qua the assessment years 2011-12 & AY 2012-13 and deleted the additions.
6. It was brought to our notice that similar issue came up before this Tribunal in the case of sister trust (DY Patil Educational Academy) I.T.A no1033, 1034 & 1035/Mum/2021 for A.Y.2011-12, 2012-13 & 2013-14, wherein the AO made similar additions u/s 153C of the Act based on identical/similar/same fee receipt wherein development fee was also collected by those trust which was added by the AO on the very same reasoning that it was not permissible for the assessee to have collected development/fee [corpus] involuntarily by compulsion, so benefit u/s 1 1(1)(d) of the Act was denied to those trusts and accordingly similar additions were made, which was deleted by CIT(A) by relying upon the decision rendered by Hon’ble Jurisdictional Bombay High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Continental Warehousing 374 ITR 645 (Bom); and decision rendered by Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of All Cargo Global Logistics Ltd. vs. DCIT (2012) 18 ITR 106 (SB) which was confirmed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in ITA No.1414 of 2013. On appeal by Revenue, this Tribunal upheld the view of the Ld. CIT(A) by noting that the assessment years before it were unabated assessments and therefore the AO could not have disturbed the completed assessments without incriminating material qua the assessee qua the assessment years.
7. Coming back to the present case, we note that the Ld. CT(A) has followed the binding judicial precedent on similar lines and have given relief to the assessee. Before us, the main plea of the Ld. CIT-DR was that the development fee collected by the assessee trust on the basis of a single fee receipt from the students, shows that the students didn’t had any option but to mandatorily give/remit the fees (including the development fees which is part of regular tuition fees). According to the Ld. CIT-DR, the assessee shows such development fees as corpus funds, but since such corpus funds had been collected compulsorily from the students, the same cannot be given benefit u/s 1 1(1)(d) of the Act. However, we note that the AO based on copy of fee receipt from which it was evident that development fees was also collected, has formed an opinion that the assessee is collecting the corpus fund involuntarily from the students. This action of the AO cannot be per-se treated as incriminating material, because the fee receipt in question is in public domain; and not discovered during search for the first time. And it is not the case of AO that assessee has been collecting the development fee without any receipt being given to the students and done the same secretly without accounting for it in its books; or neither, there was any complaint from the students/parents against giving this development fees nor the AO has made any inquiry after he discovered about assessee collecting development fee from students and has come to factual conclusion after inquiry that assessee was in fact compulsorily extracting the development fee/corpus in-voluntarily from students. In the absence of any complaint or inquiry as aforestated merely because copy of fee receipt was found during search which [ fee receipt] include the item of development fees, cannot be a ground to form an opinion that the same was compulsory extracted from the students and so, it is hit by the section 1 1(1)(d) of the Act. In such a scenario the same cannot be termed as incriminating material qua the asses see for these years (AY.2011-12 & AY.2012-13). Therefore, relying on the ratio of the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Continental Warhousing Ltd. Vs. DCIT (2012) 23 taxmann.com 113 (Mum) wherein it was held as under [Head-Notes]: –
“Section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Search and seizure – Assessment in case of (Scope of) – Whether in a case where pursuant to issue of notice under section 153A assessments are abated, Assessing Officer retains original jurisdiction as well as jurisdiction conferred on him under section 153A for which assessments shall be made for each of six assessment years separately – Held, yes – Whether no addition can be made in respect of unabated assessments which have become final if no incriminating material is found during search – Held, yes [Paras 28, 29 & 30] [In favour of assessee]
8. Respectfully following the aforesaid binding decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Continental Ware housing Ltd. Vs. DCIT (supra) as well as relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case CIT Vs. Kabul Chawla (2016) 380 ITR 571 (Delhi) and other judicial precedents on this issue, we confirm the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) and dismiss the revenue appeal.
9. Coming to the ground no. 4, which is against the action of the CIT(A) allowing the assessee to carry forward the deficit of Rs. 11,14,00,030/- being excess expenditure of receipt to subsequent years and holding the same as eligible to be set off with the income of the subsequent years. At the outset, the Ld. AR of the assessee submitted that this issue is no longer res-integre and drew our attention to the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of assessee’s sister trust case DCIT vs Dr. DY Patil Educational Academy [ ITA no 1033 & 1034/M/2021 1] order dated 11.02.2022 (supra) wherein similar ground was adjudicated by this Tribunal in favour of the assessee as under: –
“15. The AO disallowed the set off of brought forward deficits/losses, being excess of expenditure over receipts, of prior years against the income of the current years without relying upon any incriminating material, if any, found during the course of search. However, the Ld. CIT(A) allowed the set off of carried forward losses claimed by the assessee trust qua the years under consideration i.e. A.Y. 2011-12, 2012-13 & 2013-14 by relying upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in assessee’s sister concern case (CIT vs. D.Y. Patil Sports Academy in ITA No.1030 of 2017 dated 04.11.2019) which order has been upheld by relying upon the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT(Exemption) vs. Subros Educational Society 2018 (7) SCC 548 by returning following findings:-
“8.2.1.I have considered the facts of the ‘case, the findings of the AO as incorporated in the assessment order, and the submissions of the assessee in this regard. In assessment order, the A.O. has not allowed set off in respect of losses brought forward from previous years and also not allowed the losses of the current year to be carried forward. It is observed that while disallowing such claim ld. AO has not placed reliance on any incriminating documents found during the course of search which could be said to be adversely affecting the case of the assessee as to this issue.
8.2.2 The assessee submitted that this disallowance was made previously during the original assessment proceedings and issue has been allowed in favour of appellant by the Ld.CIT(A), and the claim of carry forward and set off has been allowed vide order dated 06.07.2018 and 28.03.2018 for A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15 respectively.
8.2.3 It was submitted in the online submissions filed that the deficit of impugned year being the excess of expenditure over receipts is eligible for carry forward to subsequent years. It was also submitted that the deficit incurred during previous year is to be regarded as application of funds in subsequent years and thus the appellant is eligible to set-off the deficit of previous year with the income of subsequent years. In this context, the assessee relied on several judicial decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court, Jurisdictional High Court and other High Courts to support the case of the appellant.
8.2.4. I find that the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court has considered this issue in the case of CIT vs. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection reported in 264 ITR 110, wherein following substantial question of law was admitted by Hon’ble High Court .
“3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the tribunal was justified in law forward the deficit of earlier year and set it off against the surplus of subsequent years when the same was not allowable in the case of assessee trust in whose case income exempted under section 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.”
In this case, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court decided the aforesaid substantial question of law in favour of the assessee by holding as under:-
“5. Now coming to question No. 3, the point which arises for consideration is :
whether excess of expenditure in the earlier, years can be adjusted against the income of the subsequent year and whether such adjustment should be treated as application of income in subsequent year for charitable purposes? It was argued on behalf of the Department that expenditure incurred in the earlier years cannot be met out of the income of the subsequent year and that utilization of such income for meeting the expenditure of earlier years would not amount to application of income for charitable or religious purposes. In the present case, the Assessing Officer did not allow carry forward of the excess of expenditure to be set off against the surplus of the subsequent years on the ground that in the case of a Charitable Trust, their income was assessable under self-contained code mentioned in section 11 to section 13 of the Income-tax Act and that the income of the Charitable Trust was not assessable under the head “profits and gains of business” under section 28 in which the provision for carry forward of losses was relevant. That, in the case of a Charitable Trust, there was no provision for carry forward of the excess of expenditure of earlier years to be adjusted against income of subsequent years. We do not find any merit in this argument of the Department Income derived from the trust property has also got to be computed on commercial principles and if commercial principles are applied then adjustment of expenses incurred by the Trust for charitable and religious purposes in the earlier years against the income earned by the Trust in the subsequent year will have to be regarded as application of income of the Trust for charitable and religious purposes in the subsequent year in which adjustment has been made having regard to the benevolent provisions contained in section 11 of the Act and that such adjustment will have to be excluded from the income of the Trust under section 11 (1)(a) of the Act. Our view is also supported by the Judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v. Shri Plot Swetamber Murti Pujak Jain Mandal [1995] 211 ITR 293. Accordingly, we answer question No. 3 in the affirmative ie., in favour of the assessee and against the Department.” ( emphasis supplied) Further, in the case of DIT vs. Mumbai Education Trust reported in 244 Taxman 163, Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court of Bombay had decided that :
“Impugned order of the Tribunal has dismissed the Revenue’s appeal on both the issues namely allowability of depreciation on capital assets acquired for the purposes of carrying out charitable activities and set off of deficit of earlier years against income of the current year. The impugned order in fact followed decision of this Court in CIT v/s. Institute of Banking Personnel Services reported in 264 ITR 110 while holding in favour of the Respondent assessee.” In the case of cre Vs. Subros Educational Society reported in 166 DTR 257, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that;
“(a) Whether any excess expenditure incurred by the trust/charitable institution in earlier assessment year could be allowed to be set off against income of subsequent years by invoking Section 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961?” …. To this extent, Mr. K. Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant/appellant is correct. Therefore, we have heard him on the aforesaid question of law as well but did not find any merit therein.” In the case of CIT vs. Shri Plot Swetamber Murti Pujak Jain Mandal reported in 211 ITR 293 Hon ble High Court of Gujarat had decided that :-
“There is nothing in the language of s. 11(1)(a) to indicate hat the expenditure incurred in the earlier year cannot be met out of the income of the subsequent year and utilization of such income for meeting the expenditure of the earlier year, would not amount to such income basing applied for charitable or religious purposes. That apart income derived from trust property has to be determined on commercial principles and if commercial principles for determining the income are applied, it is but natural that the adjustment of the expenses incurred by the trust for charitable and religious purposes in the earlier year against income earned by the trust in the subsequent year will have to be regarded as application of income of the trust for charitable and religious purposes in the subsequent year in which such adjustment has been made having regard to the benevolent provisions contained in s. 117 and will have to be excluded from the income of the trust under s. 11(1)(a). The deficit arising out of excess of expenditure over income during the previous year relevant to the assessment year should, therefore, be set off against the surplus of income over expenditure relating to subsequent year in computing the taxable income of the later assessment year.”(emphasis supplied) In the case of CIT vs. Shri Gujrati Samaj (Regd) reported in 257 ITR 397, Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh had decided that
“In view of s.11(1)(a) it cannot be said that the expenditure incurred in the earlier year cannot be met out of the income of the subsequent year and utilization of such income for meeting the expenditure of the earlier year would not amount to such income being applied for charitable or religious purposes: Having regard to s.11(1)(a) when the income of the trust is used or put to use to meet the charitable or religious purposes it is applied for charitable purpose and the said application of the income for charitable or religious purposes takes place in the year in which the income is adjusted to meet the expenses incurred for charitable or religious purposes. Thus even if the expenses for charitable and religious purposes have been incurred in the earlier year and the said expenses are adjusted against the income of a subsequent year, the income of that year can be said to have been applied for charitable and religious purposes in the year in which expenses incurred for charitable and religious purposes had been adjusted. There are no words of limitation in s.11(1)(a) explaining that the income should have been applied for charitable or religious purposes only in the year in which the income had arisen.”
In the case of CIT vs. Matriseva Trust reported in 242 ITR 20, Hon’ble High Court of Madras had decided that :-
4. With regard to the second question, the Tribunal has held that the trust is entitled to set off the amount of excess application of the last year against the deficiency of Rs.82,516 of the present assessment year.
5. When similar questions came up before Rajasthan High Court and Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT vs. Maharana of Mewar Charitable Foundation (1987) 60 CTR (Raj) 40 : (1987) 164 ITR 439 (Raj) : TC 23R.1198 and CIT vs. Shri Plot Swetamber Murti Pujak Jain Mandal (1994) 119 CTR (Guj) 144 : (1995) 211 ITR (Guj) 293 :TC 23R.1228 respectively, both Rajasthan High Court and Gujarat High Court have answered the questions in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 6. Following the aforesaid decisions of Rajasthan and Gujarat High Courts, we answer the second question referred to us in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”In the case of Gonvindu Naicker Estate vs. ACIT reported in 248 ITR 368, Hon’ble High Court of Madras had decided that:-
“The expenditure, if incurred in an earlier year is adjusted against the income of a later year, it has to be held that the trust had incurred expenditure on religious and charitable purposes from the income of the subsequent year, even though the actual expenditure was in the earlier years, if in the books of account of the trust such earlier expenditure had been set off against the income of the subsequent year. The expenditure that can be so adjusted can only be expenditure on religious and charitable purposes and no other.
In the case of OTC Exchange of India vs. ADIT reported in ITA No.7189, 7190 & 7191/1 Mum/ 2016, Hon’ble ITAT, Mumbai had decided that;
“Ground No. 7 of the grounds of appeal is regarding confirming the action of the Assessing Officer in not allowing the setoff of earlier years loss against current year’s income. ………… Respectfully following the said decision, we hold that excess of expenditure in earlier years can be adjusted against income of subsequent years and such adjustment would be application of income for subsequent years and therefore we direct the Assessing Officer to allow the claim of the assessee for set off of excess expenditure of earlier years against current year’s income following the above decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court (supra).”
8.2.5 It is found that the other Judicial decisions relied upon by the assessee also supports the case of the appellant. In fact, it is evident that the Hon’ble Courts, including the Hon’ble jurisdictional High court, and the Tribunal has consistently pronounced that in case of Charitable Trust excess expenditure over income is to be allowed to be carried forward for setting off against income of subsequent years.
8.2.6 Furthermore, it is found that the decision in the case of CIT vs. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection (supra) has subsequently been followed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Director of Income-tax Exemption v. Society for Applied Microwave Electronic Engineering & Research [2019] 106 taxmann.com 203 (Bom.) and the SLP filed by the department in respect of order in this case has been dismisseby the Hon’ble Apex Court in 106 taxmann.com 204 (SC).
8.2.7. Hence, respectfully following the judicial decisions cited supra, I hold that the assessee is eligible to set off losses brought forward from previous years and carry forward the deficit, being excess of expenditure over receipts, to subsequent years and the same is eligible to be set-off with the income of subsequent years. The AO is accordingly directed to allow the set off of brought forward of deficit in AY 2011-12 and allow to carry forward the balance deficit in the succeeding years for setting off against income of such succeeding years.
8.3.8. I have also taken note of the fact that the issue was previously considered by the Id. CIT(A) in the case of the ass essee during original assessment proceedings and the same was allowed to the assessee. Hence, this being an unabated assessment year, in any case the AO did not have jurisdiction to revisit the issue when it was not based on any incriminating material found during the course of search as held in the multiple judicial decisions referred to previously while adjudicating previous grounds of appeal. Ground No.4 for Assessment Year 201112 is accordingly Allowed.
8.3.9. So far as this issue is concerned, facts of the case related to AY 2012-13 and AY 2013-14 are identical to the facts for AY 2011-12 and accordingly the Ground No. 4 for Assessment Year 2012-1 3 and Ground No. 3 for Assessment Year 2013-14 are also allowed.
16. Moreover, this issue has already been decided in favour of the assessee trust for A.Y. 2011-12, 2012-13 & 2013-14 in the completed assessment framed under section 143(3) of the Act. Again it is a settled principle of law that in case of completed assessment framed under section 143(3) of the Act it cannot be disturbed by the AO by framing assessment under section 153A/153C of the Act unless incriminating material qua the issue in question has been unearthed during the search operation. Undisputedly, no such incriminating material has come on record.
17. Moreover, the Revenue has raised this issue just to generate unnecessary litigation on the pretext that since Department has not accepted the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Subros Educational Society in M.P. No.941/2018 in CA 5171/2016 as the Department has already filed a review petition vide diary No.20745/202, the outcome of which has not been brought on record by the Ld. D.R. during the course of argument, which is not permissible under law.
18. So in view of what has been discussed above, the Ld. CIT(A) has validly and legally decided this issue in favour of the assessee by relying upon the decision rendered by the Tribunal, Hon’ble Bombay High Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hence, ground No.3 & 4 of appeal Nos.1033, 1034 & 1035/M/2021 are also determined against the Revenue.
19. In view of what has been discussed above, aforesaid appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed.
10. Since the Ld. CIT-DR could not point out any change in fact and or law and, since we find the facts to be similar and no change in law, we respectfully following the ratio of the Co-ordinate Bench decision on this issue in assessee’s sister trust case DCIT vs Dr. DY Patil Educational Academy (supra); and further we find that there was no incriminating material found during search qua assessee qua this issue qua the relevant AYs, the AO ought not to have disturbed the assessment for the relevant year as held by the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Continental Ware housing Ltd. Vs. DCIT (supra) as well as relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case CIT Vs. Kabul Chawla (supra) and other judicial precedents on this issue, we confirm the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) and dismiss the revenue appeal.
11. Coming to the ITA. No.2119/Mum/2021 (A.Y.2012-13), we find that the sole ground raised is identical to the ground nos. 1 to 3 in ITA. No. 21 18/Mum/2021 for A.Y.201 1-12 and in the light of our decision confirming the action of the Ld. CIT(A) on this issue, we dismiss the grounds raised by the revenue. In the result, both the appeals of the revenue stands dismissed.
12. In the result, the appeals filed by the revenue are dismissed.
Order pronounced in the open court on 20/07/2022
